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Economist Joseph Schumpeter’s examination into the relationships between
business cycles and periods of economic expansion defines the government’s role in
markets as limited. However, he viewed government intervention as a precursor to
improving the levels of economic growth and expanding an individual’s quality of life.
This study examines how measures of business and political climate might explain
variations in the level of economic growth and development across the states.
Economic growth is gauged from the microeconomic perspective of the individual
(per capita income) and from the macroeconomic viewpoint of the state’s economy (gross
state product). Economic development is defined by changes in a quality of life index.
The state’s political climate has a component of ideology, measured as state tax burden
and by an index that compares the ratio of public to private sector employment and a
component that captures the capacity of a state to manage the affairs of government.
The ability of these non-economic, political variables to predict changes in levels
of economic growth and development is compared to the explanatory power from six
i

indices of a state’s business climate. While the institutions that publish these indices
claim to have identified the socio-economic variables responsible for defining economic
growth across the American states, none have identified how the richness of a state’s
political climate might influence its level of economic growth or economic development.
Each variable is defined in a lagged regression model and used to predict growth
and development. The findings show that the ratio of public to private sector employment
is the most reliable indicator of changes occurring across both measures of economic
growth. While some of the measures of a state’s business climate were superior indicators
of changes in per capita income, they fell short of predicting changes in GSP. None of the
indicators used in this study were able to predict changes in economic development. The
findings highlight how states with a high quality of life enjoy higher levels of economic
growth. These same states exhibit higher tax burdens and possess smaller governments. It
appears that lowering taxes is not a panacea for increasing economic growth and
improving the quality of life.
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CHAPTER 1: BUSINESS CLIMATE, POLITICAL CLIMATE AND ECONOMIC
GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT
Introduction
Today it is all too common to hear the media express concerns over how
government policies impact individual freedoms and weaken the integrity of a free
market system. Many academic studies agree and cite higher taxes and larger
governments as major impediments to economic growth. So it is not surprising to find
that across the nation, economists and policy analysts are actively engaged in a search to
identify and measure the variables that can help explain the variation in the levels of
economic growth observed across the American states. The difficulty in deciphering
which variables cause growth begins with the definition of economic growth as opposed
to economic development, the definition of business climate and the effect that political
climate has over levels of growth and development.
The challenges of segregating the variables that cause growth from those that
represent the effects of growth have popularized efforts to meld these variables into a
single index. Today several national and regional institutions publish an index that
purports to have identified the variables responsible for variations in the levels of
economic growth across the American states. While the titles under which these indices
are reported vary widely, each claims to having captured the essence of the state’s
capacity or its potential for economic growth. This capacity is frequently referred to as
the state’s business climate.
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While each of these indices capture the factors commonly used to assess the cost
of doing business within a state, none acknowledge how the richness that defines a state’s
political climate influences its level of economic growth or its level of development. This
study examines whether business climate indices can predict the levels of economic
growth and economic development. These results are compared to how the non-economic
factors used to measure a state’s political ideology and its capacity to manage the affairs
of government influence the levels of economic growth and economic development.
The Utility of Business Climate Indices
Today there is very little research examining the claim that adjusting policy in
response to an index of business climate leads to a corresponding change in the patterns
of economic growth experienced by a state. Yet this lack of research has not stopped
states from adopting measures of business climate as one of their benchmarks for
formulating economic policy.
The debate over the value that should be assigned to a business climate index has
led some investigators to criticize the way that the terms themselves are used in these
reports. The lack of uniformity in the way some of the terms are defined has evolved into
tacit disagreements over the methods used for collecting and analyzing these data (CEFD,
2006; MERI, 2005, and Rooks, 2006). This disagreement has been fueled by a recent
study that reveals how the definition of the indicators, the selection of measures, and the
methods employed to determine the criteria for assigning weightings to the measures
have all been heavily influenced by how well they fit the ideological underpinnings of the
entity publishing the report (Fisher, 2005). Deller (2004) goes so far as to suggest that
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these biases undermine the quantitative value that can be ascribed to any of these
measures.
As the author of the Economic Policy Institute (EPI) study, Fisher (2005)
considers such inconsistencies validation that each index is actually measuring something
different. He highlights these inconsistencies by questioning how the Beacon Hill
Competitiveness Report (BHI) can rank Massachusetts as the most competitive state, yet
the Small Business Survival Index (SBSI) ranks it 41st. Likewise, he wonders how the
BHI can consider Mississippi to be the least competitive place in the nation, yet the SBSI
ranks it as the seventh best place for small businesses. Finally, the business climate
assessment made by the Pacific Research Institute (PRI) portrays Kansas with the highest
level of something it calls economic freedom, a measure they use to gauge the level of
free-market innovation, yet the SBSI ranks it 31st (Fisher, 2005).
Fisher’s (2005) critiques are based on the suggestion that because each index
purports to be measuring “something of critical importance to a state’s economic future
and its potential for growth”, they should certainly converge around a simple ranking
(pp.72-73). It is from within that context that Fisher makes his most stinging indictment
and cautions lawmakers against using these rankings as benchmarks for formulating
policies. He concedes that while some indices may offer utility in guiding a specific
dimension of policy, none can claim having established a universal framework suited to
defining how a shift in policy increases levels of economic growth. Yet, in spite of these
warnings, one finds numerous references where public officials and state agencies cite
their desire to improve their performance in one or more of these indices as justification
for arguing for a change in policy (MDF, 2003), (wwwcfed.org/go/scorecard).
3

Works by Dye (1980) and those of Holt and Turner (1996) expose the Achilles
heel for adopting measures of business climate as a benchmark for altering policy. In
their work, The Political Basis of Economic Development, Holt and Turner (1996)
examine how political environments drive the conditions that increase levels of economic
growth. Dye (1980) offers insights into how differences within state policies contribute
to the differential in the growth observed amongst the states. These works provided the
impetus for comparing how a state’s business climate and its political climate might be
used to explain changes in the levels of economic growth and economic development.
Before answering the basic question of their utility, the measures of business
climate must be placed into context. The utility assigned to measures of business climate
are portrayed within the constructs of a regression model. These models tout how a
change in the index will translate into a change in the economic performance of a state.
However, the variables used to construct the indices contain measures derived from both
economic and non-economic sources.
Purpose of this Study
This brings us to the central questions posed by this investigation: how can one
assess the utility of a business climate index without first considering whether the
political climate of the state expresses a willingness to change, and whether the state
exhibits the capacity to produce the type of changes necessary to establish a new level of
economic growth?
This investigation tests the hypothesis that variations in a state’s political climate,
defined from measures that gauge both its capacity to manage the affairs of government
and its political ideology, influence the level of economic growth and economic
4

development in the American states. It places the Schumpeterian (1934) notion on the
causes of growth into an analytical framework to decipher whether a state’s approach to
adopting programs, policies, and laws has influenced its level of growth or level of
development.
This is accomplished by testing the relationship that measures of a state’s business
climate and measures of its political climate have to changes in measures of economic
growth and economic development. The analysis proceeds along in two distinct stages:
(1) to examine a gap in the literature, two decades of data are collected that reveal how a
state’s prevailing political ideology and its capacity to manage governmental affairs may
have contributed to the levels of economic growth or economic development within that
jurisdiction, and (2) tests are conducted to define how a measure of a state’s political or
business climate influence levels of economic growth and development when the level of
economic development is high and when the level of economic development is low.
While it is easy to understand how the conceptual definitions of the terms
economic growth and economic development came to be used interchangeably, the
operational definitions adopted by this investigation rely on two very distinct sets of
measures. Economic growth is measured by quantifiable changes in the level of per
capita income and by the year over year change in gross state product (GSP). Economic
development is gauged by measuring the change in a composite of social indicators that
define the quality of life within each state. The basis for these definitions is explored in
the literature review.
Based on the review of the literature, discussed in the next section, we assert that
assessing the influence that a state’s political climate has on its economic growth and
5

development is the first step in constructing objective, non-partisan comparisons of a
state’s economic performance.
Reason for the Dissertation
The literature reveals a gap in efforts to quantify the relationship between political
climate, measures of economic growth, and those of economic development. The
literature also highlights how past attempts to improve economic growth while
simultaneously seeking to improve an individual’s quality-of-life (QOL) have produced
mixed results. Nowhere are these contradictions more apparent than in the work of
Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh (2003). These authors reveal how increasing levels of
investments in education failed to sustain the momentum of growth that was underway in
the technology sector. The literature review expands upon this topic and highlights how
states vary in their ability to spawn the type of policy deemed critical to actively
participating in this new global economy. While investigators continue to diagnose the
causes for these failures, the absence of an objective, analytical framework suited to
explaining the influence that a state’s political climate has on its pattern of economic
growth and economic development remains a gap in the research.
A review of published dissertations failed to uncover an investigation that
examined the relationship between measures of a state’s business climate, its political
climate, and the level of economic growth and development occurring within that
jurisdiction. While Michael Porter’s (1998, 2000) seminal works describe how
governmental support of economic clusters influences levels of economic growth, he did
not delve into the interrelationships between a state’s political climate, its business
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climate, and the incidents of economic growth and development observed across a range
of states.
Determining the influence that political climate has on the dimensions of
economic growth and economic development updates the contemporary theories that
suggest variations in economic growth are related to changes in the quantity, quality or
access to human capital, financial capital, and natural resources. While each of these
factors contribute to the growth and expansion of a traditional economy, we posit that
these measures have less influence over the levels of growth and expansion occurring in
the emerging new or knowledge-based economies (KBE).
Finally, testing the impact of political climate separate from those of its business
climate will help arbitrate the debate over whether a specific published index of a state’s
business climate should be adopted as a benchmark to alter policy in ways that many
believe help create higher levels of economic growth.
Contribution to the Body of Knowledge
Over the past two decades policy analysts have attempted to quantify how
government intervention in free markets influences the level of economic growth in
nation-states. Investigations into the influence that the economic actions of government
actions have over levels of growth continue to be scrutinized (Powell, 2003). Levels of
taxation, policies of expenditures and the nature of the regulatory environment are the
main subjects for these investigations. In their attempts to expose the underlying cause
for variations in the levels of growth in developed economies investigators have begun to
reexamine the empirical models that have been the mainstay of growth theory (Malizia
and Feser, 1999). Those findings highlight how changes in the interrelationships amongst
7

the factors of production, land, labor, capital, and resource availability have altered the
character of growth in the 21st century.
Within the field of development economics a consensus is emerging that the cost
of admission into the new, knowledge-based economy (KBE) requires abandoning the
politically expedient remedies that focus on resuscitating vestiges of the old economy.
This shift in emphasis needs to be accompanied by the recognition that moving public
investments into programs that improve the social and physical infrastructures will help
sustain and attract the educated workforce of the future. The management skills needed to
effectively allocate public resources between the competing needs of improving the
quality of life for constituents and investing to improve the infrastructure for future
growth are not evenly distributed across the governments that operate the states (Syracuse,
2001).
As investigators explore ways to quantify the costs and define the benefits of
shifting the portfolio of public investments, they have unearthed a series of low-cost
measures that help spawn initiatives in entrepreneurship and technical innovation. These
include investing in programs that improve the quality of place and the quality of life.
Initiatives in each of these areas have had positive impacts on the rate of entrepreneurship
and on the rate of economic growth. Kreft (2003) considers initiatives that increase the
levels of entrepreneurship as a way for states to accelerate future growth while
simultaneously producing a revenue stream that can fund the programs that elevate the
quality of life for its constituents. The discovery of a plausible cause-and-effect
relationship between growth and quality of life has sparked a renaissance to analyze how
the policy instruments known to promote individual well-being might be modified to
8

improve levels of economic growth and development. It is through this lens that
investigators have begun examining the interrelationships between quality of life, quality
of place, and the government’s role in creating economic growth and economic
development within a state (Brookings, 2006).
Daly (1994), a pioneer in the movement to define conditions of economic
sustainability, judges sustainability by how well the body politic endorses policies that
improve the well-being of individuals. These include such qualitative measures as access
to open spaces, levels of happiness, and the capacity to convey this atmosphere of
happiness to future generations. Several investigations have defined this notion of wellbeing as a change in an individual’s quality of life (QOL). A series of quantitative
measures attributed to the QOL in each state are adopted by this study as the proxy for
defining changes in the conditions of economic development.
Quantifying the relationships between a state’s business climate, its political
climate, and the occurrence of economic growth and economic development is an
essential step in deciphering whether the policy environment in a state supports the
conditions of economic growth and economic development, or whether it remains locked
in a quagmire of economic stasis.

9

Research Questions
This study seeks answers to the following questions:
1. Can the indicators of a state’s political climate, defined as its political
ideology and its capacity to manage the affairs of government, improve
our ability to explain variations in economic growth as well as those of
economic development?
2. Can the index of a state’s business climate explain variations in the levels
of economic growth and development observed across the American
states?

10

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
Public Policy in Market Based Economies
Understanding the factors that affect economic growth and development in the
states requires an appreciation of the basic economic theories that define the nature of
interactions between markets and governments. According to Gramlich (1981),
government’s intervention in a market economy is based on any of three primary
objectives: (1) improving economic efficiency, often through policies that seek to alter
the parameters of market pricing and thus influence the allocation of resources; (2)
redistributing incomes within a society so as to restore or achieve distributive equity; or
(3) stabilizing prices, employment, and factors that contribute to output so that the rate of
economic activity is controlled.
In most instances, the form of a government’s intervention is shaped by the
behaviors emanating from within specific segments of the market. In markets
characterized by the production of private goods these behaviors are fairly predictable.
Efforts by most producers are directed at designing and implementing strategies that help
maximize profits. These producers execute this strategy in a manner that balances
economic risk against a degree of economic certainty. So it is reasonable to expect that
they will play by a set of rules where price is used to efficiently allocate resources,
equitably distribute incomes, and temper the pace of demand. Of course each of these
conditions represents a cornerstone of neoclassic economic theory.
There are occasions when the efficiency of this system comes into question.
During such times there is usually a social or economic problem attached to the way
markets have either over- or under-allocated resources. Under those conditions there is
11

the expectation that governments will intervene and craft policies that cause the
producers to absorb spillover costs or stimulate an expansion of outputs to increase the
benefits.
Policies designed to repress the impact of a market failure, or what economists
refer to as an act taken to redress a negative externality, seek to restore equilibrium by
assessing an incremental cost to the producer. These costs take the form of legislative
mandates, regulatory policies, or various forms of taxation. In each case, the intent is the
same: insure that the producer absorbs the social costs associated with the production of
the private good.
Likewise, whenever private markets produce spillover benefits, governments can
use subsidies as a way to encourage higher levels of output. Intervention of this type
helps drive the market to new, higher equilibrium point. In instances of under allocation
the objective of the remedy is always the same: encourage an increase in the level of
outputs.
Throughout the literature there is near universal agreement of an inverse
relationship between economic growth and a government’s intervention in the economy.
Higgins, Levy, and Young (2003) logged over 3000 county based observations and
concluded there was a strong negative correlation between the extent to which the public
sector was represented, be it federal, state, or state government, and the conditions they
used to measure economic growth. When Karabegovic and McMahon (2005) examined
the influence that government intervention had on conditions of economic growth across
the U.S. they were able to associate increasing levels of government intervention with a
reduction in something they referred to as the economic freedom of the individual. They
12

determined that a reduction in economic freedom produced a negative impact on growth
in per capita incomes.
Consistent with the findings of Karabegovic and McMahon (2005), Powell (2003)
determined that a reduction in government intervention increased the economic freedom
enjoyed by individuals: in this case for citizens in the country of Ireland. Like
Karabegovic and McMahon, Powell was successful in assigning significance to the way
that a change in the level of economic freedom impacted levels of economic growth.
Since market-based systems account for nearly 80% of the economy’s output it is
imperative that we understand the influence that government intervention plays in
shaping a state’s potential for improving its prospects for growth. Attempts to quantify
these relationships have led economists and policy analysts to craft a series of economic
and non-economic measures into an index that purports to measure a state’s capacity for
growth. Today, indices of this type are published by a variety of institutions and are most
frequently referred to as a measure of the state’s business climate. The subject of business
climate is explored in a later section of this literature review.
Economic Growth
All too often the words economic development and economic growth are used
interchangeably. Since many economists tend to define the term economic development
as more economic growth, it is common to find the theories that define how economies
expand expressing these changes as changes in levels of economic development. Even
today we find several government and non-government agencies explaining changes in
their measures of growth in terms that seem better suited to defining the conditions
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responsible for producing the change. In some cases we even find government agencies
defining economic change as a change in economic development (EDA, 2004).
For Friedman (1962) and other neo-classical economists, economic growth is
defined by quantifying changes in output or changes in the levels of per capita income.
At this point it is important to acknowledge that regardless of the potential contradictions
within the lexicon, there are no contradictions with the findings that all who view growth
through the lens of neoclassic theory share a common belief that markets, not
governments, should provide the incentives leading to more growth. The neoclassic view
of the relationship between markets and governments allows that group to stipulate
measures of growth as the changes that occur at the macro level of a state or nation’s
economy and as changes occurring within the micro economy as measured at the level of
the individual. In this section, we examine the logic behind our intent to measure and test
the effects that political and business climate have over growth measured both ways.
While Rodrik (2004) is quick to critique the neoclassicists approach to defining
and measuring measure economic growth, those methods continue to dominate the
literature. As a result, contemporary thought on ways to measure economic growth
continue to support the notion that economic growth or improvements in the economy
should be assessed from changes in output measures such as gross domestic product,
(GDP) or per capita income (PCI).
That approach is supported by Vaughn and Bearse’s (1981) suggestion that
economic growth be defined by changes in output or changes that affect the scale of an
economy. In acknowledging how these measures might slow improvements in the human
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condition, these authors suggest amending the neoclassic model so it captures measures
that define levels of investment and patterns of personal consumption.
In almost every instance the literature determines economic performance from the
measures that support the policy agenda of the neoclassicists. This has resulted in the
development of benchmarks that encourage markets to expand in ways that allow
individuals to maximize the satisfaction of their preferences. So it is not surprising to find
many economists endorsing the findings from publications of business climate indices
that extol the virtues of free market policies. In several cases their basis for assessing the
efficiency of these policies are captured in the economic construct that touts using
traditional cost-benefit analysis (CBA) as the tool for evaluating effectiveness. Naturally
within the field of growth economics the adoption of CBA has many critics. Most of the
concerns over the use of this tool center around the methods used to define social costs
and the way the discount schedule is defined. In each case the underlying issue is whether
CBA is an appropriate tool for assessing the loss of an intangible or aesthetic element
such as those found in the natural environment.
While economists and others that might consider themselves part of a school of
economic growth concede the notion that government’s role is to intervene to correct the
inefficiencies arising out of market failures, they are just as quick to assert that when a
policy adheres to their definition of efficient allocations, measured by maximizing the
ability of the individual to exercise free choice over a range of preferences, the incidences
of such failures are minimized.
Even if scholars can agree on the proper definition and measure of economic
growth there is not a consensus about how it occurs or why the benefits of growth usually
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end up being so unevenly distributed. Even the most ardent proponents of neoclassical
theory accept that the outcome from a cycle of economic growth will always convey
gains to some and losses to others. In her attempts to explain this conundrum Blanke
(2003, p.1) points out that while there is nothing more important to the welfare of the
citizens in a state than the growth and stability of its economy, the determinants of what
defines growth remains one of the “greatest mysteries” of economics.
Blanke’s (2003) review of the historical record unveiled the research that has been
undertaken to define the conditions that enhance or impede economic growth. She traces
the origins of these investigations to Malthus. Malthus’19th century work was the first to
connect the limit on economic growth to the limits of the fixed resources found in the
natural environment. By the early 20th century the limits to growth were being redefined
by a region’s capacity to invest in physical capital and infrastructure. Later these findings
were supplemented with Schumpeter’s (1934) suggestion that growth was the outcome of
a cycle in which private enterprise destroyed and then recreated markets. In accordance
with his theory, the limitation to growth is based upon the extent to which free markets
perpetuate a cycle of continual renewal. By the middle of the 20th century Solow (1991)
countered the Schumpeterian notions of growth derived endogenously and began to
depict growth as the outcome of exogenous technical change. In spite of Solow’s
suggestions that growth results from exogenous change, most investigators today suspect
that the rapid pace of structural realignment currently underway in the marketplace
results from a mix of both factors. This has reignited investigations to understand how the
endogenous conditions unique to local markets may be influencing economic growth.
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Increasingly the conditions thought to influence growth are being viewed as a
combination of economic and non-economic forces.
Schumpeter (1934) was among the first to uncover the role that endogenous
change plays in defining growth. Schumpeter (1934) suggested that internal forces such
as the quality and quantity of human capital, the presence of labor exchanges, and the
type and level of reinvestments made to establish or preserve market share were among
those responsible for driving the type of change he observed in an economy, a change he
characterized as a cycle of “creative destruction”. While his seminal work was titled The
Theory of Economic Development, he was, in fact, outlining his theory of economic
growth. Today, investigators have focused their attention on understanding how
investments in human capital, especially those that help create and diffuse knowledge,
influence levels of economic growth.
While research into this nascent field of growth economics continues to advance
our understanding of the mechanisms responsible for creating growth, at present nobody
has devised a unified theory capable of fully explaining or predicting periods of growth,
stagnation, or any of the many transitions that occur between these states of nature. In
testimony to that statement we turn to the work by North and Thomas (1973) and Hoff
(2001). Each of these authors suggests that while the models explaining economic growth
have provided insights into the variables that might be causing growth to occur, they
consider measuring factors such as innovation, education, and capital accumulations as
circular reasoning, as these are “… not the cause of growth but, in fact, are growth”
(North and Thomas,1973, p.2). Rodrik (2004), and Hoff and Stiglitz (2001) posit that
changes in economic growth might be better explained by examining the differences
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within or across institutional settings. North defines such institutions as: “ ….the rules of
the game in a society, or more formally, [they are] the humanly devised constraints that
shape human interaction” (p.3). It seems clear that these authors are referring to an
ecosystem of factors which we explore and characterize as the political climate of a state.
Of course the uncertainty in establishing the underlying cause for changes in the
frequency and durations that define Schumpeter’s cycles of growth has a direct impact on
the way policy should be structured and how it should be measured. If indeed a goal of
government is to facilitate the cycles of growth generated by the private sector while
monitoring market conditions and intervening to minimize the generation of negative
externalities, then the obvious cannot be left unstated: if we do not know which variables
are responsible for causing changes in these cycles and we do not know how to
objectively measure the impact of these variables then it is easy to understand how we
have reached a point where nearly all government policies are judged efficient! As a
result of this uncertainty, policy makers are left without a tool that can help explain how a
small change in the dimension of one policy might influence levels of economic
prosperity. The real concern is how this limitation may be preventing lawmakers from
devising strategies that will prepare their constituencies to adapt to the rapidly changing
conditions that characterize participating in a global economy.
Rodrik (2004) suggests that resolving this issue goes well beyond the need to
simply differentiate the measures that cause change from those responsible for its effect.
He concedes that while the neoclassic models offer a limited tool set from which to
evolve policies of growth, their limitations in shaping policies that can sustain growth
should be the focus of concern. Here we find him making a direct reference in support of
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defining conditions of economic growth separate from those of economic development.
Rodrik (2004) uses his description of the complexities inherent in any attempt to establish
policies of sustainable growth to make his case for interjecting governments into markets.
Rodrik’s call for government reforms echoes Porter’s (1998) findings. Porter (1998)
recommends governments develop policies that show preference to distinct industrial
sectors, something he refers to as clusters. He considers government’s development of
these economic strategies a precursor to sustaining growth. Like Porter, Rodrik (2004)
relates our collective failure to converge around an improved economic scenario to
variations in the way these governmental institutions are arranged and on the differences
he observed in the social preferences expressed by certain cultures. In highlighting the
role that these non-economic forces, particularly political forces, play in defining growth,
Hoff and Stiglitz (2001) and Rodrik (2004) felt that none of the works examined in their
review of the literature produced a thorough understanding of how political processes
interact with the economic forces in ways that drive growth in markets. While the
authors confirmed that the body of literature continues to view government’s intervention
in markets as a detriment to economic growth, they felt more was at work here than
simply the size of government or a set of policies that expressed a willingness to
intervene. These authors seemed to be making a circuitous reference to our inability to
understand the dynamics that take place when political cycles and business cycles change.
Economic Development
If proponents of economic growth tend to be dominated by economists then the
proponents of economic development are dominated by planners and politicians. It is
therefore critical to understand the differences between the way an economist defines a
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policy to be efficient and the way a politician would make that claim. The variation in the
way each of these groups defines economic efficiency tells the story of how investigators
have approached analyzing the influence that politics have on levels of economic
development and economic growth within the jurisdiction of a state.
The political culture of a state has a large influence over the nature of planning
and the implementation of its economic policy (Wiewel, Tietz and Giloth, 1993). At each
step in that “policy process”, state and local planners must confront the conflicts that
arise from a desire to create change that is (1) acceptable, (2) necessary, and (3) retains or
enhances political capital (Dye, 2002, 14.). As a result of their interaction with political
forces: citizens, interest groups and bureaucratic agencies, state planners are often
relegated to defining efficiency as the successful outcome of a political process. Naturally
defining efficiency from such qualitative methods is seen by others as a denial of
everything that is right with the neoclassic theory: market based equilibrium and
efficiency defined from cost-benefit-analysis. Given the differences in the backgrounds
and viewpoints of planners and economists it is easy to understand why investigators
have struggled to quantify the influence that the non-economic forces associated with a
state’s political environment have over its economic growth (or development). One
reason for this struggle is the many different ways that past studies have approached the
definition of a state’s political environment. The other reason is based on the varying
approaches to defining efficiency: can this be an efficient outcome if the process used to
quantify the gains understates the social cost? The inability to resolve these two issues led
Weiwel, Tietz, and Giloth (1993) to conclude that the adoption of a broadly accepted
theory of community development ... “ is a long way off.” (p.95). It does not require a
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leap of faith to extrapolate this statement to include state based economic development.
In one of the more insightful articles on this subject, Howland (1993) sheds some further
light on the reasons these two points of view seem so convoluted: they reflect a
misapplication of the neoclassic theory. She finds the criterion that markets remain selfcorrecting does not apply when the economy of a state or region is small. She suggests
that a market’s resiliency and its capacity to be self-correcting are only observed when
the economic structures are highly diverse. This would suggest that to the extent a state’s
economy is less diverse it is simply less able to comply with the theoretical guidelines of
the neoclassic model. It appears that under those conditions politics step in to fill the gap.
So while economists tend to extract their theories of economic growth by looking at ways
to optimize economic systems that operate at a large scale, state planners and politicians
are forced to examine the issue of growth while addressing a set of conflicts that are very
local. Naturally, the planners and politicians resolve these conflicts with the tools at hand:
the political processes. These variations in the perspectives held by economists and
planners suggest how the investigations into economic growth and economic
development in a state have emerged. When the literature discusses economic
development in the context of the political environment of a state it approaches the issues
from the vantage point of either the politician or the economist but rarely both. This
explanation should also shed some light on the conflict that arises between economists
that believe they know how something should be done and politicians that must settle for
an implementation that is feasible.
Turning back for a moment to economic development, Vaughan and Bearse
(1981) were among the first to overtly suggest that economic growth is something
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different, and certainly not the same thing as economic development. While they suggest
that changes in economic growth should continue to be based upon the type of
quantitative measures that gauge changes in economic output, the measures of economic
development should rely on qualitative measures of the type used to gauge structural
changes within the economy: innovations in institutions, behavioral changes, and the
adoption and development of technology.
Unlike neoclassic economists, planners, most politicians, and the other proponents
of economic development view the neoclassic model through a lens that portrays the
landscape locally, in a state, across a region, or within a tightly-defined locality. This
observation is supported by the way the Economic Development Administration (EDA)
elects to define economic development: as a set of actions that enhance the productive
capacity of land, labor, capital, and technology of a national, state or local economy
(EDA, 2004). Since most economists agree that the policies that lower investment costs
or provide tax incentives can improve a firm’s productive capacity, the definition from
EDA underscores the role that states’ governments play in creating conditions favorable
to improving levels of economic development.
Blakely and Bradshaw (2002) make the case that the term economic development
is simply not amenable to being defined by a strict economic model. These authors make
it clear that economic development should not be considered part of a unified strategy
that defines economic growth. Blakely and Bradshaw (2002) define the term in the
context of a ‘movement’. This allows them to avoid the dilemma of having to create a
unified theory capable of connecting elements of economic growth with those of
economic development. This seems an endorsement of the opinion rendered by Weiwel,
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Tietz, and Giloth (1993) that sees the ability to define such a theory a long way off.
Blakely and Bradshaw ( 2002) defend their definition of economic development as a
movement by claiming that all of the prevailing theoretical models that describe regional
or local economic development rely on the following, general equation:
Local and Regional Development = c X r,
where ‘c’ equals the economic, social, technological and political capacity of a region,
and ‘r’ equals its resources: natural resource availability, location, labor, capital
investment, entrepreneurial climate, transportation, communication, industrial
composition, technology, size, export market, international economic situation, and
national and state government spending. Comparing this definition against that put forth
by proponents of the neoclassic theory highlights how much the definition of economic
growth expands when it includes aspects that some suggest represent economic
development. As we will see later, many of the institutions publishing an index of a
state’s business climate have used this expanded definition as a way to justify
incorporating more variables into their measures.
Throughout the literature one comes away with the sense that underlying all these
attempts to define the term economic development, is an acute awareness of the need to
have a measure that captures the dynamics of an economy. Principally these measures,
like those proposed by Vaughn and Bearse (1981), seek to define the impact from
changes that result from the loss of some industries and the changes that societies must
undergo as they create space for emerging markets. Today this transformation is being
played out as a decline in traditional manufacturing and a social system struggling with
how to absorb and participate in the new, knowledge-based economy (KBE). The impact
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of this socio-economic transition has rekindled our interest in developing a better
understanding of the contribution that human capital and technology makes towards
achieving economic progress that can be judged sustainable.
In attempts to address the question of how to capture the dynamic nature of
markets, several of the institutions measuring business climate have added indicators to
capture levels of innovative capacity. So while the publishers of business climate indices
capture these measures as a way to gauge changes in the level of economic growth, their
adoption of these measures is more apt to align with measures of economic development.
This opinion is consistent with that of Vaughn and Bearse (1981). They expect the
measure of economic development to be defined as a structural change within the basic
composition and mix of an economy. The real issue is that most indices do not distribute
or otherwise differentiate their measures across these two states of nature, growth and
development. This surfaces the concern over whether they are measuring growth,
development, or both. This matter is explored in a later section.
The need to prepare society to adapt to these shifting economic conditions has not
escaped Daly (1994). Once again he leverages the market failure argument to highlight
how the effort to formulate policies that adjust GDP, and by inference the GSP, masks
our ability to assess whether members of a society posses the capacity to adapt and
confront the changes underway in an economy. In deference to suggesting that economic
progress continue to be defined from measures used to track changes in the quantifiable
measures of output, Daly seeks to alter our definition of progress. He believes the best
way to judge progress is to determine whether a society is improving its capacity to
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support the constructs of intergenerational equity. This important subject is discussed in
more detail later in this review.
Malizia and Feser’s (1999) summary of the major theories of development serve
as a testimony to Blakely’s (2002) claim that all the economic development theories can
be explained by the short form:
Local and Regional Development = c X r.
An overview of the theories that Malizia and Feser (1999) reviewed appear in
Appendix A. A quick review of the works outlined in that table highlights how the
lexicon has contributed to the proliferation of conflicting definitions. However, a closer
examination reveals that all of these theories have focused on a single goal: capturing the
more dynamic state of economic development.
While each of the theories of economic development discussed by Malizia and
Feser (1999) demonstrate an ability to respond to shifts in the economy, each adopts a
slightly different set of dynamics to explain the forces driving economic development.
Malizia and Fraser (1999) point out that if one accepts the notion that the goal of
development is structural reform then the following theories of economic development
would be relevant: the Growth-Pole Theory which views the nurturing of fast moving ,
gazelle type industries as its primary source of structural change; the Entrepreneurship
Theory which supports restructuring the economy around innovative processes, which in
turn sponsors different modes of inter-sectional connectivity; the Product Cycle Theory,
which is closely aligned with strategies to create knowledge and spawn its diffusion; and
finally the Flexible Specification Theory, which highlights Porter’s (1998) notion of
attaching economic value to creating and supporting highly agile industrial clusters.
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Alternatively, evolving a strategy of economic development from within the
constructs of the Economic Base Theory, the Staple Theory, the Regional Concentration
and Diffusion Theory, or the Interregional Trade Theory will increase government’s
intervention in an economy. But even those theories that endorse increasing the levels of
intervention fail to explain how following the politically expedient strategy of supporting
traditional industries and traditional forms of employment encumbers the development of
human capital in ways that would support a new era of economic progress.
Once again, we find Daly (1996) offering to solve this conundrum: society needs
to shift to his definition of progress. His proposal is to replace the current vision of
progress, measured by quantitative expansion, something we adopt as our operational
definition of economic growth, with measures that define the attainment of goals that
center on improving the quality of life, our choice for operationally defining economic
development. He submits that the most efficient method for realizing these goals is to
replace the extreme individualism of the Homo economicus, currently seated at the center
of neoclassic economic theory, with an individual focused on both a real and abstract
group of others that reside within their community. His support of a communitarian ethic
as the vehicle for achieving sustainability melds quite nicely with his rationale for
equating sustainability with measures of intergenerational equity. Likewise, the moral
claims attached to intergenerational equity provide him with sufficient justification for
measuring progress along a vector that is normally used to gauge the quality of life
(QOL). In Daly’s (1996) case, he wants to insure that the QOL measures taken in the
present reflect a set of conditions that individuals can be expected to experience in the
future.
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By defining sustainability from qualitative, QOL measures, Daly (1996) and
others from the school of development (Milbrath, 1989), can argue that policies focused
on achieving economic growth will always have a negative impact on society’s obligation
to future generations. Of course, the willingness to frame a social system around Daly’s
definition of economic development is totally dependent upon society’s worldview of
how individuals should relate to the physical environment.
Those possessing the world view of an environmentalist retain an anthropocentric
construct and thus limit their considerations of intergenerational equity to the impact that
decisions might have on the quality of life for a future generation of humans. This
contrasts with the views held by social and deep ecologists, both of which posit that
intergenerational equity is a right to be bestowed upon all sentient beings. Social
ecologists expect humans to use their labyrinth of social systems to create a safety net
able to protect the ecosystem. Those possessing the worldview of deep ecologists lean on
the tenets of the precautionary principle and abstain from interfering with nature; do
nothing lest it create an unknown harm, now or in the future (Laverty, 2003).
Compared with Daly, Milbrath (1989) is seen to take a more moderate approach
to governments’ role in markets. He suggests that markets are effective and efficient
methods for allocating goods and services and that they produce conditions that stimulate
social learning. The following summary stipulates the limited role he sees markets
playing in support of economic development (p 27):
•

Markets are unable to anticipate and plan for the future;

•

Markets while not inherently unjust cannot correct injustice;

•

Markets fail to protect us from dangerous externalities;
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•

Markets undervalue nature;

•

Markets fail to provide for public goods, and;

•

Markets cannot restrain our growth or provide quality of life in a society
that is overcrowded and experiencing shortages.

Milbrath contends that society needs to depend on governments to correct the
problems and supplement the deficiencies inherent in market-based economies. His
rationale for government intervention is quite simple: he believes that as individuals, our
normal reaction to the negative externalities generated by policies to increase levels of
growth is to ignore them. This behavioral-based hypothesis leads Milbrath to conclude
that governments have a legitimate purpose to intervene in ways that will temper the
impact of market failures. While others have hinted at the presence of an appropriate
condition for intervention, Milbrath appears to consider the dimension of time, early
intervention, approaching preemption, as the only viable method for slowing down a
cycle of growth. While his suggestion for preemption stems from a desire to give the
political and economic systems time to reflect and redefine the equilibrium point between
increasing rates of growth and achieving a predefined quality of life, the neoclassic
economist would certainly argue in favor of other methods. What is intriguing here is
Milbrath’s suggestion that there is a time interval or some trigger point when
governments need to intervene in markets. The argument both for and against
government intervention in markets finds consensus around the idea that government
intervention is legitimate if it is focused on persevering or restoring the quality of life for
members of its society. So there is little disagreement with the suggestion that this point
of intervention should be triggered by the need to preserve an individual’s quality of life.
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The contention arises in how to determine the level of deterioration that warrants
intervention. Similarly there is need to define the type of intervention needed to restore
equilibrium. The measures used to infer the level of government intervention in statebased economies is captured in this study by the measure of a state’s political ideology.
The selection and treatment of the variables used to create this measure are explored in
the methods section of this review.
It is also interesting to note that many of Milbrath’s observations mirror those
identified by Schumpeter (1934). In his treatise, Schumpeter states that the
interrelationship between growth and development is cyclical, framed by the oftenquoted phase “creative destruction”. Contrasting Schumpeter’s analysis of business and
economic cycles against the proliferation of economic development theories presented in
the earlier section showcases our assumption that government’s role in shaping the
temporal character of these cycles is poorly understood.
The one bright spot in all this is found in the research that followed Schumpeter.
Those investigations have explored the myriad of factors that help guide an economy
along the path of creative destruction. In the process several of these investigators have
elected to define economic development as economic growth plus some number of
measures that indicate changes in the quality of life. Schumpeter’s (1934) own
observations highlighted how an individual’s search for an improved QOL can be a major
force in shaping the prosperity of a firm. This serves as yet another data point in support
of an interrelationship between what we have come to define as economic growth and
those of economic development.
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Another way to view government’s intervention in markets can be extrapolated
from the work by Lentz and Mortensen ( 2005). These authors focused on understanding
the factors that motivate an individual to improve their economic well being. In their
scenario, it is easy to understand how the discontent arising from loss of employment
could spark an individual’s desire to improve their lot in life. If this cascades into an
exodus where employees are departing an industry where the level of economic
uncertainty is high to move to an industry where the prospects are brighter, then this shift
has created a drain of skilled labor in one sector and an infusion of skills into another
market. To the extent that this natural migration of labor ignites a structural realignment
within an economy, it is easy to see how a government’s intervention, denoted as a nonmarket force engaged to help stabilize the ailing sector of this hypothetical economy,
could establish an artificial and protracted period of stasis between the Schumpeterian
oscillations that describe periods of economic growth and those of economic
development. This behavior is witnessed whenever governments enact policies that
attempt to preserve traditional jobs. The literature makes it abundantly clear that political
pressure to sustain employment is a key reason governments are willing to intervene in
markets (Blakely and Bradshaw, 2002). Under these conditions governments’ actions are
motivated by trying to preserve the power base that resides within the economic
structures of the recent past. Of course, throughout this process governments are
allocating resources that might have otherwise been used to improve the capacity of the
human capital demanded by a future economy. Apart from the short-lived value that the
policies to preserve a status-quo in employment may offer to politicians, investigators
have implicated these policies as the primary reason the individuals in a state have been
30

locked out of enjoying the benefits of more growth (Maine Economic Research Institute,
2005). This was the same conclusion reached by North and Thomas (1973). Their work
aligns with the more contemporary studies conducted by Acemoglu, Johnson, and
Robinson (2002). Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson make a structural connection
between levels of intervention and the quality of a government institution. They conclude
that the quality of the institution accounted for some of the differences in levels of
economic prosperity observed across nation-states. From those investigations we can
hypothesize that the lack of convergence of prosperity across the American states, a
region where on most measures the demographics and economic differences would be
considered minor, might be attributed to variations in their political ideology and their
capacity to manage the affairs of government.
The literature reveals that during prolonged periods of economic growth the
human condition improves and eventually evolves to achieve a new, more enlightened
stage of social development. If this is the case then we would expect to find states with
high levels of economic growth exhibiting high levels of economic development. The
discovery that a lack of economic convergence might be due to variations in the
institutional settings across the states is an important finding and one that has proven
pivotal to the way the methods for this investigation have been structured.
Numerous studies and books offer policy solutions that address the triad of
challenges facing those that must choose between producing more economic growth or
more economic development: redirecting the economy, improving the human condition,
and protecting the resources of the planet. Most of these recommendations attempt to
isolate policies that constitute economic growth from those that foster economic
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development. In their seminal piece, For The Common Good, Daly and Cobb (1994)
offer their own solutions for reconciling the inconsistencies that exist when designing
policies of economic growth vs. those of economic development. They discuss each in
the context of how contemporary policies on trade, population control, land use
regulations, agricultural practices, industry, labor, income policies, taxation, and national
security, demonstrate their support of growth over development. Naturally their
recommendations seek to alter policy in ways that will help move economic development
closer to their goals for achieving sustainability: recommendations for changing patterns
of land use reflect an ethic of bio-centric egalitarianism; the policy prescription for
addressing population growth focuses on achieving something called “optimal scale”.
The authors provide insights into the context and meaning of the term scale: “economics
for persons in the community must face the question of scale; how many persons
simultaneously living at what level of per capita resource use, is best for community,
where community includes concern for the future and non-human species as well as those
presently living humans? The next question: What are the best means of controlling the
scale of population and per capita resource use?” The authors define the optimal
population as one that can sustain itself for a “very long time at levels of per capita use
that permit ‘a good life’ for all” (1994, p. 241). This leaves us with the obvious questions
of what defines a ‘‘good life”, and who defines how these conditions are obtained?
Attempts to define the precepts leading to a “good life for all” can be traced to the
writings of Aristotle. In his work Nicomachean Ethics, he suggests that living well, i.e.
leading a virtuous life, allows us to develop what the Greeks call ‘eudaimonia’, a good
guardian spirit. In those writings Aristotle suggests that while living a virtuous life is
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necessary, virtue alone cannot fulfill some of the other criteria required to acquire
happiness. His other prerequisites include good fortune, (to bring one the material goods
necessary for a happy life), and physical and spiritual health (Aristotle, trans.www. 2006).
It is from within these ancient constructs that classical liberalism develops its most
stinging critique of economic development. By endorsing the pursuit of individual rights,
liberties and happiness, classical liberals consider policies that emphasize economic
growth and smaller government as the primary sources for improving the quality of life.
These beliefs are reflected in Hobbe’s (1651/2000) critique on the dangers of large
government, Locke’s (1689/2000) examination of the relationship between labor and
property rights, Friedman’s (1962/2000) views on the link between economic and
political freedoms, and Hayek’s (1944) treatise on the threat that collectivism holds for
democracy (also see Blaug, 2000). The common theme running through all of these
writings is a strong belief in the individual’s right of self determination. The fact that
such rights are articulated as ‘inalienable’ in the U.S. Constitution continues to influence
elements of economic policy. More recently, growth economists have adopted the term
economic freedoms as a way to describe their measurement of these rights (Wang, 2005).
Not surprisingly, several of the factors thought to contribute to the good life are
captured in the indices that define a state’s business climate. As noted earlier, these
indices do not differentiate between measures of growth and those of development. As a
result their determinates for QOL tend to meld with some of the other variables that
economists routinely use to measure material well-being: health, safety, political stability,
family life, community life, climate and geography, job security, educational attainment,
access to goods and services, political and/or economic freedom, and gender equality
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(The Economist, 2006). The literature fully endorses efforts that aggregate these variables
into indexes that indicate a region’s QOL (UN, 2006). International agencies such as the
UN have a long history of using selected measures of well-being to help them define the
QOL in a region. Towards that end the UN has continued to refine its measures of QOL.
Today this institution reports results from an HDI, or human development index. This
index measures poverty, literacy, education, life expectancy, and birth rates. A subset of
this measure, the HPI, the human poverty index, is used to measure a country’s standard
of living (UN, 2006).
The importance of capturing levels of economic development should not be
understated. The literature provides a wealth of information to support the positive
relationship between measures of economic growth and changes in the quality of life
(Economist, 2006). Each example points to a strong positive correlation between
increased GSP, increased per capita incomes, and improvements in the quality of life. A
study by Banerjee and Newman (1993) highlighted this relationship when they examined
the problem of trying to sustain a degree of intergenerational equity when the capacity of
society is one of low wages and low wealth, as these societies are clearly unable to make
even the most basic of bequests to future generations. Any student of freshman
psychology will be quick to link those findings to Maslow’s (1970, p. 151) hierarchical
order of human needs.
A study by Powell (2003) supports the tact taken by the classical liberals and
suggests that improving the conditions for economic growth will logically spawn
improvements in the QOL. Whether that relationship holds in reverse is unclear.
Certainly if Schumpeter’s cycles of creative destruction were found to have a closed loop
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or feedback mechanism then this inverse relationship might be inferred. Given the
apparent synergy between the type of growth that Daly might judge sustainable,
(measured from improvements in the QOL, and the traditional measures used to define
levels of economic growth, changes GSP or per capita incomes) it is a bit of a surprise to
find Daly willing to replace such easily quantifiable measures of growth with less
rigorous measures of progress.
The one item to be gleaned from Daly’s assertion that society can achieve a level
of social progress while ignoring the policies that promote improvements to the GDP,
GSP or per capita income, is that he believes that all developed economies are comprised
of citizens that already have the capacity to bestow wealth on their progeny...today. Since
this degree of prosperity is not enjoyed by all citizens in all states it is with some
trepidation that we would entertain a recommendation to replace the objective
determinants of economic growth, measured as GSP and per capita income, with a more
subjective measure of progress. Of course this investigation does embrace Daly’s notion
that defines economic development from measures of QOL.
Finally, it is important to note that much of the neoclassicist’s critique
surrounding Daly’s work on sustainable growth is based on its incompatibility to operate
within the political structure of a capitalist, free market system. For example: it is well
accepted that in free societies intergenerational equity is addressed by policies of
redistribution. Bowles (1998) offers an insightful critique into the use of
intergenerational equity as a measure of economic development. He makes it clear that
measuring the behavior and openness of markets is an effective way to define how wealth
is acquired and passed across generations. When markets are not open and individuals are
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not free to pursue their own self interests, the totality of wealth is diminished. It is
interesting to note that in connection with the consequential loss of intergenerational
wealth, Bowles reveals a diminution in the utility of the other, non-monetary components
that are frequently attached to the value chain of intergenerational equity. Many of those
measures are used to define the quality of life today and are connected to the strand of
QOL that goes on into the future.
These past two sections of the literature review identified the two major and
competing views of the economy: economic growth and economic development.
However, there are few studies at the state level that examine how these views compete
or what drives their respective behaviors. For the reasons stated at the beginning of this
section, much of the work cited in this review tends be the work of economists. Many of
these works were theoretical in nature or discussed the application of theory to a large
national economy. Works by Hoff and Stiglitz (2001) as well as those of Rodrik (2004)
support our basic argument that policy analysts need a holistic framework suited to
measuring how economic and non-economic factors interact and contribute to conditions
of economic growth separate from the way they interact to effect levels of economic
development.
Business Climate
As noted in the earlier section, the politics within a state define its policy
environment. The nature of these policies affects the behaviors of businesses and
individuals alike. As businesses begin to grow they are confronted with a myriad of
challenges. Do they invest and expand in local facilities? Do they build a new facility?
Do they relocate to another, more attractive jurisdiction? So it is imperative that planners
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and politicians have a tool that can interpret how these policies shape the business
communities perception of the state and can anticipate how these businesses will respond
to government actions.
While the terms used to define a state’s business climate vary widely, the majority
of the operational definitions focus on gauging how a state’s tax or regulatory
environment affects its prospects for attracting or retaining business. Fisher (2005)
collected a variety of business climate indices from across the states. His work reveals
how all the institutions publishing an index of business climate believe they have
captured the mix of conditions that improves the capacity or potential for economic
growth. While this list of potential indicators is endless, the indicators selected seem to
ebb and flow between measures that the literature considers to be a indicators of
economic growth: changes in per capita income, changes in the GSP; and those that may
result from growth, higher levels of educational attainment, lower crime rates. These
inconsistencies support Fisher’s (2005) indictment that the publishers of these indices
base their claim of value by employing “circular reasoning” (p. 2). His findings that the
only thing these indices have in common is their claim that locations with “lower taxes
and fewer government regulations are better” support his critique of a strong ideological
biases running though all these reports (p. 2).
While Fisher (2005) naturally questions the utility of using these indices to
modify policies of growth, he fails to offer any explicit comparisons of how each index
performs relative to its ability to predict or explain changes in the levels of economic
growth or development seen across the American states.
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In spite of Fisher’s (2005) warnings concerning the utility that should be attached
to an index of business climate, the popular press and state web sites are riddled with
support for using these indexes as benchmarks for improving a state’s prospect for
economic growth ( MDF, 2003). In large part this results from the way states currently
compete to attract and retain businesses. It turns out that reporting performance along the
dimensions of one or more of these indices is a good way to communicate the value that
an independent body attaches to living and working in a state. Based on the advertising
space that states purchase to tout their performance in one of more of these rankings one
gets the impression that these indices of business climate must be capturing the attention
of some businesses. Unfortunately the headline-like exposure awarded this term has
caused it to find its way into the lexicon of economic policy. A scan of the Department of
Economic and Community Development web sites from several states reveals just how
many states are using their standing in one or more of these indexes to communicate their
competitive position and to attract new business prospects (MDF, 2003).
So it is not surprising to discover that states like Washington have begun to use
their standing in these rankings to justify changes in their tax policies and to adjust their
approach to the use of tax incentives to attract and retain businesses
(www.cfed.org/go/scorecard). The fact that states have adjusted their polices to shift
their position in these rankings has spurred criticism from groups like the American
Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME). The AFSCME’s
suggestion that the revenues lost from the tax incentives directed at improving a state’s
business climate simply shifts the tax burden from businesses and onto working families
is echoed by other critics of these practices. The basis for their argument is that over time
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the perpetuation of government incentives makes it more difficult for local governments
to sustain public spending. The AFSCME warns that incentives to improve economic
growth in the short run do so at the expense of the quality of life (AFSCME, 1988).
While the AFSCME does not quantify these impacts, their warning underscores the
danger of adopting a benchmark from a business climate index that focuses on directing a
policy agenda of less government and lower taxes. This is simply another example
demonstrating the importance of quantifying the relationship between a government’s
actions to intervene in markets and the level of economic growth or development within
the state.
The remainder of this section examines the body of research that suggests
improving the measure of business climate will improve a state’s prospects for economic
growth. This is accomplished by assessing the relationship between measures of business
climate and the two silos that have long dominated economic growth theories: placebased theories and people-based theories.
Business climate and placed-based theories of economic growth.
Location-based theories center on assessing how a firm makes the all important
decision on where to locate facilities, where to expand existing operations or whether to
withdraw operations from geography. Blair and Premus (1987) studied how the locationbased theories of economic growth have evolved. Much of their work focused on the
nature of economic clusters located around the Silicon Valley area of California and
along the high technology strip of businesses located along Route 128 in Boston,
Massachusetts. At their inception these theories were simple transportation-based, costminimization strategies. Today, they have evolved into a series of hybrid theories
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directed at capturing the role that technology plays in driving growth in the new economy.
Included in these newer theories are factors that measure the technical competence of the
local work force, the cost of state and local taxes, the attractiveness of a state, and factors
that contribute to the quality of life. These authors conclude that whenever a firm is
operating in the mode of the traditional economy its production costs remain strongly
influenced by the physical location of the business. This supports the notion that in
certain markets the decision of where to locate has an influence over the firm’s ability to
position a competitive offer. Included in these author’s list of factors contributing to a
firm’s decision on where to locate are the expansiveness of a state’s infrastructure, the
composition and cost of its labor pool, the structure of local and state taxes, the quality of
life, and the stability of governmental policies.
As noted in the earlier sections of this literature review, Blakely and Bradshaw
(2002) posit that the economic development theories of the past have focused on
monitoring and measuring factors that influence the ‘r’ or resource component of this
equation. Of course, this is consistent with expectations. The variables associated with ‘r’
are generally defined as those that influence the firm’s production costs. While the actual
values associated with each component of ‘r’ will be specific to an individual firm, many
of these values will reflect costs that are ubiquitous across all firms operating within an
industrial sector. The inference to be drawn from the literature supports the suggestion
that for those firms operating in the traditional economy these costs are driven by the
firm’s physical location.
The factors influencing both the capacity and the resource component of this
equation are frequently embedded into the index that defines a state’s business climate:
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the expansiveness of a state’s infrastructure, the composition and cost of its labor pool,
the structure of local and state taxes, the quality of life, and the stability of governmental
policies. Despite being confronted by nearly two decades of literature touting the
dominance that one or more of those factors play in defining levels of growth, Blair
(1991) insists that many of the more subjective, less quantifiable variables such as those
discussed in the next section, and thought to define the structure of a state’s political
climate, while poorly documented, may in fact be equally important.
Porter (1998) reveals that the formation, depth, and support that the governments
provide to key economic clusters have a significant influence over the level of economic
growth within a state. He defines a cluster as, “a geographical concentration of
interconnected companies, specialized suppliers, service providers, firms in related
industries, and associated institutions, specifically universities, trade associations” (p.
197). His efforts to link the treatment of clusters to conditions of economic growth has
led investigations to decipher the role that physical location might play in predicting
growth in the new, knowledge-based economy. Porter (1998) also takes stock of the
diminished capacity that governments possess as they try and render support to domestic
firms that are confronted by the challenge of participating in global markets. One
proposal for addressing this challenge is to have governments intervene in markets in
ways that increase their control over the local economy. This can be accomplished by
shifting the state’s policy agenda towards micro-economic policies that conform to
meeting the needs that are unique to a core group of economic entities, or in his terms,
industrial clusters. Examples of this would include efforts by local municipalities to link
the creation of tax increment financing districts to efforts that attract specific types of
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businesses to the location. Such efforts might include the development of business parks
where the incubators within that park are designed to meet the needs of a particular class
of manufacturers: biotechnology, advanced materials production, information technology
and the like.
The literature is generally supportive of the idea of governments intervening in
support of industrial clusters. This strategy has been tried in several states and has been
shown to preserve jobs and stabilize the local economy (Porter, 2000). As noted earlier,
the factors that motivate businesses operating within the same economic sector to relocate
are defined by a broad range of variables. While many of these variables represent a set
of cost drivers that are shared by all participants in that vertical market, other costs are
unique to the firm. They may reflect the conditions associated with servicing a local
market or staying within proximity of a political jurisdiction. So before a state can
embrace Porter’s recommendations and establish a suite of micro-economic policies, the
government needs to possess the capacity to evaluate how the policies in place today
encumber or enhance the ability of a firm to achieve its business goals. Regardless of the
industry segment these goals continue to be defined as operating profitability and
attracting capital.
Porter (1998, 2000) did more than consider the importance of clusters: he
examined what motivated their behaviors. After examining the decision trees these
companies used to formulate a business location decision, he discovered several instances
where firms within the same industrial segment were basing their location decisions in
response to competitive threats. His analysis exposed these threats as economic in nature
and found them to be shared by all producers in that market. He concluded that because
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the driving force behind decisions on where to locate originated from the dynamics
influencing the industry in which the firm operated, these types of decisions were not
amenable to being set into a universal law or theory.
A slightly different conclusion was reached by Evans-Klock (2005). After
exploring the process that Japanese automakers used to formulate decisions on where to
locate plants in North America, the investigator discovered the location decision was
driven by a desire to design greater flexibility into the labor pool. By selecting a location
where the labor force was able to operate outside the control of unionized auto workers
the company was able to redefine the organizational structures of the plant and create the
same high performance, flexible work systems used in Japan. During this same time
frame several other automakers, including General Motors, continued to locate or expand
in proximity to existing resources and within range of the infrastructure centered in the
Midwest. To a large extent these findings counter Porter’s assertions on what motivates
firms to locate. Here investigators found firms operating in the same industry giving
somewhat different reasons for their preference for a location. In the Japanese example
the preference is for locations that offer a differential advantage over the competition, in
this case in wages and in more efficient modes of organizing labor. They also base their
preference on a desire to stay aligned to the core business model and operating
philosophy of the parent organization.
Porter’s (1990, 2000) statements that there are always other factors motivating a
firm to exploit a specific, internally-defined strategic advantage allows him to escape the
criticism arising out of these more recent findings. He indicates there will always be
cases when these types of strategic factors will trump the central tenets of traditional
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location theory. In those instances, the dynamics within the firm will dominate a location
decision.
By elevating the requirement that governments must understand the forces that
motivate these types of business decisions, Porter (1998) is supporting our hypothesis
that a government’s capacity to manage these conditions influences the level of economic
growth that can be enjoyed within the jurisdiction of a state. Porter’s (1998,2000) work
investigating the benefits of economic cluster leaves little doubt that to the extent that the
sources of these stimuli are better understood, policy makers will be able to customize
programs that enhance the level of growth and development in their locale. Since the
amount of interaction between the public and private sector has a direct bearing on how
well policy cycles and business cycles are integrated, some method for inferring this level
of interaction should improve our ability to predict or explain the conditions leading to
economic growth.
The belief that location decisions are motivated by the profit maximizing
constructs of neo-classic economic theory led Witt (2002) to re-examine the behaviors
leading to growth as it is defined by the Schumpeterian cycle of growth: growth through
endogenous change. His work reveals that the driving force behind the Schumpeterian
cycles of creative destruction, growth followed by decline and rejuvenation, is best
represented by a measure of the firm’s capacity to survive the natural evolution of market
forces. Like Porter (1998), Witt observed that the key to anticipating how a firm will
respond to changes in market conditions is through a more thorough understanding of the
forces that motive it to succeed: capture more market share, vertical expansion of product
lines and the like. In reaching the conclusion that the decision processes associated with
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business location, expansion or contraction, are composed of a very deep mix of
psychographics, Witt (2002) provides a justification for those that believe the proper role
of government is one of facilitation not intervention: the system is simply too complex to
be centrally managed.
In their theoretical investigation to gauge the influence that measures of industrial
productivity play in defining economic growth, Griffith, Redding, and Van Reenen
(2003) developed a cross country and cross industry analysis that found measures of
innovation and research and development useful in identifying productivity changes
occurring within an economy. They linked variations in productivity to changes in the
rate of technology transfer and to the institution’s ability to protect intellectual property.
They connected performance in each of those categories to differences in the structure of
government policies and the organization of their institutions. Since their work also
attributed these differences in productivity to variations in the physical location of the
industries we continue to categorize these under the heading of placed-based theories. As
a side note, these authors considered the social rate of return from investments in research
and development (R & D) to be understated. If this were proven true, then a case can be
made that a legitimate role of government is to accelerate economic growth by increasing
the level of investments in certain innovative processes. Whether this behavior is
representative of intervention or facilitation is exposed in the findings and is discussed
later in this manuscript.
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Business climate and human capital theories of economic growth.
While the strategies associated with cost minimization are seen as the common
thread that runs through the fabric of every business strategy, and labor is often seen as a
cost to be managed, there is a growing appreciation of the value that a skilled and
dedicated workforce plays in mitigating cost. Certainly there is an understanding of the
relationship between poor labor relations and lower productivity. The desire to increase
the value of the employee is reflected in the way they are expected to participate in the
life of the business: employee involvement, consensus building and six sigma quality
initiatives are all ways that employees are being asked to contribute to the economic
performance of a business. This desire to establish a more engaged workforce is being
reflected in some of the theories that relate the perceived value of human capital to
decisions businesses make when they decide to relocate.
Evans-Klock (2005) found that the Japanese automobile manufacturers sought
locations where the labor market was conducive to establishing high performance work
systems over those geographies that offered incentives, expertise, or where the
infrastructure was already centered on supporting the manufacturing of automobiles. In
this instance the managing directors of this Japanese firm rated the benefit of moving to a
region of higher labor efficiencies (lower cost, and more flexible work rules) , above the
benefits of locating to a region proximal to suppliers, vendors, a legacy infrastructure,
and a trained labor force. As stated earlier, their decision was based on the desire to
redefine a labor environment and secure a long term competitive advantage within their
industry. They sought out locations that would allow them to emulate the business
practices mandated by the parent company. Clearly the factors that weighed most heavily
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in this recent decision ran contrary to those that have long dominated traditional location
theory. Evans-Klock’s (2005) found this decision to be in stark contrast to a series of
decisions in which General Motors continued to locate and expand in the mid-west. The
decision process used by the Japanese automakers highlights the way that the traditional
elements of the location theory have been eclipsed by newer concepts that elevate the
value of human capital. In a very real sense, the findings by Evans-Klock cast a thin
shadow over Porter’s (2000) conclusions that clusters play an important role in defining
and possibly predicting future economic growth. However, the study by Evans-Klock
serves to reaffirm the Schumpeterian notion that the evolutionary component of
economic growth is driven from changes within the firm or markets. It appears that this
evolutionary and somewhat ephemeral character of growth originating endogenously has
stymied efforts to create a unified theory capable of encapsulating explanations for cycles
of economic growth and economic development. In his assessment of Schumpeter’s
theory of economic development, Witt (2002) expresses his concern: “ …the debate on
the Schumpeterian hypothesis concerning the relationships between innovativeness and
market structure, has made great progress, [yet] the proper place of innovations and the
motivation to pursue them within an evolutionary theory of the economic process still
needs clarification” (p. 21).
In a study based on the behavioral dimensions of human capital in Danish firms,
Lentz and Mortensen (2005) discovered that changes in job types, changes in economic
security, and changes in prospects for employment stability motivated workers to relocate
from firms with low productivity to those of higher productivity. They found the rate of
mobility to be an important contributor to rate of economic growth. The finding that
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economic growth can be achieved by encouraging the migration of knowledge workers to
move across firms updates the Schumpeterian notion that expects to find growth spawned
from within the cycle of creative destruction occurring within the firms operating in an
industry or an economy (1934).
The literature supports what most economists have been saying for a long time,
that the epoch of economic turmoil is created by entrepreneurs seeking to define new
ways of meeting the demands of rapidly changing global markets. Like the mythical
Phoenix, the innovative and productive capacity of this new worker will give rise to a
new economic structure, replete with innovative modes of development and new methods
of production. By and large this new economy links the fortunes of economic growth and
productivity to advances in the fields of information technology, energy, biotechnology,
and advanced manufacturing. The recent advances in both the production and use of
information technology have led to the development of what some now call the new,
knowledge-based-economy (KBE). The momentum within this new market has increased
the demand for human capital. This shift in the demand for resources, from physical to
human capital, is largely responsible for the disequilibrium observed within both our
social and economic systems. In seeking to capture the importance that Blakely and
Bradshaw (2002) and others ascribe to the influence human capital plays in the future of
economic growth, many of the institutions publishing a business climate index have
adopted measures that indicate the level of educational attainment within a state. This
seems reasonable as most of the literature attaches a high significance to the relationship
between education and measures of economic prosperity. So it is with interest that we
find Galor’s (2005) research running a bit contrary to the popular notion that levels of
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educational attainment are an indicator of future economic activity. While he agrees that
policymakers’ efforts to increase access to better education will improve the comparative
advantage of an individual, he finds the lack of structure associated with the
implementation of these policies counterproductive to achieving that goal. To the extent
that this lack of structure fails to elevate human capital across the entire social strata he
considers such policies a failure. He places the responsibility for alienating individuals
from participating in the new economy squarely onto the backs of institutions. One can
logically assume that there is a spectrum of inclusiveness and that somehow this is linked
to the demographics of a state. Factors such as age distribution and income, its legacy
economic structures, levels of educational attainment, its political climate, and ultimately,
its capacity to innovate, would all be expected to influence the rate at which a society can
absorb and take advantage of these educational opportunities.
Alternatively, the research conducted by Lentz and Mortensen (2005) and Klettle
(2002) highlights how the investments in education and in research and development
have created a series of innovative structures the likes of which have been shown to
improve the quality and quantity of intellectual capital. So while Galor’s (2005) work
might provide one with reason to pause and begin to question the amount of spillover
benefits coming from investments in education, the consensus within the literature
continues to suggest that such investments, whether sourced from within the private
sector or the public sector, enhance the state’s prospect for improving its economic
condition. Since the call to spark more innovation from within a society usually evokes
policies to expand investments in education, Galor’s (2005) work should serve as a
reminder that investments in education, or for that matter any number of other
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government-funded remedies, must be accompanied by a cohesive strategy of
implementation. In the end this is not about finding solutions, it is about understanding
trade-offs. Gauging the effects of the trade-offs that occur in this complex arena of
economics policy carries some weighty consequences. The ability to manage
implementations, analyze trade-offs, and unravel cause from effect can all be tied to the
quality and the capacity of the body politic.
The conclusion to be drawn from a distillation of the literature is clear: to the
extent that the business climate benchmark selected by a state continues to be linked to
the older, location-based theories of economic growth, the longer their policies will
isolate firms from enjoying the kind of organic growth generated by cycles that drive
markets to purge inefficiencies and reward innovators. Oddly enough, the current practice
to use these indices selectively may explain why business climate indices have not
established the normative claim of spawning policies that improve business attraction and
retention within a state.
Summary business climate.
Fisher (2005) does not test the interrelationships between improvements in
economic growth and the adoption of any of the major indexes of business climate. In
more recent work Kreft (2003) examined the impact that very specific indicators of
innovation, entrepreneurial activity and venture capital had on conditions of economic
growth. He found that there is a one-way causal relationship between state
entrepreneurial activity and venture capital: entrepreneurial activity causes the inflow of
venture funding, not the reverse.
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Based on this review, a clear way to test the effect of a state’s business climate on
levels of economic growth or development is to define the interaction between a specific
set of indices and the changes in levels of growth, measured both as changes in gross
state product and per capita income occurring across a suite of states. Determining
whether a business climate index can predict changes in the levels of economic growth or
development will aid in an assessment of its utility as a benchmark for altering policy.
Political Climate
Political theory supports the premise that the composition and make-up of a
government affects its economic policy. The actions governments take are a reflection of
its political climate. Thus the measure of political climate affects the shape, form and
character of a state’s economic policy. There have been numerous attempts to frame a
definition of political climate. Those deemed suitable to achieving the goals of this study
led to an examination of how the literature defines and measures political ideology and
how it defines and measures the capacity of a state to manage its affairs.
This section explores the various pathways that political scientists and politicians
have traveled to define the political climate of a region. The literature review revealed the
rationale behind the measures most commonly used to define political climate: those of
political ideology and political culture. A review of the studies in each of these areas
provides the waypoints for designing a methodology that assesses whether a state
possesses the political will to change its economic fortunes.
The second dimension of a region’s political climate is defined by measuring its
capacity to manage. In recent years the Maxwell School at Syracuse University, under
funding from the Pew Foundation, has measured the management capacity of state
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governments. According to Maxwell, a state’s capacity to manage its affairs is closely
linked to its ability to adjust policy and respond to the broad base of socio-economic
needs that are expressed by constituents and local businesses.
The perspectives on what constitutes a suitable definition of political climate vary.
In their treatise on the role that location and space theories play in economic development,
Blair and Premus (1993) suggest that while political climate is a major factor in a firm’s
decision on where to locate, their investigations only consider it applicable when the
location decisions are being made on an international scale. By focusing their definition
of political climate on levels of government stability, these authors presuppose that
whenever a location decision is constrained to selecting a state or region within the
developed economies of the west, political climate plays a minor role. It is worth noting
that this assumption runs counter to their own statements claiming that whenever a
region’s political climate contains elements known to support a business’ ability to make
sound investments it becomes a major factor in that firm’s decision on where to locate.
Since it is well within the purview of individual states to enact policies that directly
impact a business’ returns on such investments, it seems only reasonable to test this
aspect of Blair’s criteria and assess whether the variations in the political climates across
the states have had an influence on the variations in economic prosperity.
To a large extent the difficulty associated with obtaining objective measures of a
state’s political climate stem from the fact that while the definition of this term is
generally understood by political scientists, it is a relative newcomer to the lexicon of
economic policy. Elazar’s (1984) investigations to define and categorize the political
culture of states have redefined the boundaries traditionally used to segregate political
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ideologies. His work defines and characterizes three political sub-cultures: individualistic,
moralistic and traditionalist. He then hypothesizes that identifying the presence or
absence of these sub-cultures enables one to explain the political views of constituents
concerning the role that government should play within that society.
In general parlance, whenever the term political climate is bantered about by
politicians and members of the press, it can be considered an attempt to define the
ideological shift occurring within or across one of Elazar’s subcultures. Certainly when
the term is employed by the mainstream media it rarely describes anything more than a
small ideological shift somewhere in a subset of a much larger social setting. From an
academic perspective this constrained perspective fails to define the role that a broad
array of political factors plays in motivating the actions within a state. To help close this
gap, this investigation searched the literature for a method suited to translating a state’s
political culture into one of political climate. This effort required extracting measures
from the broad ecosystem of political factors that Gray et.al. (2004), Hanson (1993), Dye
(2002) and others consider influential to determining a state’s policy-making
environment…“Its long standing historical and cultural patterns, contemporary public
opinion and ideology, and the influence of national trends” (Gray, p. 22).
While it is well accepted that public opinion influences the shape and definition of
some types of policy, it is unclear how public opinion in a state influences such broad
reaching policy areas as economic growth and development. Part of the reason for this
uncertainty stems from the fact that everyone tends to view their economic growth issues
differently. This makes translating the problems that are voiced by a vocal few into a
solution that satisfies the needs of many much more difficult. Saiz and Clark (2004) link
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this problem of perception to the way policy makers view and interpret economic theory.
As pointed out earlier, there are situations in the life of a state when the government may
need to step in and provide incentives to insure that a legacy industry invests in ways that
help secure the economic future of their employees. However, if public opinion considers
it more important that government focus on attracting new businesses then the
government is going to be confronted with a different set of challenges. In the former
condition the policy maker analyzes and then addresses the challenge from within the
realm of the variables that define the location theory of economic development (Blair and
Premus, 1993). For example, the policy options available are shaped by some of the more
traditional choices that states have used to help mitigate the cost associated with some of
the firm’s basic production factors: tax breaks on capital investment, support for labor
training, or simply alter the regulatory environment for the firm in that location. In the
case where the government’s strategy is to focus on business attraction there is a need for
the body politic to understand the role that infrastructure and quality of life play in
attracting new business.
Since economic policy is made through a political process we have focused this
part of the literature review on exploring what we know about the forces that motivate
political change. From there we can decipher the role that a state’s political climate plays
in spawning economic growth and economic development.
The literature is clear that regulatory environment within a state is a reflection of
its political climate. In certain cases the regulatory environment is seen as an impediment
to increasing levels of economic growth. David Truman (1981) has argued that while
regulatory policies of the type enacted by the EPA and OSHA are affected by a relatively
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stable group of actors, other policies, such as those associated with redistribution, for
example, tax incentives offered to a business, are more defined, and tend to be formulated
in an arena of public awareness. The way different forces act to influence different types
of policy is best understood from the vantage point of how policy is created.
One perspective on how government policies are created suggests the importance
that government actors, public opinion, bureaucracy, lobbyists and interest groups play in
shaping the policy process. Kingdon’s (1984) work in this area describes how shifts in
policy streams and policy windows motivate changes in a policy agenda. He asserts that
three sets of variables (the problem stream, the policy stream, and the political stream),
while operating autonomously will converge when either a problem window or a political
window is opened. The opening of a problem window usually follows the incidence of a
major economic or social problem. Most openings occur when the issue at hand can only
be addressed by elevating it to those responsible for governance. Kingdon reveals that a
political stream opens in response to changes of the administration, changes in the
ideological underpinnings of the representatives, or when there is a shift in the mood of
the citizens. Since the most dramatic change occurs when each policy stream is active
and when the actions under consideration are in response to political stimuli, it is
important to understand which factors motivate change within each of the streams. A
simple extrapolation of Kingdon’s theory allows us to posit the following: when citizens
continue to experience suboptimal economic performance, it is quite likely there will be a
convergence of the problem, policy and political streams. This convergence is followed
by the opening of a problem window. Through this opening citizens become exposed to
the issues and have an opportunity to engage in the political process. At that point they
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can elect to open the policy window and pressure their lawmakers to make a shift towards
policies known to shape economic growth, economic development, or both; or they can
leave the window closed. Understanding when it is prudent to open a window and when it
is best left closed is explored in this study by measures of a state’s capacity to manage its
affairs.
Political ideology: propensity to regulate.
Another way that political scientists have measured political climate is from
within the realm of its ideological bias. Based on the literature, political ideology can be
defined by measuring a state’s propensity towards regulation and by default the growth of
state government. Gray and Hanson (2004), Lester (1990), and Elazar (1984) all endorse
the basic tenet that suggests the extent to which the ideology of a state can be defined as
liberal indicates its political culture being prone to endorse increasing levels of
government regulation. Likewise, the extent to which a state’s ideology is defined as
conservative seems indicative of a political culture somewhat less supportive of
increasing regulations.
In a review of the literature to examine the relationship between economic growth
and the size of the public sector, Gordon and Wang (2004) found numerous
contradictions and conflicts in the results presented. While Acemoglu, Johnson, and
Robinson (2002) and others demonstrate a positive relationship between economic
growth and the quality of the government institution, those works appear a bit contrary to
Barro’s (1997) findings that provide evidence of a negative relationship between
economic growth and an increase in public expenditures. The influence that increased
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expenditures has over levels of economic growth and whether those increases lead to
improvements in the quality of government or its size are explored a bit later.
Lester’s (1990) discovery that a state’s political ideology explained differences in
the regulatory activity across the states led this investigation to collect data as a timeseries and adopt regression models using lagged exogenous variables. This method
attempts to capture the non-instantaneous effect that measures of political climate have
over the regulatory environment. This approach is used to frame the way each variable
influences the levels of economic growth and development. A detailed description of how
these models are structured is provided in the methods section of this study.
Political ideology: government growth.
One of the more traditional methods for measuring ideology involves establishing
the extent to which the state legislature is either Democratic or Republican. In states with
a liberal ideology citizens see a legitimate role for government and thus one would expect
to witness an expansion of the public sector. The opposite is, of course, true for
conservative states.
Work by Gray and Hanson (2004) affirms Lester’s findings that a state’s political
ideology can be measured by its predisposition towards regulation. Gray and Hanson
(2004) identified three proxies for measuring the tendency towards regulation: patterns
and priorities of expenditures, patterns and priorities assigned to revenue sources, and
government employment as a percentage of total state employment.
Another approach to gauge the ideology of a state is to examine the size of its
government. Studies by both Garand (1993) and Kapeluck (2001) demonstrate the link
between the size of a government and these polar measurements of ideology. In their
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investigation to uncover the relationships between economic development (what we call
growth), the nature of political institutions, and the scope or size of the public sector,
Gordon and Wang (2004) discovered a tie between the regulatory factors they used to
judge the qualities of political institutions and the improvements in economic growth.
Their research failed to uncover any empirical evidence to suggest that the size of
government affected economic growth or that the size of government influenced the
regulatory behaviors of public institutions.
The literature supports our approach to explaining the political ideology of a state
from dimensions that compare its level of employment in the state and local government
against those of its cohorts.
Political ideology: responsive government vs. excessive government.
Some of the earliest works to explain the reason for government growth were
conducted by Wagner (1877/2004). His investigations considered government growth to
be a function of the economic and social changes that were accompanying our shift
towards industrialization and urbanization. Consistent with the axioms of what has come
to be known as Wagner’s Law, we would expect to find both the form and structure of a
state’s political climate evolving in parallel with the changes in its economic structure. If
this relationship holds then there must be a link between measures of economic growth,
measures indicative of a government’s responsiveness, and its movement along a
spectrum that gauges its capacity to address such change.
In investigations to explain the differences in government growth across states
over time, Lowery and Berry (1983) examined a series of works that isolates and
characterizes the two theoretical pillars that define strategies of government growth:
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measures that indicate a responsive government and measures that suggest excessive
government. They contend that the measure of a responsive government can be
determined by judging the way the scale of government ebbs and flows with the
expectations and demands expressed by its citizens. Alternatively, they characterize as
excessive those state governments in which the government supersedes the role that
constituents would like to see them occupy. The importance that these findings attach to
the size of government justifies our approach to gauging political ideology by
normalizing the width and breadth of employment in a state’s public sector.
Lowery and Berry (1983) emphasize an important indicator that must be
appended to the ecosystem used to describe a state’s political climate: the responsiveness
of government to the interests expressed by its constituency. Here we focus on what the
literature says about how constituencies will respond to conditions that improve
economic growth and economic development. Lowery and Berry’s (1983) survey of the
literature indicated that the most common methods for gauging the responsiveness of
government are defined by measures of party control and ideological leanings, the
presence or absence of inter-party competition, and the prevailing political culture. While
there is the notion that a responsive government is associated with the political culture
defined as liberal, one normally thought of as endorsing the continued growth and
expansion of government, it is actually found that whenever that expansion is the result
of policies known to favor economic growth, such as might be seen from increased
expenditures and staffing to support expanding the math and science programs in public
education, then these acts can also be considered part of a conservative ideology.
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Kapeluck’s (2001) search for a linkage between party control and government
responsiveness tested the long-held notion that a protracted period of liberal control, or
what we might generally term as leadership under control of Democratic parties,
increases the size of government, while control under conservative or Republican parties
leads to governments that are relatively smaller and more stable.
Of course many investigations have linked the idea of a responsive or excessive
government to a conservative or liberal regime. While Kapeluck (2001) expanded his
investigation and explored the relationship between the responsiveness of governments in
situations of both high and low levels of party competition, he was unable to associate
changes in either the scale of government spending or its relative rate of growth to the
absence or presence of a political monopoly. Finally, an examination of the seminal
works on state politics by Dye (1980, 2002), and Gray and Hanson (2004) also failed to
support the claim that a measure of inter-party competition can be used to gauge
responsive government. This has left many in the academic community wondering if
there is any relationship between the amount of inter-party competition and the
responsiveness of governments.
Kapeluck (2001) and Garand (1993) also tested the assumption that whenever the
political cultures of a state are judged liberal the growth of its government can be
explained as the outcome of a citizenry willing to accept an expanded role for
government. Likewise, in the political cultures of the more conservative states one
expects to find its citizens endorsing policies that minimize government regulation. Their
findings presented a bit of a conundrum. Providing that an allocation of public resources
could be shown to produce incentives for economic growth, they found conservative
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states were apt to allocate more resources. These included incentives to expand
infrastructure and support policies that lead to a more liberal distribution of tax incentives.
In these and other cases, the justification for increased government intervention by these
conservative states was predicated on the assumption that such actions would act to
correct policies of over-regulation and thus accelerate free market practices. The
expectation that these actions would generate more growth at a faster pace was
inconclusive.
Much of what we think about when we consider Elazar’s works tends to focus on
the definition and influence that a political culture has in a society. However, we can
easily extrapolate Elazar’s (1984) description of how various cultural modes influence
the state’s political systems into an examination of how these cultures would influence
the size of the public sector. States exhibiting the characteristics he attributes to an
individualist subculture would endorse the operation of free and open markets and
express a desire for smaller government. In those instances the legislative representatives
from these states would embrace benchmarks from business climate indices supporting
lower levels of taxation and smaller governments. States with moralist cultures would
embrace government’s intervention to curb policies of economic growth as the
constituencies would view such policies as complicit with a proliferation of market
failures. Often within these moralistic cultures the activity to spawn intervention is
carried out by interest groups. As such the call to action may result in no call being
placed, as moralist’s are likely to invoke the precautionary principle which simply states
that if we are unable to accurately assess the policy’s impacts then do nothing. While
such recommendations are made under the pretense of protecting the public’s interest,
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this approach remains the subject of intense criticism both from neoclassic economists
and those that follow classical liberalism.
The final subculture examined in Elazar’s study is that of the traditionalist. He
finds the states typifying a traditional culture to be indifferent to the role of government.
Elazar’s (1984) classification of the way political subcultures influence state’s
political systems reinforces one of the key assumptions of this study: assessing a state’s
capacity for embracing policies of economic development and economic growth
mandates a set of measures that can profile the political landscape of a state, something
we have elected to define as its political climate.
Antithetically, studies by Erikson, Wright, and McIver (1993) confirm the role
that a dominant political culture has on the behavior of the individuals residing within
that political boundary. They tie the basic elements that dominate liberal or conservative
viewpoints to the endorsement of liberal or conservative policy choices. As was the case
with the investigations into the role of party control and inter-party competition,
Erikson’s investigations to decipher whether changes in government size are a reflection
of the prevailing political culture appear inconclusive.
The question of whether a government’s responsiveness is related to its capacity
to install the appropriate fiscal controls was investigated by Matsusaka (1995). He finds
that states with citizen referenda have lower levels of state spending. This suggests that
governments, in and of themselves, lack the capacity to install the type of controls that
their constituency deems necessary to remain fiscally prudent. At first these findings
appear to infer that states with high levels of referenda activity will have lower levels of
taxation and then, almost by default, will exhibit a more favorable business climate. Such
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a conclusion would be consistent with the literature’s suggestion that businesses prefer to
locate and expand in areas that exhibit lower levels of taxation. Yet not all referenda
states have low taxation and not all occupy a top tier ranking in terms that define their
business climate. This brings us to the heart of this investigation: it matters why, where,
and how a government spends its resources. For example, a state with an aging
population might elect to under-fund local and secondary education while increasing
support for health care and prescription drugs for the elderly. While the net result might
be lower total expenditures, if other lawmakers determine that the revenues are not being
equitably dispended for the purpose of expanding an agenda of economic growth, say by
increasing the capacity of human capital by expanding investments in education, the state
leaves itself open to being criticized for misallocation of resources. The literature also
makes it clear that each of these types of allocation decisions are guided by a state’s
political climate. Garnering a better understanding of the tenets that define the political
climate of a state is crucial to determining the influence that such measures have over the
state’s potential for increasing its level of economic activity.
In a study to examine the influence that high demand groups have over levels of
governmental response, Kapeluck (1991) noted that a positive relationship between the
size of high demand groups within the general population and the level of government
responsiveness was not unique to the demographic being served. There does not appear to
be anything in the literature to suggest that the benefits emanating from these responsive
styles of governments would be limited to citizens or that they would not apply equally to
businesses and other groups with political influence.
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Political ideology: excessive government and its effect on economic growth.
The tenets of economic growth theory are useful for testing whether government
has a positive or negative effect on growth. Today the most popular means of gauging its
negative impact involves assessing those categorical values that define whether the
actions taken by governments can be judged excessive. The most common measures of
excess are those that define the methods and means of collecting revenues, the state’s use
of debt (debt to GSP and non-interest spending), the influence of intergovernmental
grants, (percentage of revenue vs. GSP) and constituency size and its standard of living
(per capita GSP). Fisher (2005) highlights how the consensus among those publishing a
business climate index is that the lower the collective revenues, the more positive the
climate for economic growth.
Singleton and Griswold (1999) take a slightly different tact and connect
government size to functions deemed critical to expanding and growing in the new
economy. They suggest that the presence of multiple layers of jurisdiction impacts the
policies of taxation, affects copyright protection, defines the nature of mergers and
acquisitions, and establishes the level of consumer protection. However since the authors
considers each of these functions a mandate placed on government by the new economy,
they caution against focusing solely on the size of government. They submit that
measures of excess within a bureaucracy and not its size are better indicators of judging
whether the policy environment fosters or stymies innovation and growth. From their
work one might infer that the easiest way to mediate the competition for jobs and
business development amongst the states is with smaller government and fewer
regulations. This recommendation would certainly be consistent with the neoclassic
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approach of positioning markets, and not governments, as the clearing house for insuring
efficient distributions. This investigation will test the validity of such recommendations.
The political and management capacity of governments.
According to Honsdale (1981) political capacity is the measure of a government’s
“… ability to anticipate and influence change; make informed and intelligent decisions
about policy; attract and absorb resources…and evaluate current activities to guide future
actions” (in Gray and Hansen, 2004, p. 395). As noted earlier, Lester’s (1990) approach
is to define political capacity in terms used to measure political culture. He suggests
creating this measure as a composite of variables that delineate the number and type of
political parties, interest group relations, and the source of electoral support. The latter is
generally defined by the level and source of campaign contributions.
Due to the strong emphasis placed on predicting the influence that a political
culture will have on a government’s performance (usually measured as policy outcomes),
scant attention has been paid to examining how this same measure might influence the
capacity of governments to manage. In the past, investigators have operated on the
assumption that management capacity is closely associated with the relative size of a
state’s government. As a result, efforts to measure capacity have been limited to linking
the state’s political culture with its fiscal policies. The Government Performance Project
produced by Maxwell School at Syracuse University (GPP) offers insights into how a
broad suite of variables typically tied to managing and monitoring business performance
might be used to indicate whether a government possesses the management capacity to
change and adapt (Syracuse, 2001). The variables they selected assessed management
capacity along a variety of fairly traditional dimensions, including financial management,
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human resource management, information technology management, capital management
and a catch-all category they call managing for results (Syracuse, 2001). In the GPP’s
efforts to measures high and low capacity governments the researchers were careful to
define management capacity as potential for performance and not as performance itself
(Syracuse, 2001). They discovered that high-capacity governments focus on creating
positive change and remain vigilant to the conditions that might impede management’s
ability to innovate. High-performing institutions were also found to be learning
organizations. They actively sought out and incorporated the experiences of others into a
suite of best-practice benchmarks. This type of benchmarking was instrumental in
helping those states create a shared vision of their future. This allowed those highperforming states to build consensus around a set of actions that would improve their
capacity to adapt and address change.
The results from the GPP study offers insights into which governments have
achieved high levels of management capacity, which were not trying, and which ones
were either improving or regressing. However, the Maxwell report is quick to point out
that they are not providing a benchmark against which specific remedies are given; rather
their goal is to articulate the conditions against which potential performance or
management capacity can be gauged (Syracuse, 2001, Chapter 2).
In a study along the same lines as the GPP, Malhotra (2002) examined the actions
that states need to take to prepare members of society to transition to a new, knowledgebased economy. In that investigation he cites a government’s capacity to adapt and
change as a critical factor for achieving economic growth. In both instances the authors
agree that future markets will operate at a rate-of-flux that will challenge the capacity of
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governments to react in ways needed to support economic growth. The common themes
running through the GPP and Malhotra’s (2002) report is one of readiness and
preparation. Governments need to improve their capacity to adapt and change.
This investigation embraces Maltotra’s observation that determining the source of
variations in a government’s capacity and its responsiveness will become an increasingly
important predictor of its level of economic growth and economic development.
Summary of political climate.
One of the leading controversies in the contemporary literature concerns the
interrelationship between the size and direction of government growth and the measures
adopted to gauge economic growth and, to a lesser degree, economic development.
This portion of the literature review highlighted how several investigations that
delve into the forces that shape the size of government or its rate of growth have tied
these changes to measures of its political culture or its political ideology. Today,
researchers in these fields are continuing to rely on some of the more subjective yet
traditional measures of ideology: liberal or conservative; legislative structures that are
dominated by democrats or republicans; and the influence of national trends towards
more government or less government. While some of these studies touched on the
influence that each measure plays in improving levels of economic growth, few have
examined their influence on levels of economic development.
In an effort to install some objectivity into the measure that defines a
government’s capacity to manage, the Maxwell report offers an important new dimension
to defining the political ideology of a state. Certainly the traditional measures that define
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a state’s willingness to change have been missing a companion measure that gauges its
capacity to actually implement and manage that change.
The literature endorses the approach taken by this investigation that compares the
political ideology across states by measuring their relative level of employment in state
and local government and as a measure of state and local tax burdens. Combining each of
those measures of ideology with an indicator that gauges a state’s capacity to manage its
affairs provides this investigation with a holistic picture of the political climate within a
state. This collection of variables enhances the validity of our claim to have tested the
influence that political climate has over levels of economic growth and economic
development.
This review highlights the importance of discerning what a government is willing
to do from what it is capable of doing. Measuring and testing the effect that each of these
variables has over levels of economic growth and development is considered a precursor
to examining the interrelationships between a state’s political climate, its business climate
and the conditions that will enhance levels of growth and development. Finally, the effort
to segregate the actions a government is willing to take from those it is capable of taking
fills a gap in the literature and offers a realistic and objective basis for comparing the
influence that these non-economic variables have over the economic conditions across
states.
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CHAPTER 3: DATA SOURCES AND METHODS TO OPERATIONALIZE
VARIABLES
Introduction, Gaps in the Literature
Theoretical basis for this analysis.
The theoretical basis that Schumpeter (1934) develops to define economic growth
as the outcome of creative destruction, a cycle driven by the competitive behaviors of
actors operating in free and open markets, is based on the following precepts: (1) growth
that is deemed sustainable is delivered in stages; (2) each stage is characterized by the
way many actors, operating across many markets, respond to competitive pressures that
are unique to their market niche; (3) the diversity of response helps to stabilize an
economy as only rarely will the conditions that shape the response from one set of actors
in one market coalesce into a common response from all actors in all markets; (4) while
government plays a legitimate role in helping grow markets, its influence is optimal when
its intervention is limited to correcting those market failures that degrade the quality of
life for large segments of its population.
Today there continues to be serious debate surrounding what, if any role
governments should play in influencing both the duration and characteristic of these
cycles. The goal of this investigation is to explore how a state’s political climate, defined
by measures of its political ideology and measures used to gauge the government’s
capacity to manage, has contributed to the variations in the level of economic growth and
economic development observed across the American States.
It is at this juncture that we expose a major gap in the literature. None of the prior
studies on this topic have dissected a state’s political climate into elements that define its
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political ideology separate from its capacity to manage. Likewise, none of the prior
investigations have examined how factors commonly used to define a state’s political
ideology, often considered a measure of its willingness to change, interact with factors
that define the most basic element of any response: the capacity to do so. By electing to
operationally define each factor from within a set of objective determinants, this
investigation provides an alternative framework for assessing how the political climate of
a state, its willingness to change in response to prevailing economic conditions, and its
capacity to shape a response that is appropriate, have influenced levels of economic
growth and those of development.
The methodologies selected for this investigation were designed to address the
research questions posed by this investigation. The operational definitions for all the
variables used in this investigation are presented in the following sections.
Application of Theory
Political theory supports the premise that the make-up of a government,
conservative or liberal, Republican or Democratic, will influence how it frames and
implements policy. However, establishing a set of non-partisan metrics capable of
operationally defining make-up, or what some within academic circles refer to as political
culture or political ideology, have proven illusive. As noted in the review of the literature,
Gordon and Wang (2004) highlight the conflicts, contradictions, and inconsistencies
associated with creating simple, direct, and objective determinations of how a state’s
political ideology influences its policy choices.
This investigation embraces the works of Lowery and Berry (1983), Garand
(1993) and Kapeluck (2001), all of which suggest that a valid representation of a state’s
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political climate can be gleaned from the measures of political ideology that dominates
the jurisdiction. These investigators quantify ideology by measuring the relative size of
the public sector, in this case the larger the size of government the more liberal the
ideology. Towards that end we adopt as one indicator of political ideology measures that
compare the relative size of employment in the public sector within each state. Lowery
and Berry’s (1983) investigations explored the various ways this measure was used to
assess whether the prevailing political ideology is excessive or responsive to meeting the
needs of their constituents. Each of these studies has been instrumental in moving the
determinants of political ideology out of the shadows of subjectivity and into the light of
an objectively quantifiable variable. This facilitates the adoption of measures well suited
to the rigor of the statistical testing undertaken by this investigation.
Finally, a close review of the works by Gordon and Wang (2004) and those of
Malhotra (2002) reveals how the underlining quality of political institutions has
influenced levels of economic growth. By testing the influence the capacity to manage
has on levels of economic growth and economic development this investigation creates a
loose connection between the measures used to gauge the capacity of a government to
manage and the overall quality of that institution. No direct test is made on the influence
that the quality of the institution has over levels of growth or development.
Considered collectively, these studies support our contention that crafting a
holistic picture of a state’s political climate mandates an operational definition comprised
of two distinct dimensions: (1) measures that define its political ideology or its
willingness to change; and (2) measures that define its capacity to manage and by default
its ability to manage change. This study posits that both measures are indicative of how
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policy choices are formulated and implemented, and as such each is likely to exert its
own influence on the variation in economic growth and development across the states.
Finally, the efforts undertaken to define a state’s political climate from a set of
objectively determined measures side steps any partisan critique of these results.
Certainly, the ability to make non-partisan assessments of how political forces interact
with economic forces to drive economic growth makes these results more palatable. In
their review of the literature, Rodrik (2004) and Hoff and Stiglitz (2001) found the lack
of objectivity a major impediment to the adoption of such findings.
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The Operational Definition of Economic Growth
Definition.
For the most part, the measures of economic growth continue to rely upon the
theoretical framework of the neoclassical economists. Freidman (1962) and his
contemporaries support the notion that a measure of economic growth must capture the
impact that competitive pressures operating in free markets create when they force
producers to reorganize their factors of production. The assertion that increases in
operational or management efficiency drive economic expansion allows the neoclassical
economist to select quantifiable measures of economic output as their indicator of
changes in the level of economic growth. However, within complex economic structures
the ability to accurately measure growth requires that those assessments be made at both
a macro level, within a state economy, and at the level of the individual. Consistent with
those objectives, this investigation defines economic growth as a change in two of the
most commonly used measures of economic output: changes in levels of gross state
product (GSP) capture the breadth of change occurring at a macro level of a state’s
economy, and changes in the levels of per capita income measure changes in the
economic condition of individuals.
Justification.
Investigations by Vaughn and Bearse (1981) examined the use of neoclassic
metrics and considered them reliable indicators of changes occurring within an economy.
Likewise, Schumpeter (1934) considers the ability to measure economic output to be a
reliable indicator of how well the private sector is reorganizing its factors of production.
This measure infers the level of economic growth and overall expansion. Dye’s (1980)
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work examining the influence that levels of taxation had over levels of economic growth
also relied on the neoclassic determinants of growth.
It was not until the environmental movement of the late 1960’s and 70’s that
arguments began to surface to counter the neoclassic view that more growth equates with
a better quality of life. During that timeframe several of the suggestions put forth as
alternative measures of growth were reviewed by North and Thomas (1973), and again,
later, by Hoff (2001). For the most part their findings are consistent with those of Fisher
(2005) and suggest that several of the alternatives proposed, such as measuring changes
in the level of educational attainment, or changes in the accumulation of capital, are not
measures of growth but are measuring the results of growth. The controversy over which
measures cause growth and which measures are indicative of growth’s effect have led
most investigators to return to the neoclassic view of measuring economic growth from
quantitative measures of output such as GDP, GSP, and per capita income.
Data source and type.
The most widely accepted measure for determining changes in a state’s level of
productive output, (GSP), and measures representing changes in the economic well-being
of the individual, (per capita income), are used by this study to operationally define
changes in the level of economic growth occurring within a state and changes in the
economic growth experienced by the individuals residing in that state.
The Bureau of Economic Analysis’ measure of the GSP in each of the 50 states
was collected from across all economic sectors operating within that jurisdiction. These
data were collected from 1980 to 2006. The absolute GSP value for each state in each
year was recorded as reported. Each original value was then converted to represent the
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percentage change over the prior year. That value, the percent changes year to year, was
tallied for each state in each year and was carried forward in this analysis.
Measures of per capita income in each of the 50 states were tallied from the
Census Bureau and the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Data were collected from 1987
through 2005. The values were retained and carried forward in this analysis as absolute
dollars.
Limitations.
The limitations of adopting traditional neoclassical measures as our indicator of
economic growth are cited by Rodrik (2004). The author’s critique focuses on how these
measures fail to inspire the development of a culture of growth that can be judged
sustainable. At the same time his assertion that policies for sustaining growth need to
combine measures of government reforms with other non-economic measures resonates
as an endorsement for assessing how a state’s political climate influences the conditions
of economic growth as something separate and distinct from determining the influence it
has over conditions of economic development.

75

The Operational Definition of Economic Development
Definition.
The operational definition of economic development is based on Daly’s (1996)
argument that in order to survive as a species mankind must shift its definition of social
progress from measures of quantitative expansion in the economy, measures which we
have come to call economic growth, to measures that can gauge a qualitative
improvement in the quality of an individual’s life. His call for such a dramatic change
reflects his desire to expose the shortfall of capitalist settings in which the social costs
associated with achieving more growth occasionally supersedes the benefits that
individuals or communities receive. Clearly an undaunted reliance on neoclassic
measures ignores the unintended consequences that more growth may be creating in the
lives of individuals. The paradox of how capitalism’s choice for measuring social
progress has impacted society at large, both for the better and for the worse, remains the
subject of studies by economists and sociologists alike. Most of the qualitative
determinants that Daly wants to see used to as a measure of progress are echoed in the
QOL measures that political and social scientists use to quantify changes in the human
condition. Consistent with Daly’s worldview, this study segregates the conditions of
economic development from those of economic growth, and adopts as its proxy for
economic development a set of QOL measures. This proxy is used to quantify and
operationally define the levels of economic development within each state.
The selection of QOL as a proxy for quantifying economic development also
finds support in the work of Holmes (2002) and in the United Nations reports (2006).
Both suggest the fallacy of measuring social progress from within the single dimension of
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outputs that are the result of more growth. Finally, the use of QOL as a proxy for
measuring changes in the level of economic development establishes a measure that
bridges Schumpeter’s periods of growth and destruction. While it is beyond the scope of
this work to analyze and dissect these iterations into two distinct periods, this
investigation is interested in establishing a framework that can be used to profile how the
residence time on each side of this cycle influences levels of economic growth or
development. At this point we are only able to infer that cycles of economic growth are
spurred by the competitive forces that create more efficient behaviors from within the
private sector. Certainly the observations that most markets respond to competitive
threats or substitute goods by making incremental improvements in efficiency confirms
the assertion that within a complex economic structure any social cost attributed to the
ebb and flow within a single market is muted by the oscillations taking place from the
growth occurring across all sectors of that economy. Absent a force large enough to
influence a diverse set of markets, one rarely finds markets responding in harmony to a
set of competitive threats. So it is no surprise to find that the factor best suited to
tempering government’s intervention in markets is the dynamism inherent in a marketbased economy. At the other extreme is the tumult created when forces internal to
markets and external to local economics collide to create wholesale destruction of
markets. When that destruction disrupts the quality of life for a broad base of the
population, governments must intervene and restore the level of economic development.
While Schumpeter’s theories were not directed at the economic behavior of states, they
allow one to assert that when a state languishes on one side of a cycle or the other it
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displays a lack of the dynamism needed to increase its level of economic development
and economic growth.
A closer review of Schumpeterian theory suggests that the more rapid an
economy accelerates through each period and the more pronounced the oscillation within
each period; the more likely it is that the levels of both economic growth and economic
development will increase. This step-wise function leads to more growth and yields a
higher level of economic development. When this is properly choreographed it
establishes a style of growth that even the most ardent critics of neoclassic economics
would find socially acceptable.
While Schumpeter (1934) stopped short of making any explicit references as to
which measures he considered best suited to judging changes in the human condition, he
was quick to suggest that whenever market failures lead to a wholesale deterioration in
those conditions, then governments need to intervene to curtail any escalation in social
costs. However, since he never states how to measure these conditions, his arguments for
intervention never explicitly mention trigger points indicative of the ideal point in the
cycle when government’s intervention is needed or considered optimal. As a result we
can only infer that Schumpeter is relying on the capacity of government to respond to the
events as they evolve. Such an expectation would seem reasonable as governments would
be assumed to possess the capacity to react in ways that stem the impact that negative
externalities have over a population. So while Schumpeter (1934) suggests a more
mechanical description of how this intervention might occur and Daly (1994) makes
several references as to how such unintended costs are best defined by qualitative
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measures, in the end both authors seem willing to abdicate this question of timing to the
political process.
Holmes’ (2002) efforts to create a QOL index from a framework of economic,
social and demographic variables provided a template for selecting the indicators used in
this investigation. His investigation offers some precise guidelines for defining and
quantifying the variables critical to constructing a valid quality of life index.
While the operational definition of economic development developed for this
investigation is consistent with Daly’s (1994) desire to measure social progress as a
change in a series of measures that define quality of life, we necessarily limit these
indicators to those that can be tied to the experiences of individuals, and not a community.
A good solution to dealing with the paradox of measuring QOL for individuals separate
from that of a community can be seen in the way the United Nations (UN, 2006) selects
the indicators used to measure the Human Development Index. The measures for the HDI
are specifically designed to capture changes in the quality of life of individuals. The
approach taken by the UN to specify QOL at the level of the individual and not the
community is used as a guideline to help define the elements needed to create the
composite QOL index used in this study.
The composite QOL index created for each state is represented by measures of
educational attainment, poverty rates, crime rates, income, and health. Values for each of
these indicators were collected over the time span from 1980 through 2005.
Justification.
Spurred by the finding of the World Commission on Environment and
Development (Brundtland, 1987), Milbrath (1989), Daly and Cobb (1994) and others
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raced to pick up the baton and begin replacing the neoclassical construct of economic
growth with measures that capture the unintended social cost associated with increasing
levels of outputs. These individuals were anxious to define the impact that unbridled
economic growth had on the sustainability of the natural environment and on the quality
of life for members of a society.
Despite three decades of work to differentiate the conditions of development from
those of growth many of the citations continue to use the terms economic growth and
economic development interchangeably. In their effort to delineate these conditions,
Vaughn and Bearse (1981) suggest that while the measures of economic growth continue
to be based on the quantitative changes in an economy, the conditions that define
economic development are best depicted by measuring structural changes within an
economy. By their definition these qualitative changes would include changes in the
behavior and innovative capacity of institutions. The step taken by this study to define
economic development as a variable separate and distinct from the measures used to
define economic growth acknowledge the importance of partitioning how each condition
is assessed.
It is also important to point out that one of Daly’s (1994, 1996) suggestions on
how to shift a society’s measure of progress is the recommendation to adopt a set of
qualitative metrics that capture how changes in a social system affect its capacity to
support the constructs of intergenerational equity. This struggle to unravel the effects that
free and open markets play in creating the type of wealth required to sustain gift-giving
across generations was the subject of investigations by Bowles (1998), and by Banerjee
and Newman (1993). As noted in the literature review, each of these investigators
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highlights how a system void of wealth and beset by a low wage structure diminishes the
capacity of a society to affect a transfer of intergenerational equity. So while Daly’s work
provided this study with its justification for a proxy that defines changes in the level of
economic development, his desire to measure a society’s capacity to support
intergenerational equity relies on a set of theoretical constructs that defy measurement.
Creating and testing the utility of this measure is both unnecessary and outside the scope
of this investigation.
But Daly is not alone in trying to quantify the impact that a policy of unbridled
growth has on a society. As noted earlier, in their attempt to define economic
development as something separate and apart from economic growth, Blakely and
Bradshaw (2002) side-stepped the issue of quantification and chose to define economic
development within the context of a social movement. Like Schumpeter (1934), Milbrath
(1989) is quick to acknowledge the presence of a cyclical relationship between these two
opposing states of nature, growth vs. development. He even goes so far as to suggest that
this dependency may be amendable to more structured analysis. By defining economic
development as something distinct and separate from economic growth this study opens a
portal for conducting an analysis into how the non-economic forces of a state’s political
climate influence the behavior of each variable.
Data source and type.
The indicators used to measure changes in the levels of economic development in
each state in each year include levels of educational attainment, poverty rates, crime rates,
income levels, and health. Data from each state on each indicator were collected from
1980 through 2005. The average and standard deviations were calculated for each
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indicator in each year. Boolean algorithms were designed to compare and then recode the
original score from each state in each year against the average and standard deviation of
all states in that same year. The general form of the filter, less the specification of its
conditional formatting, is shown below:
If X > (Ῡ + 1.0σ) = 1.
If X > (Ῡ + 0.5σ) = 2.
If X > (Ῡ - 0.5σ) = 3.
If X< (Ῡ - 0.5σ) = 4.
The goal is to create an index capable of comparing performance across a
spectrum of the states.
As noted above, the filtered output was coded as a 1, 2, 3 or 4. In those states
where a higher original value portrayed an attribute favorable to improving the quality of
life, for example educational attainment, then the states with values exceeding their
cohorts by the annual average value plus one standard deviation was coded as a 1. This
represents approximately 15.8% of the observations. Original values exceeding the
average plus a half a standard deviation were coded a 2. This represents 15.0% of the
observations. Original values greater than the average minus one-half of a standard
deviation were coded a 3 and represent 38.3% of the observations. Finally, if an original
value was more than one half a standard deviation unit below the average, it was coded a
4, and represented 30.85% of the observations. In instances where a higher original value
conveys a negative influence on the quality of life, such as higher mortality rates, the
Boolean logic was inverted and with that the numbering sequence used to code the
variable was reversed. The procedure for coding insured the percentages assigned to top
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and bottom performing states remained intact. Considered collectively states coded 1 and
2 represent the top 30% of the states. States coded a 4 represent the bottom 30%. The
approach to coding from a mathematically objective method allows this investigation to
compare the relative level of performance of each state for each indicator in each year
measured.
The final determinate for the level of economic development exhibited by each
state in each year is based upon a composite QOL index. The composite index is created
by averaging the coded values for each of the indicators observed in that state in that year.
For example, if in 1995 a state’s crime rate was coded a 4.0, its level of educational
attainment coded a 2.0, its index of comparative health coded a 2.0, and the poverty level
coded to a 3.0 then the 1995 composite QOL index for that state would be coded as 2.75.
The average and standard deviation of this index over the years 2001-2005 is shown in
Appendix B. No weightings were assigned to any of the indicators. The following
sections highlight the source and type of measurements used to define performance in
each of the sub-categories used to create the composite QOL index for each state.
Educational attainment.
The indicator used to define the level of educational attainment is depicted by the
percent of the state’s population under 25 possessing a high school education. These data
were sourced from the Census Bureau. The original values were coded in the manner
noted earlier. In a typical year, 2005, the original values ranged from a low of 78.9%
attainment (KY) to a high of 92.5% (UT). Across the data set the levels of educational
attainment ranged from an annual average of 67.5% to as high as 86.8%.
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Poverty rate.
A state’s poverty rate is defined by the percent of the population below the
poverty rate defined in that year. These data are sourced from the annual social and
economic supplement of the U. S. Census Bureau, the Poverty and Health Statistics
Branch of HHES, and the Department of Commerce. The original values were coded in
the manner noted earlier. In a contemporary year, 2005, raw values for the percent of a
population below the poverty line ranged from 5.6% (NH) to a high of 20.1% (MS).
Across the data set, the percent of the population in poverty ranged from an annual
average of 10.87% to a high of 15.38%.
Crime.
The crime level within each state is defined by the incidence rate of violent crimes
per 100,000 of the population. These data were compiled from the statistics collected
from the U.S. Justice Department. The original values were coded in the manner noted
earlier.
In a typical year, 2005, original values for the incidents of violent crime per
100,000 ranged from 98 (ND) to 761(SC) per 100,000 of the population. Across the data
set, incidents of violent crime ranged from an annual average low of 397 to a high of 568
per 100,000.
Income.
The definition of income is based on the actual per capita earnings in each state for the
years 1980 thought 2005. These data were collected from the Regional Economic
Information System, Bureau of Economic Analysis, and the U.S. Department of
Commerce. The original values were coded in the manner noted earlier.
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In a typical year, 2005, original values for per capita income across all the states
ranged from $24,664 (LA) to $47,388 (CT). Across the data set, per capita income levels
ranged from an annual average of $9775 to a high of $33,671.
Health.
The definition of overall health within a state relied on statistics comparing the
death rates in each state. These data were collected from all state from 1981 through 2004
and represented the aggregate rate of death from all causes and from both sexes. These
data were obtained from the Population Division of the U.S. Census Bureau. The original
values were coded in the manner noted earlier.
In a typical year, 2004, the original values for death per 100,000 across all the
states ranged from 3588 (HA) to 5608 (AL). Across the data set, death rates per 100,000
populations ranged from an annual average of 4757.3 to 5670.0.
Summary of sub-indices.
Creating a quality of life index for each state in each year provides this study with
a proxy for measuring changes in its level of economic development. The selections of
indicators to create the sub-indices as well as the method to create the composite index
were consistent with the approaches reported throughout the literature. Since the
literature failed to offer any justification for assigning weights to any of the individual
indicators used to create the composite QOL index, it is created without consideration of
a weighting scheme. Adopting Boolean conditioning statements to code the original
values provided an objective mathematical method for creating the rankings. Rankings
were assigned in relation to cohort states and were determined within each year that the
values were collected. The values used to code each indicator ranged from 1.0 (best) to
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4.0 (worse). The composite QOL index created for each state in each year establishes an
objective method for profiling changes in the level of economic development occurring
across all states in all years. This approach facilitates a comparative analysis of the
performance across states within years.
Limitations.
While the indicators used to measure the quality of life suggest the depth and
effectiveness of a state’s social programs, the indicators used in this study were also
limited to those that were (1) endorsed by the literature and (2) available from secondary
sources. Finally, while studies from within the field of development economics are
starting to equate shifts in social capital and changes in the capacity of human capital to
changes in the quality of life, no attempt was made to define or otherwise incorporate
these more subjective indicators into our proxy for defining the level of economic
development within a state.
The Operational Definition of Political Climate
Definition.
Political will and support for policies of growth
As noted in the review of the literature, there are a variety of meanings attached to
the term political climate. Within the academic literature the term political climate is
most often used in reference to measures that define differences or a change in the
political ideology of the state.
Our review of the literature reveals two schools of thought on how to best define
and measure political ideology. Lester (1990) suggests the best method for building an
ideological continuum ranging from liberal to conservative is to use measures associated
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with the propensity to increase or decrease government regulations. Elazar (1984)
preferred to define political ideology as something emanating from the cultural
differences that define variations in social structures. In a search for a more pragmatic
viewpoint this study turned to the work of Garand (1993) and Kapelunk (2001). These
investigators define political ideology from measures that compare the relative size and
the relative rate of growth of government. Lowery and Berry (1983) examined the
dimensions of political climate from measures that define the way that the quantity of
funds collected, specifically the burden from state and local taxes were viewed.
By comparing the citations and noting the varying approaches used to define the
influence that a state’s political ideology has on its economic performance, one finds an
array of conflicting images of how politics might be driving economic performance. The
source of this conflict appears to stem from the fact that some of the key measures of
political performance are missing from their definition of political ideology. The
measures that are missing are those that lie outside the paradigm commonly used to frame
the political ideology of a state. Any student of behavioral psychology will be quick to
point out the weakness in trying to characterize the nature of a response based solely on
intent. In cases where a comparison of organizational response is needed, the
methodology must quantify facets of the subject’s willingness to respond and tie this to
their capacity to do so. Towards that end this study captures measures that define a state’s
willingness to change and its capacity to do so. Both measures are hypothesized to
influence a state’s approach to attract and retain business and each defines the states’
ability to respond to changes in the fast paced world of economic growth.
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This study uses a state’s willingness to change as it conceptual definition of
political ideology. The operational definition is created from the two independent
measures highlighted by Garand (1993), Kapelunk (2001) and Lowery & Berry (1983).
The first gauges the relative size of employment in state and local government. The
second is defined by the absolute levels of taxation borne by its constituents. The later is
considered more typical of how political scientists have measured the political ideology
of a state (Dye, 1980). Creating two measures of political ideology allows this
investigation to test how each variable influences levels of economic growth and those of
economic development across the 50 states. This approach also provides an opportunity
to examine the impact that the additive effect of political ideology, measured in two ways,
and the capacity to manage, has on each dependent variable: economic growth and
economic development.
The operational definition of a state’s capacity to manage is derived from the
grading system that the Pew Foundation’s Government Performance Project assigns to
each state and is discussed in the next section.
Justification.
As noted in the review of the literature, Blair and Premus (1993) emphasize the
importance that a region’s political climate plays in a firm’s decision on where to locate,
whether to invest and expand, or whether to terminate operations and relocate. They see
the characterization of these local conditions as an extension of the location theory of
economic development. They considered the operational measure of political climate to
be comprised of elements that are both economic and non-economic in nature. Again
referring to the literature review, the variables these authors select for their operational
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definition exist at the macro level and appear limited to assessing the investment
decisions firms encounter when the decision to locate has a global scope. In making this
distinction the authors also make it clear they do not expect that the minor variations in
the political climate across the U.S. states to exert much of an influence over the
investment decisions guiding domestic firms. Yet those claims run counter to their own
findings that suggest that whenever a region’s political climate is able to influence the
factors that businesses rely upon to make investment decisions, such as the incidents of
incentives, the level of individual and corporate taxation, the quality of the infrastructure
and the array of factors that influence the quality and quantity of the labor force, then the
measure of the political climate within a region are important elements in the decision to
locate or expand.
While political theory has long held that the political make-up of government
institutions influence the form and shape of the policies it creates, the literature does not
provide a holistic definition of how the measures used to define the political climate
within the jurisdiction of a state might influence its level of economic growth or
economic development. By defining the political climate of a state with measures that
frame both its willingness to change and its capacity to manage, this study can categorize
and analyze the influence that political climate has on clusters of states that exhibit
favorable or unfavorable levels of economic growth and those of development. While this
bifurcated approach to assessing the impact of political climate is a bit unique, it is an
approach that is easily teased from within the interstices of the literature.
For example, the literature provides insights into the relationships between factors
that improve or impede our measures of economic growth and those that enhance or
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diminish the conditions that affect our measures of economic development. Both Daly
(1996) and Milbrath (1989) contend that policies thought to accelerate levels of economic
growth, for example tax incentives, are done at the expense of economic development.
While on the surface this observation appears consistent with the Schumpeterian
notion of two rather distinct cycles, nowhere does Schumpeter infer that the policies
suspected of inducing growth do so at the expense of development. Quite the contrary, he
asserts that the holy grail of sustainable growth depends upon perpetuating a cycle where
one phase offers to push until the other is needed to pull.
So while the citations in the literature reveal several studies that initially set out to
unravel the interrelationships between a state’s political culture and its propensity to
support economic growth, none have included the non-economic, political variables
associated with a government’s capacity to manage and none have isolated the effects
that a state’s political climate has on economic development separate from those of
economic growth.
The works by Garand (1993) and Kapeluck (2001) provide a conduit between
measures used to indicate the size of government and the characterization of its political
ideology. While the relative size of a state’s government suggests its bias towards
behaviors that might also cause it to be judged as liberal or conservative, our definition of
ideology is framed by measures that define a willingness to regulate and have no
connection to party affiliations. As an example, our selection of variables remains
bounded by the literature and is supported by the desire to obtain a set of objective
measures amendable to statistical analysis. Capturing these measures in the form of an
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index is an easy way to compare levels of employment in the public sector against all
forms of employment within the state.
The literature also suggests a preference to gauge ideology from measures of
revenue sourcing and from patterns and priorities of expenditure. Because the latter
measure is more susceptible to variations in state demographics, the likes of which might
mask the underlying ideological construct, we default to the use of levels of taxation as
our second measure of political ideology. Investigations by Gray and Hanson (2004) and
those of Lowery and Berry (1983) suggest changes in the propensity to grow government
can be gleaned from changes in the levels of taxation and from patterns and priorities
attached to those revenue sources. The operational definition used to frame our second
measure of political ideology compares the per capita level of state and local taxation
across states. A comparative analysis along this dimension serves as a viable test for
judging whether government is excessive or responsive.
Political capacity to manage
The second element of a state’s political climate is shaped by its capacity to
manage its affairs. The importance of this measure is not to be overshadowed by the large
body of literature dedicated to describing the influence that political ideology has on the
economic conditions within a jurisdiction. From what we can glean from the literature it
is reasonable to assume that the trajectory of economic growth in a state is driven by an
interaction between a government’s capacity to manage its affairs and its ideological
willingness to change. At the extremes this is seen as an ideology that endorses the use of
incentives to increase the levels of economic growth or it is an ideology that uses
increased taxation and expanded regulatory authority to temper levels of expansion. In
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either case the capability to enact the type of changes needed to produce a desired
outcome must be factored into an explanation of how political climate influences
economic growth.
The concept of political capacity and its role in shaping the regulatory
environment has been extensively investigated by political scientists. In fact, the selection
of the measures used by this study to define this variable was triggered by Honsdale’s
(1981, p. 578) description of why it was important to measure the management capacity
of a government: it influences... “....the ability to anticipate and influence change, make
informed and intelligent decisions about policy; attract and absorb resources...and
evaluate current activities to guide future actions”. In describing the criteria used to judge
an institution’s capacity to move society into the new economy, Malhotra (2001)
reiterates many of these same points.
The need to make a clear distinction between the measures of political ideology
and the measures of a body politics’ capacity to manage is validated throughout the
literature. Most of these writings focus on how the interaction between these two
variables can be used to explain some of the difference in the regulatory environment
across the states (Gray, 2004). While the literature explores the way regulation is
tempered by ideology, there are no investigations that explicitly link these measures to
variations in economic growth or development across the U.S. states.
Embellishing the definition of a state’s political climate with a measure of the
government’s capacity to manage is consistent with trying to better understand the role
that this measure plays in the regulatory environment known to have an influences over
levels of business attraction and retention. The inclusion of a government’s capacity to
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manage is also supported by findings that suggest measuring a state’s political ideology
provides a necessary but incomplete picture of how a state’s government might be
influencing levels of economic growth or development.
The operational definitions adopted for this part of the investigation help quantify
how the political climate of a state, measured as ideology (willingness to change) and its
management capacity (capacity to change), interact to influence levels of economic
growth and economic development.
Data sources and types.
Size of Employment in the Public Sector
An index of employment in the public sector was established as the percent of the
working population employed in state or local government in each state. Employment
data were collected from the Statistical Abstract of the Census Bureau and tallied over the
years from 1990 through 2006. The average and standard deviations for public
employment were calculated from all states in each year. Boolean algorithms of the type
and form described earlier were used to recode the values. Each original value captured
the percent employed in the public sector for each state. This value was compared
relative to the average and standard deviation of public sector employment in all states in
that same year. This allowed each original score to be filtered and coded as a 1, 2, 3 or 4.
The lower values reflect conditions that the literature considers favorable to enhancing
levels of economic growth. In this example a smaller government serves as a proxy for a
lower propensity to regulate and thus yields conditions favorable to more growth. In
those cases where the values exceeded those of its cohorts by the average plus one
standard deviation, these were coded as a 4. Original values that exceeded the average
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plus a half a standard deviation were coded a 3. Original values less than the average
minus one-half of a standard deviation were coded a 2, and if an original value was
greater than one-half a standard deviation unit below the average, it was coded a 1.These
coded values provided an objective method for partitioning states into categories that can
be roughly defined as the top and bottom third. This allowed each state’s government to
be positioned along a continuum that represents excessive or responsive governments.
Tax Burden
The U. S. Census Bureau provided the data required to define the level of
personal income consumed by the taxes levied within each state. Data relating the percent
of a state’s tax burden borne by its citizens were collected for the years 1987 through
2007. The values, defined as the percentage of the local tax burden, were carried
throughout the analysis in their original or raw form. The ranges of these values varied
from year to year. For example, in 2007 the tax burden was highest in VT at 14.1% (ME
was second at 14.0%) to a low of 6.6 % in AK.
Capacity to Manage the Affairs of Government
The capacity for a state government to manage effectively is operationally defined
from the measures generated in the Government Performance Project (GPP). The
Maxwell School at Syracuse University collected the majority of the data used in the GPP.
The GPP judges a state’s performance in five distinct areas: (1) financial management,
(2) human resource management, (3) information technology management, (4) capital
management, and a generic category, (5) managing for results. A letter grade is assigned
to each state in each category and provides a sense of how well each state is able to
manage its affairs and adapt to change.
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The letter grades that the GPP assigned for the state’s performance in each area
were coded into a numeric score and then averaged across all areas to yield a single
numerical value for the state in each year. The GPP data used in this study was collected
from the study years 1999, 2001, and 2005. The range of data varied year to year. An
example can be seen in the data collected in 2005. In that year the variation in grades
across the states ranged from 72.0 for Iowa and Alaska to 92.0 for Oregon and South
Carolina. The higher scores are indicative of a greater capacity to manage the affairs of
government.
Limitations of political climate.
The goal of this study is to create a framework that is judged operationally valid
and is capable of being periodically updated. This creates a mandate that these data reside
within the public domain, that the measurements remain void of subjectivity or political
bias, and that models remain simple to use, update and maintain.
Great care has been taken to insure that the definition, selection, and manipulation
of the measures used to define the political ideology of a state comply with that goal. The
approach to defining and selecting these data followed the direction set by the literature.
The data collection methods conform to the requirement that the measures selected are
suited to judging whether a state’s government is responsive to meeting the economic
needs of its constituency or is excessively engaged in the affairs of the individual.
The major weaknesses associated with this approach are those that differentiate an
analysis based on the use of quantitative data accessible from unbiased secondary sources,
from an analysis that relies on measures that must, by their very nature, incorporate a
degree of subjectivity.
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The Operational Definition of Business Climate
Definition.
A review of the academic literature failed to produce an operational definition of
business climate that met the goals of this study: objectively derived and openly available
for future analysis. Fortunately, several agencies, universities, and nonprofit institutes
regularly publish indices define whether the business climate in a state is favorable or
unfavorable to increasing the level of economic growth. Included in these indices are
measures that their authors claim can explain the variations in the levels of economic
growth experienced across the U.S. states.
At a conceptual level the definition of business climate has achieved broad
recognition. However, its operational definitions remain quite fragmented. In this study
the operational definition of a state’s business climate is taken from each of five indices
published by three separate sources:
•

The Development Report Card for the States (DRC) published by the
Center for Enterprise Development contains three distinct indices:
o The Index of Performance assesses the general health of a state’s
economy.
o The Index of Business Vitality evaluates the robustness of the
businesses operating within a state.
o The Index of Development Capacity examines the quantity and
quality of the resources utilized today, with an eye towards the
demands that will be placed on these in the future.
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•

State Business Climate Tax Index: Published by the Tax Foundation, this
index assesses how variations in state and local taxes influence the level of
economic growth within the state.

•

Beacon Hill Index of Competitiveness, BHI: Published by Suffolk
University, this index measures the microeconomic factors that influence
growth and prosperity within a state.

Details associated with the objectives, measures, and methods used to develop
each index are provided in a later section entitled data source and type.
While each of the business climate indices claims to measure the capacity or
potential for economic growth, they exhibit a fair amount of diversity in how they
operationally define business climate. Since a goal of this investigation is to test whether
an index of business climate can help explain the variations in levels of economic growth
or economic development, it is hoped that this diversity will provide some insights into
the utility surrounding each index. Is it a useful predictor of changes in economic
development, economic growth, or both?
Justification.
Over the past decade a plethora of indices have been published that claim to have
discovered the cause behind the variations in the economic performance across the U.S.
states. Today it is not uncommon to find a reference to a state’s business climate ranking
appearing in the popular press, in trade journals for economic development, or on the
state’s web site. For example, the web site for the state of Minnesota showcases a report
entitled “Positively Minnesota- A Great Place to Live, Work and do Business”, this
report along with other items on their web site highlight the state’s ranking from no less
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than a dozen published sources. They range from Suffolk University’s Beacon Hill Index,
to reports generated in Forbes and reproduced in Site Selection magazine.
(www.PositvelyMinnesota.com). A review of the web sites of Georgia and Massachusetts
demonstrates how each is leveraging its rankings to attract businesses and encourage
existing operations to expand (memcclanahan@georgia.com , www.mass.gov/).
The media highlight how several states have begun to rely on their standing in one
or more of these indices to justify changes to their tax policy, or to alter their stance on
tax incentives. To gain an appreciation of the influence and reach that these rankings
carry one need only read the following quote from Rep. Jeannie Darneille, Washington
State House of Representatives: “The SCORECARD is just the tool to launch the
discussions and spur the policy changes needed to make a real difference.”
(www.cfed.org/go/scorecard). The scorecard she refers to is part of a new CFED report,
the Asset and Opportunity Scorecard which measures a state’s business climate (formerly
called the State Asset Development Report Card (DRC)).
Recall from the earlier section that this study defines a state’s political climate by
its level of state and local tax burden, the relative size of employment in state and local
government, and its capacity to manage its affairs. Segregating levels of taxation and
government size from intervening variables greatly simplifies the assessment of how noneconomic variable influences the levels of economic growth or development occurring
within a state.
The approach to this investigation is simplification through the segregation of
dissimilar measures. This tact serves to shelter this study from the criticisms that
investigators commonly cite over the outcomes produced when regression models are
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created from an excessive list of unrelated independent variables. While the endeavors to
establish a logical connection across a multiplicity of variables often improve the
robustness of the inferences, frequently these outputs are no more robust than those
constructed from single-variable or bi-variate models. The real concern is that these
complex models convey a sense of uneasiness over how the manipulation of a few key
variables might influence levels of growth or development. To avoid such criticisms this
investigation creates a framework for testing the impact that a limited number of
variables might have on a larger number of observations.
Data source and type.
The indicators selected for defining a state’s business climate are those that were
available in the public domain, were generated in years relevant to this investigation, had
a history of being quoted in both the media and in the popular press, and exhibited
diversity in the philosophical approach taken to craft the index. The five indices of
business climate selected for analysis in this study include:
•

The Center for Enterprise Development: Development Report Card for the States
(DRC)
o The DRC includes three separate indices. Each is examined as a separate
and distinct variable;


An index of Performance,



An index of Business Vitality and



An index of Development Capacity.

•

The Tax Foundation: The State Business Climate Index

•

Suffolk University: The Beacon Hill Institute of State Competitiveness
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The following section highlights the basic methods each organization used to
develop their index. The issues associated with the development and use of each index is
provided in the section entitled limitations.
The Center for Enterprise Development.
According to its web site (www.cfed.org),
“The Center publishes indices of a state’s economic performance, its
economic vitality, and its economic capacity. The DRC grades all states in
three indexes-Performance, Business Vitality, and Development Capacity
that measure different aspects of economic health. Each index is
composed of two or more sub-indices, also graded, that provide a more
detailed understanding of a state's economy. Sub-indexes are made up of
anywhere from two to 10 measures for a total of 67 measures. The report
card tries to assess whether the opportunities to obtain a better life are
expanding and how those opportunities are distributed across and within
states. It does so by presenting a portrait of each state, its structure,
operation, and potential. The report card is divided into three indexes:
Performance, Business Vitality, and Development Capacity”.
Each of the indices of Performance, Vitality and Capacity grades states from A
through F. Each index is comprised of a series of sub-indices which are also graded. Each
sub-index is defined by measures numbering from as few as two to as many as ten.
Considered collectively this yields a total of 68 measures used to create three indices.
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The general methodology used to create each index involves ranking every
measure from 1-50. The process described below is quoted from its web site
( www.cfed.org)
•

Raw data are collected for the 68 measures.

•

Each state is individually ranked in every measure based upon the raw data
obtained. The best score is "1", the worst score is "50."

•

To calculate sub-index scores, the relevant measure rankings for each state are
added together. Sub-index scores are ranked from "1" to "50"-best to worst.

•

To calculate index scores, the relevant sub-index rankings for each state are
added together. Index scores are ranked from "1" to "50"-best to worst.

•

States that rank from 1-10 earn As. States that rank from 11-20 earn Bs. States
that rank from 21-35 earn Cs. States that rank from 36-45 earn Ds. And states
that rank from 46-50 earn Fs.

•

When a tie occurs, each state receives the same rank and the next best
performing state is ranked as if the tie had not occurred. For example, if two
states have the best score, each receives a "1" ranking and the next state is
ranked "3."

The Index of Performance
The CFED creates its index of Performance to assess the return that various
investments in both the private and public sector have yielded for its citizens. These
include sub-indices of employment, earnings and job quality, equity, quality of life and
resource efficiency. For example, within the employment sub-index are measures of
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employment growth and unemployment rates. Within the equity sub-index are measures
of income distribution, average annual pay, and poverty rate. The resource efficiency
sub-index includes measures on per capita energy consumption, the use of alternative
energy, vehicle miles travelled, and a handful of other variables the likes of which the
CFED considers representative of how to manage natural resources in a sustainable
manner.
The Index of Business Vitality
The CFED developed its index of business vitality as a way to gauge the agility
and dynamism of the private sector. This index is comprised of two sub-indices;
entrepreneurial energy and the competitiveness of existing businesses. Entrepreneurial
energy is composed of variables that measure new company start-ups, employment in the
technology sectors, and the level of IPO’s. The competiveness sub-index looks at
measures of business closings, investment by manufacturing, and measures that gauge the
diversity within the industrial base. For more information visit www.cfed.org/go/drc .
The Index of Development Capacity
The CFED uses its index of development Capacity to measure how well the state
is managing both its physical and human resources and whether those policies indicate
trends that will prepare the state to participate in a global economy. To gauge this
performance the CFED builds its development Capacity index from measures used to
create 5 sub-indices. The sub-indices include human resources, financial resources,
infrastructure resources, amenity resources and natural capital, and a category called
innovation assets. The sub-index entitled Financial Assets is comprised of 4 variables.
These include measurements of the level of income derived from dividend, interest and
102

rent, the level of investments being made by venture capitalists, the level of financing
offered by the SBIC, and the loans being made to small business. The sub-index for
infrastructure resources includes such measures as access to affordable housing, energy
costs, and bridge deficiency. The sub-index of human resources includes expenditure
levels for education K-12 expenditures, the level of high school completion and
attainment, and a measure of college attainment.
To facilitate our analysis of the CFED data set, its letter grades were converted to
a numeric value. The method for translating a letter grade to a numeric value adheres to
the grading guidelines established by the University of Maine. The conversions were
generated for each of the 50 states in each year and for each of the three indices included
in this study. The study incorporated data for all years in which all three indices were
available: 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2006. Across the states the numeric scores
ranged from low values of 50 (WY) to highs of 97 (MA).
The uniqueness associated with how each of these indices were constructed
provides this investigation an opportunity to test how a series of indices, each comprised
of different measures, vary in their ability to predict levels of economic growth and
economic development.
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The Tax Foundation.
Like the CFED, the Tax Foundation relies on a simple system that ranks the states
from 1 (best) to 50 (worst). According to the Tax Foundation, its index is designed to
measure how state and local tax laws may have created distortions in the economic
performance across the U.S. States. By suggesting that many of the non-tax factors
known to influence local economies are in fact outside the purview of lawmakers, the
Tax Foundation justifies limiting its analysis to assessing the influence that taxation plays
on growth. They also justify their selection of variables by referencing the literature:
“Papke and Papke (1986) found that tax differentials between locations may be an
important business location factor, finding that consistently high business taxes can
represent a hindrance to the location of industry...Bartik (1989) provides strong evidence
that taxes negatively impact business start-ups.” (www.taxfoundation.org). At first blush
these authors would appear to contradict Dye’s (1980) findings indicating no strong
relationship between levels of taxation and those of economic growth. On closer
examination it appears that what Papke and Papke (1986) and Bartik (1989) are looking
at are the impacts that taxation has on a certain level, class or category of business
decisions. Dye (1980) on the other hand looked more holistically at how levels of
taxation influenced the measures of economic activity occurring within a state. Neither
conclusion is wrong; it is simply a matter of analytical perspective. Since the intent of
this investigation is to determine how measures of business climate and political climate
influence measures of economic growth and development in a state, the results of this
investigation will provide a more reliable basis for validating or repudiating Dye’s work
in this area.
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The Tax Foundation’s State Business Climate is a composite from five subindices.
•

Business Tax Index: This sub-index measures the economic impact of
state corporate tax law. It is comprised of two sub-indices. One measures
the rate structure and the other measures the composition of the tax base.
Both are weighted equally.

•

Individual Income Tax Index: This sub-index measures the economic
impact of state and county laws on individual incomes. As was the case
with the development of the sub-index of the business tax index, this subindex is made up from measures that determine rate structure and tax base.
The base is affected by such things as the presence or absence of a
marriage penalty and the state’s approach to taxing capital income.

•

Sales and Gross Receipts Tax Index: This measures the economic impact
that state and county laws have on the purchase of goods and services. As
in the previous indices, measures of both rate and base are used to
determine the final ranking. A determination of the impact that taxes
levied on products essential to the operation of a business have on its
profitability are included in the determination of the impact of the tax base.

•

Unemployment Insurance Tax Index: This measures the impact of state
unemployment insurance tax laws on business. This index includes two
sub-indices. One measures the adherence to a simple formula for
determining the rate structure, something the tax foundation refers to as
‘neutrality of the structure’, while the other measures the tax base.
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•

Wealth Tax Index/ Fiscal Balance Index/ Property Tax Index: While the
names of these measures have changed over the reporting years the goal
has remained the same: to capture the economic impact of asset-based
taxation.

As is the case for all its measures, the Tax Foundation relies on measures of tax
rate and tax base as their determinate for crafting each sub-index. Example of items
determined to have a negative impact on businesses include taxes on items that impede
the transfer of wealth and punitive taxes on intangible personal property, such as
trademarks, and taxes on inventory.
A description of the general method used to create each index and sub-index used
by the Tax Foundation is described below. For more information on the variables used to
create each sub-index or the source of data the reader is encouraged to refer to the
following web site: www.taxfoundation.org.
For each variable measured by the Tax Foundation a ranking of 1 represents the
lowest overall tax burden and a ranking of 50 represent the highest. According to its web
site, the State Business Tax Climate Index (SBTCI) is designed as a relative index. Each
variable collected is measured relative to the law in force within the other states. The
measures are not held against an ideal or arbitrary third party standard. The scale for
scoring ranges from 0 to 10 with zero being the worst among the 50 states. For example,
the rates vary from a low in the state of New Hampshire (0.85 percent) to rates that are
considered on these relative terms to be very high; Oregon and Hawaii (11 percent). As
the state with the lowest score, New Hampshire receives a 10. Since both Oregon and
Hawaii exhibit the highest rate they each receive a zero. At 6 percent the state of Georgia
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is close to the mid-point, so it receives a score of 5.10. Illinois has a rate of 3 percent and
scores 7.96, Idaho with a top rate of 7.8 percent receives a score to 3.39. A higher total
score equates with a more favorable, lower ranking.
The Tax Foundation’s state’s rankings were published in 2000, 2004, 2006, 2007
and 2008. The final score that each state receives is used to operationally define the
business climate according to the Tax Foundation.
Suffolk University
The data from Suffolk University are captured and reported as the Beacon Hill
Index of Competitiveness (BHI). According to the BHI, a state is competitive “if it has in
place the polices and conditions that ensure and sustain a high level of per capita income
and continued growth” (BHI, 2008, p.5). As with the analysis by the CFED, the BHI’s
business climate measures are constructed from sub-indices. The BHI selects its subindices from within the basic economic model that says any given level of output is
influenced by the admixture of capital, labor and technology. Its goal is to translate the
four components that Porter’s (2000) work uses to define competitiveness in the private
sector to one able to describe the nature of competition across the U.S. States. As seen in
the excerpt below, the BHI breaks these four areas of competitiveness into 8 distinct
groupings. A partial list of the measures in each sub-index is as follows. Each major
group has its own set of indicators and each is ranked as a factor deemed to have a
positive (+) or negative (-) influence on growth (Suffolk, 2008);
•

Government and fiscal policy: indicators that capture measures of fiscal
constraint and the market’s view of performance. Examples include:
o state and local taxes per capita/income per capita (-)
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o workers compensation premium rates (-)
o bond Rating, S & P and Moody’s (+)
•

Security: indicators of public trust and personal safety. Examples include:
o crime index per 100,000 inhabitants (-)
o murder index per 100,000 inhabitants (-)

•

Infrastructure: indicators include the affordability of housing, access to
internet, ease of commuting, energy costs. Examples include:
o median housing costs (-)
o air passenger miles per capita (+)
o electricity price per million Btu (-)

•

Human resources: indicators of the skills, knowledge, capacity of human
capital as well as the commitment to improve in each area, coupled with
access to health care. Examples include:
o % of population with health insurance (+)
o % of population aged 25+ graduated from High School(+)
o

•

infant mortality rate in deaths per 1000 live births (-)

Technology: indicators of R and D funding, patents assigned, proportion
of scientists and engineers in the work force and the relative importance of
high tech companies to the local economy.
o academic R and D per $1000 GSP (+)
o patents per 100,000 inhabitants (+)
o science and engineering graduate students per 100,000 inhabitants
(+)
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•

Business incubations: indicators of the birth rate of new businesses.
Examples include:
o venture capital available per capita (+)
o employer firm births per 100,000 inhabitants ( +)
o % of labor force represented by unions (-)

•

Openness: indicators of how well the businesses are connected with those
outside the local markets, includes levels of exports and the percent of the
population born abroad. Examples include:
o exports per capita, $ (+)
o incoming foreign investment per capita (+)
o % of population born abroad (+)

•

Environmental policy: indicators that gauge how well states adhere to a
moderate level of activity associated with enacting environmental
regulations. Examples include:
o toxic release inventory in pounds per 1000 sq miles (-)
o carbon emissions per 1000 sq miles (-)
o air quality (% good average days) (+)

As noted in the sample list above each index is comprised of one or more subindex. The values for each index range from 0.00 to 10.00. They have a mean of 5.00 and
a standard deviation of 1.00. The score from the index is used to rank each state in each
category. States with the lowest overall rank have the highest performance. In the lexicon
of the BHI study, variables are the elements used to make up each sub-index. Variables
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that rank between 1 and 20 are considered favorable to the state. Those ranking between
30 and 50 are deemed unfavorable.
In its 2008 report the publishers of the BHI claim that improving one point on
their competitive index translates into an increase of $1,546 in real per capita income.
To obtain a complete listing of the variables included in each sub-index or view the
report in its entirety refer to www.beaconhill.org
The values from the BHI for each state in each of the years 2003, 2004 and 2005
were included in this analysis. Typical values of the BHI range from a high of 7.00 (MA),
to a low of 3.00 (MS). In each case the higher the number the more competitive the state.
Limitations.
The limitations to operationally defining business climate from within the
framework of published measures is found in the exposure this brings to the variety of
methods used to construct each index. A brief critique of each appears below.
•

The CFED and its Development Report Card (DRC)

While the methods used to score, weight, and collate the data for each of its three
indices into a single grade are transparent, the data source and the selection of the
variables are not.
The CFED weighs all measures equally. The variables it selects and their
applicability to the category assigned is quite subjective. For example, within its
Performance Index is the sub-index called QOL. Yet the QOL sub-index does not
incorporate variables associated with the level of poverty. Instead, the measure of poverty
is reserved as a variable used to create a sub-index that defines a different measure of
performance. In this instance the measure is referred to as equity. In another example we
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discover variables used to measure or rank average annual pay are rolled into a subindex labeled Earning and Jobs. If we refer back to the literature one discovers unanimity
with how to best categorize each of these variables: poverty should be included in a
measure of QOL, while annual pay levels, of the type used here to craft the annual
payroll, is more appropriately used to define a change in the level of economic growth.
Finally, the algorithms adopted by CFED lack statistical rigor. Much of this stems
from its desire to simplify both the interpretation of its findings and any outsider’s
analysis of their data sets. Unfortunately, through the process of moving interval data to
ordinal data the CFED has lost some of its underlying fidelity. For example, in its 2007
report, data used to construct the sub-index of Resource Efficiency gives the state of
Vermont a score of 13.17. This is derived from a simple average of the state’s ranking
across all the measures used to create the sub-index. That score, 13.17, is then forced
back into an algorithm that creates its final ranking within this sub-index. In this example
Vermont receives a ranking of 9th out of a possible 50. By virtue of this ranking the state
of VT appears in the top 11 of the 50 states and thus qualifies to receive a letter grade of
A. This letter grade is carried forward in their analysis and used to create the state’s index
in the major category called Performance. Yet within the same sub-index of resource
efficiency the state of Rhode Island receives a score of 15.5, ranks 10th and thus also
earns a letter grade of A. However, New Jersey, with a score just 0.38 higher than Rhode
Island ranks 11th and receives a B as its letter grade. So while the DRC weights all
measures equally, the absence of statistical methods to filter values and define
performance based on an objective measure of variation creates spurious results and
brings into question the value one can attach to their assignment of a state’s final grade.
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•

The Tax Foundation

The Tax Foundation’s index is created from five separate sub-indices. However,
they all fall into the same monolith of measuring the influence of state and local taxation
on business and individuals. While the methods used to create this index appear to be the
most objective of those selected, its weakness lies in the absence of non-tax variables
known to influence levels economic growth or development. Unfortunately there is no
consensus on exactly how the range of tax rates or structures used by the Tax Foundation
might influence the level of economic growth occurring within a state. Despite its
inherent limitations, this index is the only measure of business climate to offer a set of
economic variables that fall under auspices of state government. Yet the literature makes
it clear that taxation is not the only variable useful in helping to define the shape or scope
of the economic growth occurring within a region. In fact, as pointed out in the literature,
many contemporary studies have suggested that non-tax variables, such as those that
define quality of place or quality of life, might overshadow the impact of higher taxes. To
date, the academic literature has been unable to reconcile how a tax that impedes the
expansion and attraction of new business impacts the level of economic growth
experienced by a state. One can only speculate as to why this remains an open issue. For
example, it is reasonable to assume that the proponents of less tax and smaller
government are unwilling to expose the unintended consequences associated with an
uneven use of incentives. Certainly the abatement of taxes for a sector of the economy
considered part of a cluster could disenfranchise those businesses that operate outside that
cluster. This may reduce the willingness of non-cluster businesses to invest and expand
within that geography. Whether the economic stability that results from supporting
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industrial clusters offsets the losses resulting from a lower level of investment by a broad
range of non-cluster industries is unclear. Finally the literature is virtually silent on how
non-tax variables such as QOL might dilute or potentially offset the influence of higher
taxes.
•

The BHI

The BHI has a very elaborate method for collecting variables and for weighting
their impact. The nature of its investigation centers on Porter’s definition of
competitiveness. As noted earlier, the measures they adopt are those used to compare the
competitiveness of firms operating in free market economies. So while the BHI embraces
Porter’s general theme, it is important to note that Porter originally developed his microeconomic theory in favor of clusters as a way to improve the competitive landscape
amongst players in the private sector. While the BHI’s 2010 Report claims that a 1 point
increase in the performance is associated with $1,546 increase in real per capita income,
the confidence they attach to using measures that frame the competitiveness amongst
private sector firms as shaping the competition occurring amongst the states would seem
to warrant closer scrutiny (Suffolk, 2010).
Summary Statement on the Limitations of the Indices
The major limitations to the information generated by these indices:
•

Several of the measures used to develop the indices or one of its major
sub-indices are duplicates of what the literature suggests are measures of
economic growth.
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•

Several of the measures used to develop the indices or sub-indices include
measures used to construct the QOL index, our surrogate for measuring
levels of economic development.

•

Several of the measures used to develop the indices or sub-indices include
indicators this study adopts as a determinant of a state’s political climate,
specifically levels of taxation and measures that reference the size of state
and local government.

Despite these limitations each of the five indices selected by this study are used
by politicians and policy advisors to guide and formulate policy. Therefore, each needs to
be tested in a formal model that examines their ability to predict or explain changes in the
levels of economic growth and those of economic development within a state. Most of
these indices do not consider the effect of their measures on economic development as
defined in this study.
Summary of Methods: Business Climate
The measures used to craft these rather complex indices helps to explain why they
offer such little value to policy makers. The fact remains we do not know if these reports
are measuring changes in the level of economic growth or economic development.
Except for the report by the Tax Foundation, it is impossible to determine which factors
are within control of governments. Yet even the Tax Foundation’s report contains a mix
of rates and conditions. This makes it difficult to determine whether adjusting the tax rate
in one category will have a positive or negative impact on the prevailing economic
conditions. Finally, there seems to be a direct relationship between the complexity of the
index and our ability to decipher whether the change made to improve upon a score or
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ranking will result in changes to the levels of economic growth, economic development,
or both.
The confusion surrounding the utility of these reports stems from their inability to
segregate and then describe, in an operational sense, how the non-economic forces that
this study describes as a state’s political climate, influences the body politic’s response to
shifts in local markets.
This new appreciation of the architectural underpinnings used to create business
climate indices justifies the decision not to test the combined influence that business
climate and political climate have on conditions of economic growth or economic
development. The equation required to test such a relationship would incorporate
independent variables with a high degree of serial correlation. As a result this
investigation tests the influence of business climate separate from those of political
climate. An explanation of the analytics used to answer the research questions is provided
in the following section.
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Analytical Methods
Regardless of whether an investigation is being launched by a social scientist, or
by a practitioner from within one of the pure and applied disciplines, the objective of
their analytical methodology remains the same: provide the most efficient means for
asking a fixed set of questions from a potentially large set of data. In the social sciences,
data collection methodologies tend to be closely coupled to the formulation of the
research question under investigation. A good example of this is the way survey
instruments are designed and how the responses are analyzed. In the disciplines of
chemistry, biology and physics, the nature of the question defines the design of the
experiment(s) and establishes the methods used to capture and analyze the data they
generate. What differentiates these investigations is the method they use to create or
capture data.
From the outset, a goal of this investigation has been to offer a simple, auditable
framework capable of analyzing the influence that measures of political climate and
business climate have over levels of economic growth and those of development. So by
definition this investigation must rely on data originating from secondary sources. As a
result, the vast majority of the 10,000 or so variables collected to help answer the
questions posed by this investigation were not designed with these questions in mind.
Given the origin of these data, the first step in this analysis is to assess how these data
vary over time across states. The relationships that each state has to these data are
exposed in descriptive statistics and supported by a variety of charting techniques. For
example, frequency plots and scatter diagrams identify the presence or absence of
symmetry in these data. Pareto charting of the average and standard deviation values of
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each variable in each state proved to be a quick and efficient method for comparing
changes in the levels of economic growth, economic development, political climate and
business climate across states.
Of course there is a certain temporal character attached to this analysis. Markets
are slow to respond and adjust to changes in economic policies. As a result, the effects of
a policy change cannot be judged instantaneously. To account for this delay, a lag period,
defined in annual intervals, is established for each of the independent variables. The
selection of these lags is defined by a series of OLS regression trials that establish that
point in the past when the independent variable exhibited its greatest influence over the
behavior of each dependent variable. The lag periods yielding the highest correlation
coefficients were applied to each exogenous variable. These annual lags are then
incorporated into an array of regression models that test the explanatory power of the
variables, both as individual contributors and in additive relationships. OLS regression
with lagged exogenous variables (OLS-LEV) was adopted as the technique best suited to
defining whether the long run movement of data amongst states can be used to predict
changes in growth and development. The specification of a generalized, OLS–LEV
model as well as examples of how the general model is modified to answer each of the
research questions are highlighted later in this section.
Justification.
The criteria for selecting the analytic methods used by this investigation include:
(1) an ability to describe patterns of change, (2) an ability to detect vectors of change, and
(3) a capacity to define the strength of association. Following Menard’s (2002) guidelines
for conducting longitudinal research, all the variables used in this analysis were collected
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at regular intervals, in this case annually. This enables a comparison to be made of all
states within the same year or groupings of years.
Data collection for longitudinal research.
These longitudinal research methods help interpret the differences in the levels of
economic growth or development as differences across states in a specified time frame.
The dependent variables measure the absolute change in the level of economic growth or
economic development occurring within each state. These measures are not rate
dependent. The justifications used to examine changes in levels rather than changes in
rates are based on the suggestions within the literature and on the uniqueness of the
variables used in this study: (1) the measurement of a rate change tends to be influenced
by factors external to the political system, specifically changes in demographics; (2) the
measurement of a rate change can be artificially skewed by broad based federal policies
that by their nature can be applied unevenly, especially in states with small population,
for example the closure of military bases; (3) the values used to define a change in rate
tends to be more difficult to insert into an analysis that seeks to avoid interpolating data;
and finally, (4) measuring changes in levels minimizes the interaction amongst variables
when the independent variables have to be lagged.
Data characterization and analysis.
A three step method is used to characterize the behavior of these data across the
time series and answers the basic question of whether measures of a state’s political or
business climate can predict or explain variation in the level of growth and/or
development across the states.
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1. Data Characterization: Pareto charts and frequency plots were used to
examine the distribution of each value across all states in all years. The
descriptive statistics used to characterize these distributions provided
insights into the way the variable each shifted across the time series.
Measures of dispersion, the annual mean and the annual standard
deviation, were calculated for all data. The descriptive statistics for each
variable defined as the five-year average from 2001 to 2005 is shown in
Appendix B. Any data destined to be translated in to an index were filtered
using the values of the sample mean and standard deviation. These values
were used in Boolean conditioning statements that filtered and recoded the
original values into an index suited to calibrating a state’s performance
relative to its peers. The values assigned as the index were analyzed in this
investigation.
2. Test for Correlation: Correlation tests exposed the relationship between
dependent and independent variables. These tests were also used to expose
relationships between variables the literature indicates could share a
common pedigree. An example would be the relationship of personal
income as a determinant of economic growth and its use as a variable to
define QOL, our surrogate for defining levels of economic development.
These and other relationships were analyzed to identify variables
considered highly correlated.
3. Determination of lag periods and the specification of OLS regressions
models to analyze time series data: A series of trials were designed to
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determine the regression technique best suited to describing how measures
of a state’s business and political climate influenced levels of economic
growth and development. OLS, 2-stage least square (2S-LS), exponential,
logarithmic and polynomial models were developed and tested. The
techniques associated with OLS regression were deemed the most suited
to this investigation.
Lag periods were defined from a series of OLS regression trials.
The models producing the highest correlation coefficient, R-squared value,
defined that point in the past when each of the independent variables
exhibited its highest influence on the dependent variable, either the level
of economic growth and/or economic development. These results justified
the specification of a 5-to-10 year lag on the measure of state and local tax
burden (PC_I_RS), and 10-to-12 year lag on the index of employment in
the public sector (PC_I_GEMP). The data used to measure a government’s
capacity to manage its affairs (PC_C_GPP), did not benefit from the
application of a lag.
A review of the literature and a brief correspondence with an
author of the Vega-Gordillo and Alvarez-Arce (2003) study helped refine
and adapt the algorithms used by this investigation. This led to the
specification of a generalized OLS regression model with lagged
exogenous variables, OLS-LEV suited to estimating the influence that
political climate and business climate have over measures of economic
growth and development:
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…where YT represents the measures of the dependent variable defined
from all cases in time T, where T is either the value for the five year
average from 2001-2005 or the base year 2005; k and q represent the
number of states (cases), included in each test;

T-i

and

′T-i represent

one or more of the independent variables whose lag interval i is defined as
T-i.
OLS-LEV models are adapted from this general equation and used
to examine the time-series data collected for this investigation. The
techniques for applying OLS-LEV models to the examination of timeseries data are supported by Ostrum (1990). While this type of analysis is
frequently thought of as a time-series regression model (TRS), the focus of
this investigation is to generalize around the influence that business and
political climate have across many states and not across time periods
within a state. So while we find the definition of OLS-LEV frequently
mentioned in the context of a time-series regression technique, analyzing
queries of how each state behaves across all time ranges is outside the
scope of this study. An investigation to analyze and then compare state by
state performance for the variables defined in this study will be part of a
future investigation.
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The database compiled for this investigation provided an array of options for
designing a model that tests the questions posed by this investigation. To simplify this
investigation, each endogenous variable was defined as the average annual value obtained
from 2001 through 2005, and as the value in the base year, 2005. Values from these times
were used to test the ability of the independent variables to predict economic growth and
development. 2005 represents the most contemporary year for which all data required by
these analyses are available. To dispel any notion that 2005 could be an outlier, the
results from the OLS-LEV models used to test the explanatory power of changes
occurring in 2005 were compared to the tests performed on data collected in 1990, 1995
and 2000. The strength of the predictions, judged by comparing R-squared values, and
their significance, defined from F-tests, (p<.05) indicates the data from 2005 is typical. In
those instances where the endogenous variable was defined as an average, the lag periods
for the corresponding exogenous variables were also averaged. For example, the test used
to determine the ability of state and local tax burden, PC_I_RS, to explain changes in the
level of economic growth averaged over 2001-2005 is based on tax burden averaged over
the period 1996-2000.
The generalized OLS-LEV model is modified to compare the impact that the
annual lag on each exogenous variable has on the behavior of growth and development
observed in each of the two time intervals. Except as noted, the tests are made against
data collected in all states for each time interval.
The findings from this investigation are presented in three distinct parts. The first
assesses the impact that each measure of political climate has over the dependant
variables of economic growth, and economic development. The second assesses the
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impact that each measure of a state’s business climate has over these same dependent
variables. The third controls for high and low levels of economic development and tests
how variations in that measure affects the ability of political climate or business climate
to predict conditions of growth and development. High performing states rank in the top
10 of all states for economic development. Similarly low performing states ranked in the
bottom 10. These rankings were based on the average performance over the dataset,
1985-2005.
Specification of the Model to Test Political Climate
To meet the requirements for assessing political climate’s influence over levels of
growth and development the generalized OLS model was modified and recast into a 6 X
5 matrix. The following example shows one of the 30 equations used to test the influence
that political climate has over levels of economic growth and development. In this
example, the additive model of political climate is specified against each of the dependent
variables: levels of growth defined as per capita income (EG_PCI), growth defined as
changes in GSP (EG_GSP), and changes levels of economic development (ED_QOL):
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To determine their ability to explain or predict changes in measures of economic
growth and development, each indicator of political climate is tested individually and as
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additive models. This includes the two measures of its ideology, PC_I_RS, and
PC_I_GEMP and the measure of its capacity to manage, PC_C_GPP.
The lag length, T, was designated from the selection process discussed earlier.
Political climate is tested with lags at both 5 and 10 years, in the example above, where T
= -5. Running tests against each of these lag period recognizes that while the lag
relationships between each set of variables were not identical, they were always optimal
in the range of 5 to 12 years. No lag was applied to the measure of capacity to manage,
PC_C_GPP, T = 0. Each dependent variable undergoes 2 sets of tests. In the first
iteration the independent variable’s ability to predict changes in the average value over
the years 2001-2005 is tested. A second iteration tests the ability to predict changes in the
data collected in the base year, 2005.
Specification of the Model to Test Business Climate
To meet the requirements for assessing business climate’s influence over levels of
growth and development, the generalized OLS model was defined in a 6 X 6 matrix. Here
the 5 indices of a state’s business climate discussed earlier are tested to determine their
capacity to explain or predict changes in the measures of economic growth, EG_GSP and
EG_PCI, and those of economic development, ED_QOL. Each measure of business
climate, the Beacon Hill Index, BC_BHI, the Tax Foundation, BC_TAXF and the
development report card, BC_DRC_ is tested to determine its ability to predict or explain
changes in the level of dependent variables defined both as the five year average and as
data from 2005. The lag applied to all measures of business climate were identical, T = -2.
The adoption of a 2 year lag reflects the nature of this variable: (1) measures of business
climate have only recently become available from secondary sources, and (2) these data
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are not always published on a regular, annual, basis. Other than the nested measures
taken from the CFED development scorecard, where BC_DRC_P is combined with _V
and _C, no additive models were specified. The reason for this is simple: those publishing
a measure of business climate believe their solo variable explains changes in the
conditions this study uses to define economic growth.
The following example demonstrates how the general equation was modified to
test the influence that each measure of business climate has over growth measured as per
capita (EG_PCI) in 2005:
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Specification of the Model Controlling for Economic Development
The third application of the generalized model seeks to determine if the
established level of economic development in a state influences the ability of political or
business climate to predict changes in the level of growth and development. This iteration
was limited to testing the explanatory power for the year 2005. States ranking in the top
deciles for levels of economic development are defined as the control group and labeled
top performing states: Connecticut, Hawaii, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Colorado, Iowa,
Nebraska, Wyoming, New Jersey and Washington were. The states ranked in the bottom
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deciles, labeled as bottom performing states, include: Oklahoma, Kentucky, Arkansas,
West Virginia, New Mexico, Tennessee, Mississippi, Alabama, South Carolina and
Louisiana. Isolating these states into two separate groups allowed a comparison of how
variations in the levels of economic development influence the ability of political or
business climate to predict variations in the dependent variables.
The following example highlights how the general equation is modified to assess
the performance of the top performing states. The first set of equations depict how the
formula was modified to assess the influence that all measures of political have over
changes in growth in per capita income, EG-PCI, growth in gross state product, EG_GSP
and economic development, ED_QOL. The last equation in this list provides an example
of how the model was specified to test the influence that a measure of business climate,
BC_BHI had over levels of growth across high performing states:
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Assessing the performance in the bottom performing states is simply a matter of
substituting n =1-10 with n = 41-50:
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In all instances where the general equation is modified: T =lag period applied to the
exogenous variable ; EG_ is the percentage change in the annual growth of _GSP or the
per capita income in absolute dollars, _PCI in the year(s) specified by the time T; when
used as a rank n=1 refers to the top ranked state, 50 refers to the lowest ranked state;
ED_ is the measure of economic development ; BC_ is the preface used to describe the
index defining the state’s business climate; T is the date of test year for the data set of the
dependent variable, either a 5 year average from 2001-2005 or 2005.
Limitations.
The limitations associated with designing longitudinal research are highlighted by
Menard, (2002, p. 3) and include: “(1) the ability to collect data for each variable over
multiple time periods, (2) the alignment of cases to the periods under analysis, and (3) the
selection of analytical tool suited to comparing data between or among periods.” To
address these and the other limitations, data used in this study were collected at regular
intervals and all were derived from secondary sources.
Ostrom (1990, p.58) expresses several concerns over the presence of serial
correlation in lagged models. Each is addressed by the methods adopted for use in this
study. First, descriptive techniques identify patterns of convergence or anomalies that
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might suggest correlation. Second, where needed, data or relationships were
preconditioned using standard regression techniques. The succession of OLS regression
trials described earlier helped limit the application of time lags to exogenous or
independent variable(s). According to Ostrom, this avoids the unwanted encounter with
serial correlation. With none of the lagged exogenous variables demonstrating any
outward signs of serial correlation, the study was clear to specify the time interval to be
used to test when a change in economic growth or development within the U.S. states
responded to changes in its political climate. The specification of a precise time interval
supports Ostrom’s requirement that the lagged models remain amendable to being
analyzed for autocorrelation using traditional modes of intervention, in this case the
Durbin-Watson statistic. Isolating the equations into specific time interval(s) has the
added benefit of specifying an OLS model with lagged exogenous values that did not
require further transformation or manipulation. As note in the literature review, the
elimination of weighting schemes helps sidestep any criticism surrounding the bias used
to assign weights.
The strategy to restrict the application of time lags to exogenous variables and not
apply partial effects to one or more of the explanatory variables (or hand working other
variables into more elaborate distributed lag models) kept this study from encountering
the pitfalls encountered when analyzing data from a time-series (Ostrom,1990). While
these more restrictive methods may have fallen short of producing stronger correlations,
they minimized exposing the findings from this study to the limitations cited in the
literature.
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Causation and Association
Although the term causation is discussed, statistics alone cannot assign causality.
The presence of association does not imply causation: but according to Chou (1969) the
presence of causation always implies association. Chou (1969, p. 631) provides several
explicit reasons why association cannot be used to assign causation: first there is the
likelihood that the association between variables is the result of pure chance; second,
association between two variables may be due to the influence of a third common
variable or an intervening factor; finally, there are occasions when the relationship, while
real, fails to delineate the relationship between the variables, in this instance failing to
unravel which is the cause and which is the effect.
Chou (1969) suggests that the case for causation must rely on logic and reasoning.
He considers these to be the only reliable sources for uncovering errors inherent in any
assessment of association. In an attempt to avoid reading causation into spurious
associations, the findings presented in this study will be critiqued against research
suggesting that economic growth is the logical outcome of discrete acts that seek to
enhance the levels of innovation. Some of these acts are within control of markets while
others fall under the influence of government regulators (Klette and Kortum, 2002).
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Summary on Analytical Methods
Considered collectively, the adoption of these analytical methods offered the
following advantages: data could be collected in fixed-time intervals, no interpolations of
data were required, the timeframes selected allowed a comparative analysis of all data
from all states, and finally, they eliminated the need to create weighting schemes for
variables. These factors coalesce into a methodology that addresses many of the shortfalls
associated with the design of longitudinal research and the analysis of time series data.
The methodology developed for this investigation is relatively flexible. The data
collection methods evolved into a data set that is well suited to supporting the underlying
goals of this study: objectivity of data collection, transparency of analytical methods, and
simplicity in the interpretation of results.
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Table 3.1 Summary: Sources and Uses of Data for each U.S. State, 2005( * except as noted)

Variable Name
Business Climate

Political Climate
a. Management
Capacity
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b. Political
Ideology

Source
The Center for Enterprise
Development
BC_DRC_P
BC_DRC_V
BC_DRC_C
Tax Foundation
BC-TAXF
Suffolk University
BC_BHI
Maxwell School; Government
Performance Project
PC_W_GPP
US Census Bureau; Statistical
Abstract
PC_I_RS
PC_I_G_EMP

Economic Growth

Economic
Development

Bureau of Economic Analysis;
Census Bureau and Bureau of Labor
Statistics, HBS
EG_GSP
EG_PCI
Census Bureau

ED_QOL

Description
State Asset Development Report Card
Index of Performance,
Index of Vitality
Index of Capacity
State Business Climate Tax Index

Range

Average

50-100*
50-100*
50-100*

76.9
77.1
76.9

1-50

25.5

2.53-7.03

5.00

72.0-92.0

81.68

6.7%-14%

10.6%

1.0-4.0

2.10

2.41%-14.11%
$24.6-47.3K

6.607%
$33.3K

1.25-4.00

2.45

Beacon Hill Index
Management Capacity in the areas of:
-Financial Mgt -HR Mgt
-IT mgt
-Capital Management
-Managing for Results
Government Growth:
Patterns of revenue sources, a percentage of
personal income consumed by various forms of
taxation
Local government employment (Index as a percent
of total state employment)
Quantitative Changes in Economy
Changes in Gross State Product
Absolute value of per capita income
Qualitative changes in quality of life
Income
Educational attainment
Poverty rates
Crime Rates
Health
A composite index of each state’s performance
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CHAPTER 4: FINDINGS
Introduction
This chapter addresses the essential question of whether the variables used to
define the political and business climates across the American states are suited to
predicting changes in economic growth or economic development. The findings are
portrayed in graphs and the results are presented in a series of tables. The iteration of
each model is labeled as a step. The outputs, described in the following sections, were
derived from the series of OLS-LEV models specified in the methods section. The tables
will highlight how well each variable explains changes in the average level of economic
growth or development occurring across the period 2001to 2005 and in the base year,
2005. While each table is accompanied by a general discussion of its findings, the
conclusions to be drawn from this collective work are presented in the following chapter.
Five regression steps will highlight how the combined and individual effects of
political climate interact to predict levels of growth and development. As referred to in
the methods section, the political climate variable measuring state and local tax burden is
labeled (PC_I_RS), the value of the index used to define the ratio of employment in the
states public sector is labeled (PC_I_GEMP), and a state’s capacity to manage its affairs
is shown as (PC_C_GPP).
Tables are also used to address the question of whether six of the more popular
measures of business climate are reliable predictors of changes in the level of economic
growth or development. The business climate variables are labeled as follows: the
Beacon Hill Index (BC_BHI) , the Tax Foundations ranking (BC_TAXF) , and
development report card ( BC_DRC_). Since the DRC produces individual measures for
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development capacity (_C), performance (_P), and business vitality (_V), each of these
indices are tested in a manner that defines their individual and additive effects.
Figures 4.1 through 4.7 characterize the behavior of key variables across all states.
These figures reveal a collection of states where the levels of economic development
(ED_QOL), remained closely aligned to changes in the measures of political climate and
levels of growth measured as per capita income (EG_PCI). Data from the top and bottom
deciles of those states are selected as controls. Each is then tested to determine whether
an established level of economic development influences the ability of political climate or
business climate to predict changes in the levels of economic growth. The dependent
variables used for this analysis were collected for 2005.
The descriptive statistics for all variables measured as five year averages are
summarized in Appendix B. Appendix C depicts the correlations of the variables.
Profile of Economic Growth Across States
Growth as per capita income
Figure 4.1 demonstrates how the levels of per capita income vary across the U.S.
States. These data are the average value collected from 1987 through 2005. The figure
highlights a disparity in annual earnings of over ten thousand dollars.
This chart gives an indication of how states might be grouped according to levels
of income. In a third of the states the average levels of per capita income exceed $25,000.
Approximately 40% fall between $20,000 and $25,000. The remainder of the states falls
below $20,000.
The observation that these states distributed themselves roughly in thirds helped
guide the design of the Boolean filtering algorithms that were discussed earlier. It is also
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worth noting the presence of an elite grouping of states. Clearly 10% of the states are
enjoying much higher levels of growth measured by this variable.
This observation, and its relationship to the other findings, is discussed later in the
summary.

Figure 4.1 Profile of U.S. States Average per Capita Income 1987-2005
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Growth as gross state product
Figures 4.2 and 4.3 highlights how the year over year changes in gross state
product varies across the states. The graph depicts the average year over year change in
GSP from 1980 through 2005. As seen in this chart, approximately 20% of the states
enjoy high levels of growth. Roughly 65% of the states have experienced an average
level of change in their output. 15% of the states experience a level of growth that is 18%
below the mean of 6.35%.
Figure 4.2 Profile of U.S. States Average Gross State Product 1980-2005
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Figure 4.3 highlights the nature of the standard deviations within each state over
this same timeframe. The chart offers little to suggest an opportunity for convergence to
either a higher or lower rate of growth. The standard deviation appears as the darker of
the two bars. The lighter bar is the average for that state over the 15 years.

Figure 4.3 Profile of U.S. States Average and Standard Deviation GSP 1980-2005
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Profile of Economic Development Across the States
Figure 4.4 portrays the average level of economic development in each state over
the years 1980 to 2005. Recall from the methods section that the QOL is a composite
index where a lower value defines a higher QOL. This chart displays a familiar picture:
roughly a third of the states enjoy a high quality of life, defined as QOL values less than
2.00. A second group exhibits a QOL that would be defined as average: QOL values
between 2.00 and 3.00. A third group displays values exceeding 3.0. This final grouping
clearly exhibits a particularly low QOL. Quality of Life ranges from 1.00 to 4.00.
In comparing the rankings here to those that depict growth measured as per capita
income (Figure 4.1), one finds several instances where states occupying the top tier in
terms of economic growth exhibit top tier performance in the composite quality of life
index. So while the states of Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Wisconsin,
Delaware, Minnesota and Illinois diverge in terms of industrial base, geography, and size,
they converge around these measures of growth and those of development. Likewise,
states such as Louisiana, West Virginia, Arkansas and New Mexico have low levels of
income and are among those states ranked low in the quality of life index.
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Figure 4.4 Profile of U.S. States Average Economic Development, QOL 1980-2005

Average Economic Development: QOL Index

Profile of Political Climate Across the States
As outlined in the section on method, the indicators of a state’s political climate
incorporate two measures of its political ideology. Ideology is defined by measuring the
size of state and local government and assessing the tax burden on individuals. Each
measure is compared to the average from across all states in that year. That comparison
serves as the benchmark for categorizing the government as excessively engaged in the
affairs of the individual or responsive to meeting their needs.
Size of government.
As noted in the methods, the measure used to gauge the size of state and local
government was developed as an index. As was the case in all indices developed for this
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investigation, the lower the number the more favorable the conditions for economic
growth. Figure 4.5 depicts the variation in the average of this index across all states. The
data were collected over the years 1987 through 2005. Here the states distribute
themselves into four distinct groups. Approximately 30% of the states exhibit a
comparatively low level of employment in the public sector. This is defined by an index
value of less than 1.50. States falling in this category outwardly display a political
ideology deemed favorable to enhancing levels of economic growth. A second grouping,
representing 35% of this sample, exhibits levels of public employment on par with the
levels observed over all states and time ranges. This is defined by an index that hovers at
or slightly above 2.00. Roughly 20% of the states have levels above the average. These
states are categorized as high and therefore potentially unfavorable to growth. However,
they are not immediately classified as excessive. This third group is defined by index
values 2.50 to 3.00. Finally, there is a fourth group where the political ideology seems
indicative of governments that could be judged excessive. About 15% of the states have
values of over 3.00 and would fall into that category. The assignment of states to
categories is based on the suggestion by the literature that as the size of a state’s
government expands beyond some norm, (in this analysis statistically beyond or below
the average) it starts to perform functions that other states have chosen to outsource. A
quick comparison of the data presented in Figure 4.5 alongside that presented in Figure
4.4 suggests some overlap between states that have low ratio of its citizens employed in
government and those with high QOL. Examples include Massachusetts, Connecticut,
Colorado, and New Hampshire.
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Figure 4.5 Profile of U.S. States Average Government Employment 1987-2005

State and local tax burdens
Figure 4.6 depicts the variations in the average level of state and local tax burden
across all states over the years 1987 to 2005. A comparison of the distribution of states
listed here against those appearing in the chart for the QOL (Figure 4.4) reveals a rather
startling find: several of the states with the highest tax burdens enjoy a high quality of life
and have the highest levels of economic growth. For example, the states of Washington,
Minnesota, New Jersey, and Connecticut exhibit tax burdens in the top 20-30% of those
measured, yet each ranks in the top 20-30 % in the categories of economic development
(QOL) and in economic growth (PCI). So while several of the business climate reports
tout the relationship between lower taxes and higher levels of economic growth, their
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claim is not borne out of these data. Take the case of the state of Alabama. The tax
burden is low. Based on the reports from the business climate indices one would assume
that its citizens would enjoy a higher quality of life and a higher overall level of
economic growth. On the contrary, Alabama occupies the lowest tier in terms of
economic growth (per capita income), and has the same position in the QOL index.
Dye’s (1980) suggestion that tax burdens have no direct impact on economic growth
seems to have merit. Only New Hampshire occupies a top 10 position in all categories
that the literature would define as favorable to improving economic growth: it has a high
level of growth, measured either as GSP or per capita income, it has a low tax rate, it has
a low ratio of employees working in state and local government, and it enjoys a high
quality of life.
Figure 4.6 Profile of U.S. States Average Tax Burden 1987-2005
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Figure 4.7 highlights how over the years a narrow variance in the measures associated
with tax burdens suggests little convergence around an acceptable or lower level of
taxation (standard deviation is the small solid bar). Over time state governments have
gravitated to a burden that allows them to operate and serve the needs of their
constituency. From the data presented in this section it appears there is some benefit to
shifting this paradigm. Several states where taxes are high and growth, both in per capita
income and GSP is low need to reconsider the role their governments are performing. As
seen in the earlier Figure 4.6, history suggests that it would be a rare occasion for a state
to stray from the rates already established. Appendix B details the descriptive statistics
for the variables used in this study.
Figure 4.7 Profile of U.S. States Average, Standard Deviation Tax Burden 1987-2005
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Economic Growth Measured as Per Capita Income
This section highlights the results of the OLS-LEV tests used to define the ability
of business climate and political climate to predict changes in the level of economic
growth measured as the per capita income of individuals within a state. The measures of
the dependent variable are depicted in actual dollars. See Table 3.1 for an explanation of
the variables used in these tables. In all instances PC_ stands for political climate. The
designation (_I) indicates a measure of ideology and the designation (_C) indicates a
measure of political capacity to manage. For example the abbreviation for political
climate, ideology defined by revenue source, tax burden, is shown as PC_I_ RS.
Table 4.1 Five Year Average, Per Capita Income vs. Political Climate
Annual

R-square

Step

Variable

Lag

(adjusted)

Coefficient

SE (coeff)

Constant

1

PC_I_RS

10

0.035

72361.131

4397.830

23390.981

2

PC_I_GEMP

10

0.231***

-2143.544***

564.450

35324.978

3

PC_C_GPP

0

0.003

47.431

127.155

27043.256

PC_ I_RS

10

0.249***

51474.440

49021.739

+ GEMP

10

(0.217)

-2074.018***

567.772

PC_ I_RS

10

53071.280

49665.685

+ GEMP

10

0.251**

-2111.569***

581.913

+ GPP

0

(0.202)

-42.521

114.985

4

5

*p<.05; ** p<.01; ***p<.001; n=50.
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29843.281

33212.371

Economic growth: 5 year average per capita income vs. political climate.
The only measure of political climate suited to predicting economic growth when
growth is defined by the average level of per capita income over the years 2001 to 2005
is the ratio of employment in state and local government (PC_I_ GEMP). Recall from the
methods section, the value of (PC_I_GEMP) is that of an index. It was derived by
comparing the ratio of each state’s level of employment in the public sector against total
employment. The index was used to establish a relative level of employment in each state
in each year. The values range from 1.00 (a statistically lower percentage of employment
in the public sector) to 4.00 (a statistically higher percentage). The values were used to
make comparisons of this measure across the states.
A hypothetical example adopted from the values in step 2 helps to explain the
influence that levels of government employment have over levels of economic growth:
EG_PCI = 35324.98 – 2143.54 (PC_I_GEMP).
Since a higher index represents a larger ratio of employment in the public sector,
every 1.00 point of change in the index of (PC_I_GEMP) represents a loss of $2143 in
personal income. This model explains 23% of the variation in economic growth measured
as per capita income (p<.001).
While the additive models combining measures of employment with the level of
tax burden (PC_I_RS), or a state’s capacity to manage (PC_C_GPP), improve the
explanatory power of the outputs in step 2, R-square of 0.231 ( p<.001) vs. R-square of
0.249 ( p<.001), the adjusted R-square of 0.217 reduces the significance of these multivariable models. The size of the SE attached to the coefficient (PC_I_RS) and
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(PC_C_GPP) indicates these multivariate models are exhibiting an unreliable level of
interaction.
The outputs in steps 2, 4 and 5 demonstrate how increasing levels of employment
in the public sector have a negative impact on levels of personal income. The values
assigned to the coefficients for (PC_I_GEMP) and the standard error of these estimates
remains within 5% of one another. These finding from this table are supported by the
works of Karabegovic and McMahon (2005) and that of Higgins, Levy, and Young
(2003), all of whom revealed a negative correlation between increases in the
representation of the public sector and the measures they used to define economic growth.
The regression tests in steps 3 and 5 suggest that the measure used to gauge a
states capacity to manage (PC_I_GPP), adds no value to the explanatory power of a
model defined solely by levels of government employment.
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Table 4.2 Per Capita Income in 2005 vs. Political Climate
Step

Variable

Annual Lag

R-square (Adjusted)

Coefficient

SE (Coeff)

Constant

1

PC_I_RS

5

0.000

NA

NA

NA

2

PC_I_GEMP

10

0.201**

-2135.705**

613.740

37687.733

3

PC_C_GPP

0

0.026

166.870

145.995

19658.219

PC_ I_RS

5

0.201**

-1363.870

54494.831

+ GEMP

10

(0.167)

-2135.473***

620.300

PC_ I_RS

5

-3500.580

54876.443

-2063.532**

632.059

95.625

136.345

37828.366

4

0.210*
5

+ GEMP

10

30090.551

(0.158)
+ GPP

0

*p<.05; ** p<.01; ***p<.001; n=50.
Economic growth: per capita income 2005 vs. political climate.
The results in Table 4.2 indicate that the only measure of political climate suited
to predicting economic growth when growth is defined by the level of per capita income
in 2005 is the ratio of employment in state and local government ( PC_I_ GEMP). These
results confirm those seen in Table 4.1. In both examples, when political climate is
defined as employment in the public sector (PC_I_GEMP), these OLS-LEV models are
able to explain between 20% and 23% of the variation in levels of per capita income.
Inserting actual data into these models reveals the utility of these estimates. In the
base year 2005 the per capita income in Alabama was $29,623 and the index of
employment was 3.0.
EG_PCI (2005) = 37687.733 -2135.705(PC_I_GEMP)
The model estimates the level of per capita income at $31,280 or within 5% of
that observed.
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Inserting these same determinants from the state of Connecticut, where the level
of employment in the public sector (PC_I_GEMP), is relatively low, defined as a score of
1.0 and the level of per capita income is relatively high at $47,388, yields an estimated
income of $35,552. The error of this estimate is over 25% of that observed. This suggests
the model is sensitive to variations in the initial level of income.
Contrary to the popular notion that an increase in taxes hinders growth, this model
discounts the notion that this measure of political ideology (PC_I_RS) can reliably
predict a change in the level of per capita income. As noted in the review of the literature,
these are the same conclusions reached by Dye (1980).
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Table 4.3 Per Capita Income 2005 vs. Business Climate
Step

Variable

Annual Lag

R-square (Adjusted)

Coefficient

SE( Coeff)

Constant

1

BC_ BHI

2

0.265***

2494.944

599.954

20812.463

2

BC_TAXF

2

0.000

NA

NA

NA

3

BC_DRC-C

2

0.356***

206.116***

40.001

17392.780

4

BC_DRC-P

2

0.374***

206.331***

38.495

17371.807

5

BC_ DRC_V

2

0.130**

123.847**

46.157

23764.323

91.090

51.097

147.736**

44.067

59.488

42.122

BC_DRC_C
0.488***
6

+DRC_P

2

10294.209

(0.455)
+DRC_V

*p<.05; ** p<.01; ***p<.001; n=50.
Economic growth: per capita income in 2005 vs. business climate.
The results in Table 4.3 define whether measures of business climate can reliably
predict economic growth measured as per capita income. A lag period of 2 years was
applied to all measures of business climate. The rationale for this selection was presented
in the methods section.
With the exception of the data from the Tax Foundation, the findings in Table 4.3
suggest that any measure of business climate can reliably predict between 13% and 37%
of the variation in the level of per capita income ( p<0.01 or higher). While the additive
effects of the development report card offers the greatest potential for predicting changes
in per capita income, the variables in that additive model appear to be interacting as the
variables have lost the significance (adjusted R-squared of 0.455, (p<.001)).
In their 2006 report the BHI claims that every 1.0 point rise in its index translates
to a $416.80 increase in per capita income (R-Square of 0.84, (p<.05)) (Suffolk
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University, 2006). For the rankings published in 2008 they claim that same 1.0 point
increase translates into a $1,546 increase in per capita income, yet the R-squared has
dropped to 0.10. Finally, for that same year (2008), they claim that a 10 point increase in
the overall ranking equates to a $1,130 increase in per capita income (Suffolk University,
2010). The outputs from the models produced by this investigation indicate that the BHI
index has the capacity to explain 26.5% of the variation in the level of per capita income:
EG _PCI (2005) = 20812.463 + 2494.944 (BC_BHI(2003)).
Since the BHI is quick to point out that their data represents a time lag of from 1
to 3 years we will take the liberty of using the output in step 1, Table 4.3 to test their
estimates.
The BHI data indicates that in 2006 Maine was ranked 36th with an index of 4.33.
In 2008 it climbed 10 points in the ranking to 26th and had a score of 4.70. By inserting
the difference between these scores (0.370), into the model in Table 4.3 one anticipates
an increase in real per capita income of $923. This value is slightly less than that
predicted by the BHI. In fact, the most recent data suggests that over those years the
income in ME increased $2,707. Across those same years a similar shift occurred in the
ranking for the state of Alaska. In 2006 the BHI ranked Alaska 14th with a score of 5.75,
and by 2008 it had slipped to 24th and had a score of 4.82. Inserting the difference in
these scores into the equation developed here results in a loss in per capita income of
$2,320. In point of fact, over that interval Alaska experienced an increase in per capita
income of $5,141.
Clearly none of the models discussed in these examples offers the reliability
expected from a good forecasting tool. Yet the estimates calculated by the models
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developed in this study and those of the BHI produce errors that were surprisingly close
to one another. For the state of Maine the BHI estimates a gain of $1,130. This represents
an error of $1,577. The error of the estimate produced from the models developed from
this investigation was $1,784. The difference between these two estimates is
approximately 14%. In the example of Alaska the BHI error amounts to $6,271. The
error produced from the models developed by this investigation is $7,461, a difference of
19%.
Once again, the explanatory power of the political climate variables developed for
this investigation appears sensitive to the extremes in per capita income. The same
appears to be true of the BHI index of competitiveness.
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Economic Growth Measured as Gross State Product
This section highlights the ability of business climate and political climate to
predict changes in the level of economic growth measured as the annual change in gross
state product.
Table 4.4 Five Year Average, Gross State Product vs. Political Climate
Step

Variable

Annual Lag

R-square (Adjusted)

Coefficient

SE( Coeff)

Constant

1

PC_I_RS

10

0.102*

-38.300*

16.363

9.286

2

PC_I_GEMP

10

0.139**

0.516**

0.186

4.248

3

PC_C_GPP

0

0.018

-0.036

0.039

8.266

0.216**

-33.562*

PC_ I_RS

10
(0.183)

0.470**

4
+ GEMP

10

PC_ I_RS

10

15.559
7.822
0.180
-33.132*

5

+ GEMP
+ GPP

15.770
0.218**

0.460

(0.167)

-0.011

0.332

10

8.731

0.037

0

*p<.05; ** p<.01; ***p<.001; n=50.
Economic growth: 5 year average gross state product vs. political climate.
The results in Table 4.4 highlight how the measures of political ideology interact
to produce a small, but nonetheless significant influence over changes in economic
growth defined as gross state product. An increase in the levels of taxation decreases the
level of a state’s GSP. Increasing the size of the public sector appears to have a positive
influence on the value of the products produced by the state’s economy (EG_GSP).
The interplay between these two variables is shown in a hypothetical example developed
from the equations in step 4 of Table 4.4:
151

EG_GSP = 7.822 – 33.562 (PC_I_RS) + 0.470 (PC_I_GEMP)
This model is directed at predicting economic growth measured as the value of
economic output from a state. The model tests the scenario that over a 5 year time frame
the state increases the tax burden by 1%. That move reduces the change in GSP by an
average of 0.336%. This finding is consistent with those elements of the literature that
associate a state’s failure to attract and retain business to levels of taxation. A closer look
at the equation derived in step 4 suggests that the negative influence from increasing
taxes can be offset by increasing employment in the public sector. For example, if the
average value assigned to the index of employment in the public sector were to increase
1.00, the loss of GSP, due to the hypothetical tax increase, could be offset by 0.470%.
While the additive model appears significant (p<.01), it explains less than 20% of the
variation in a state’s GSP.
Finally, the outputs in Table 4.4 continue to demonstrate the value of using
political ideology as a predictor of economic growth. The smaller correlation coefficients
produced here (R-square = 0.139 (p<.01) suggest the measure of public sector
employment is better suited to predicting changes in the level of economic growth
measured as per capita income (EG_PCI), ( R-Squared =23.1%, (p<.001)) than growth
measured as gross state product. The fact that this variable surfaces as being significant in
both models offers some hope that there is some utility to this variable. It should also be
noted that in Table 4.1 the measure of growth is per capita income and the coefficient
attached to the measure of government employment is negative. In Table 4.4 the measure
of economic growth is defined as change in GSP and the coefficient attached to the
measure of government employment is positive. This is to be expected. This finding
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validates the value of the neoclassic economic models suggesting that economic growth
be measured two ways. Clearly each is measuring something different.
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Table 4.5 Gross State Product in 2005 vs. Political Climate
Step

Variable

Annual Lag

R-square (Adjusted)

Coefficient

SE( Coeff)

Constant

1

PC_I_RS

5

0.112*

-75.393*

30.665

14.407

2

PC_I_GEMP

10

0.187**

1.111**

0.334

4.319

3

PC_C_GPP

0

0.036

-0.104

0.078

15.117

PC_ I_RS

5

0.304 ***

-76.867**

27.445

+ GEMP

10

(0.274)

1.124***

0.312

PC_ I_RS

5

-75.594**

27.578

1.081***

0.318

-0.057

0.069

12.245

4

0.314***
5

+ GEMP

10

16.851

(0.269)
+ GPP

0

*p<.05; ** p<.01; ***p<.001; n=50.
Economic growth: gross state product in 2005 vs. political climate.
While the results from the tests made against the data collected in 2005 are similar
to those produced from the averaged data, there are a few noteworthy exceptions.
The outputs in step 4 highlight the combined influence of taxation ( PS_I_RS)
and employment in the public sector (PC_I_GEMP). These two measures of ideology
produce an additive model that improves the explanatory power produced from either of
the individual measures. The additive model yields an adjusted R-square of 0.274 (p<.01).
A hypothetical example using the equation shown in step 4:
EG_GSP = 12.245 - 76.867 (PC_I_RS) + 1.1124 (PC_I_GEMP)
In this example we see how increasing the state and local tax burden by 1% translates
into 0.76% reduction in the level of economic growth measured as the GSP. As we
observed in the models constructed from the 5-year average data, increasing the level of
employment in the public sector by a 1.00 value of the index will offset the loss of
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growth created by a 1% increase in tax burden 1.1124-0.7687 = 0.3427. Examining the
ratio of the coefficients highlights the inflection point at which increasing the size of the
public sector fails to absorb the negative effect of increased taxation. This occurs at the
point where the level of taxation goes above 1.46%. These findings appear to contradict
the claims that a government’s size is negatively correlated with levels of economic
growth. Alternatively, this finding appear to confirm Singleton and Griswold’s (1999)
suggestion that we need to shift away from relying on measures of a bureaucracy’s size to
determine if the policy environment fosters or stymies innovation, and instead begin to
adopt indicators that judge the quality of the institution. The nature of this contradiction
and its relationship to the finding from this investigation are reexamined in the summary.
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Table 4.6 Gross State Product in 2005 vs. Business Climate
Step

Variable

Annual Lag

R-square (Adjusted)

Coefficient

SE( Coeff)

Constant

1

BC_ BHI

2

0.004

NA

NA

NA

2

BC_TAXF

2

0.137**

1.087**

0.393

0.861

3

BC_DRC-C

2

0.017

NA

NA

NA

4

BC_DRC-P

2

0.084*

-0.053*

0.025

10.678

5

BC_ DRC_V

2

0.087*

-0.054*

0.026

10.792

0.052

0.035

-0.072*

0.030

-0.069*

0.029

BC_DRC_C
0.136*
6

+DRC_P

2

+ DRC_V

13.510

*p<.05; ** p<.01; ***p<.001; n=50.
Economic growth: gross state product in 2005 vs. business climate.
In earlier findings measures of business climate seemed well-suited to predicting
level of economic growth measured as per capita income. The outputs in Table 4.6 make
it clear that none of the business climate measures are suited to predicting changes in
economic growth when it is measured as a change in the level of gross state product.
The goal of publishing an indicator of business climate is to suggest ways to
change policy to attract and retain business. The prescriptions offered should be able to
predict changes in the level growth measured as GSP. The measure of business climate
best suited to predicting levels of growth in GSP is the one created by the Tax Foundation.
It has an R-squared of 0.125 (p<.05). Yet that measure remains subordinate to the
explanatory powers of a simple, objective determinant of a state’s political climate (see
step 4 Table 4.5; adjusted R-square = 0.274, (p<01)).
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Economic Development
This section highlights the ability of a state’s business and political climate to
predict changes in the level of economic development occurring within a state. Recall
from the methods section that economic development is defined by a proxy that indexes
the quality of life enjoyed by individuals within a state. An index value of 1.00 indicates
a high quality of life. By contrast, a value of 4.00 suggests the presence of conditions that
hamper the prospects for achieving a high quality of life.
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Table 4.7 Five Year Average Economic Development vs. Political Climate
R-square
Step

Variable

Annual Lag

Coefficient

SE( coeff)

Constant

(adjusted)
1

PC_I_RS

10

0.142**

-23.455

8..310

4.849

2

PC_I_GEMP

10

0.091*

0.217*

0.099

1.968

3

PC_C_GPP

0

0.001

NA

NA

NA

PC_ I_RS

10

0.209**

-21.565**

8.119

+ GEMP

10

(0.176)

0.188*

0.094

PC_ I_RS

10

-22.375**

8.624

0.207*

0.100

0.022*

0.021

4.265

4

0.231**
5

+ GEMP

10

2.556

(0.181)
+ GPP

0

*p<.05; ** p<.01; ***p<.001; n=50.
Economic development: 5 year average vs. political climate.
Table 4.7 highlights how a state’s political climate influences its level of
economic development.
When compared to the measures of economic growth, the first change noted is the
change in the precedence relationship assigned to the individual variables. However, the
results in Table 4.7 reaffirm the utility that can be attached to combining the indicators of
political ideology, employment in the public sector, and levels of tax burden. They
predict changes in the levels of per capita income (Table 4.1, step 2, adjusted R-square of
0.217, (p<0.001)), changes in gross state product (Table 4.4, step 4, adjusted R-square of
0.183, (p<.05)), and changes in development (Table 4.7, step 4, adjusted R-square of
0.176, (p<.05)), at or about the same level. Again, the consistency of these findings
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strengthens the case for adopting measures of political ideology as an indicator suited to
predicting changes in the levels of economic development and economic growth.
The outputs in Table 4.7 highlight the presence of a positive relationship between
measures of employment in the public sector (PC_I_GEMP), and levels of economic
development within a state. When tested as a single variable this measure of political
ideology only explains a modest amount of the variation in economic development
(9.1% , ( p<.05)). The additive models produce results that are roughly twice as strong:
adjusted R-square of 0.176 (p<.01).
A hypothetical example is based on the equation in step 2:
ED_QOL = 1.968 + 0.217 (PC_I_GEMP)
ED_QOL = 1.968 + 0.217 (2.07)
ED_QOL = 2.41
Inserting the average value of political ideology measured as level of employment
in the public sector (PC_I_GEMP) lagged from the period 1990-1995 predicts a level of
economic development consistent with the average observed over the period 2001
through 2005. While the model can only explain 9.1% of variation in these relationships,
the coefficients assigned to this variable are consistent throughout the table and reinforce
the presence of an inverse relationship between levels of employment in the public sector
and the conditions that improve levels of economic development. Recall that a higher
value in the (ED_QOL) index is a lower quality of life! Since lawmakers have control
over the social programs that improve an individual’s QOL, such as public safety,
healthcare, and access to education, and since the call to improve these conditions is often
used to justify increasing the size of government, these results appear antithetical. Yet the
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literature makes it clear that more government does not necessarily equate with better
government. To that point, these findings seem to suggest that more government does not
by default create a system capable of providing its citizens with a higher quality of life. In
terms of the 17.6% of the variation in levels of economic growth explained by the
additive model shown in step 4, less government elevates the quality of life for
individuals.
As anticipated, the level of taxation also has an inverse relationship to levels of
economic development. Again recall that the lower the index of economic development
(measured as the composite index of quality of life), the higher the quality of life:
EG_QOL = 4.840 – 23.455 (PS_I_RS)
Every 1% increase in the state and local tax burden increases the quality of life by
0.235 points. This equation only explains 14.2% of the variation in level of economic
development, (p<.01).
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Table 4.8 Economic Development 2005 vs. Political Climate
Step

Variable

Annual Lag

R-square (Adjusted)

Coefficient

SE( Coeff)

Constant

1

PC_I_RS

5

0.028

-10.378

8.901

3.524

2

PC_I_GEMP

10

0.041

0.175

0.100

2.089

3

PC_C_GPP

0

0.001

NA

NA

NA

PC_I_ RS

5

0.089

-10.610

8.706

+ GEMP

10

(0.051)

0.177

0.099

PC_I_ RS

5

-10.876

8.785

0.186

0.101

0.012

0.022

3.183

4

0.095
5

+ GEMP

10

2.219

(0.036)
+ GPP

5

*p<.05; ** p<.01; ***p<.001; n=50.
Economic development: 2005 vs. political climate.
The results in Table 4.8 suggest an inability to attach significance to the
explanatory power of these outputs. However, the signs on the coefficients presented both
here and in the previous analysis indicate that the presence of more government or higher
levels of taxation reduces the level of economic development within a state.
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Table 4.9 Economic Development 2005 vs. Business Climate
Step

Variable

Annual Lag

R-square (Adjusted)

Coefficient

SE( Coeff)

Constant

1

BC_ BHI

2

0.457***

-0.490***

0.077

4.901

2

BC_TAXF

2

0.000

NA

NA

NA

3

BC_DRC-C

2

0.287***

-0.028***

0.006

4.584

4

BC_DRC-P

2

0.498***

-0.036***

0.005

5.197

5

BC- DRC_V

2

0.011

NA

NA

NA

-0.013

0.007

-0.029***

0.006

0.005

0.006

BC-DRC_C
0.532***
6

+DRC_P

2

2.519

(0.502)
+ DRC_V

*p<.05; ** p<.01; ***p<.001; n=50.
Economic development: 2005 vs. business climate.
The results in Table 4.9 highlight how measures of business climate vary in their
ability to predict changes in the level of economic development. For example, the BHI
index is a much better indication of changes in the levels of economic development (Rsquared of 0.457, (p<.001)) than it is an indicator of change in either growth measured as
per capita income (R-squared of 0.265, p<.001, Table 4.3, step 1) or growth in gross state
product (R-squared of 0.004, p=NA, Table 4.6, step 1). Similar variations are seen in the
way the development report card’s measure of performance (BC_DRC_P), predicts
change over these variables. A closer examination of these relationships reveals that the
variables used to create the series of DRC indices have similarities to those used to create
our QOL index. This may explain its strength to predict our measure of economic
development: it is measuring the same thing.
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The variability around what each of these business climate indices appears to be
measuring was expected. Fisher, (2005) based his critique of these indices on the
suggestion that they incorporate measures that are themselves indicators of growth or are
measuring the results of growth.
Recall earlier that we hypothesized that an accurate prediction of growth requires
indicators that can measure the changes that occur on each side of the Schumpeterian
cycle of growth. Any model designed to predict growth must capture the quantitative
improvements in an economy and the qualitative improvements that define changes in the
quality of life. To the extent that Fisher considers the treatment of these qualitative
measures as outcomes of growth, he is correct. The inability of the published index to
differentiate between these two measures is witnessed by the way they vary in their
ability to predict the outcomes. The results in Table 4.9 confirm the assumption tendered
at the outset of this study that some indices are better indicators of growth while others
are better indicators of development.
Controlling for Economic Development
One of the most compelling arguments used to counter policies of growth are those that
suggest the negative impact that such policies will have on the QOL enjoyed by the
majority of citizens. This investigation develops a simple model that puts that argument
to the test.
Models are created to determine how the level of economic development in a state
affects the ability of business and political climates to indicate changes in levels of
growth and development. The real question is whether the initial conditions that define
the presence or absence of economic development dilute or reinforce the ability of
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political climate or business climate to predict changes in the levels of growth. Based on
the literature the expectation is that states will respond differently.
For this round of tests states are divided into two groups. Those states ranked in the top
decile for levels of economic development include Connecticut, Minnesota, Washington,
New Hampshire, Colorado, Iowa, New Jersey, Hawaii, Wyoming and Nebraska. States
ranked in the bottom decile include Oklahoma, Kentucky, Arkansas, West Virginia, New
Mexico, Tennessee, Mississippi, Alabama, South Carolina and Louisiana. The details
associated with this exercise are provided in the section on methods.
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Table 4.10 Top 10 States, Per Capita Income vs. Political Climate
Step

Variable

Annual Lag

R-square (Adjusted)

Coefficient

SE( Coeff)

Constant

1

PC_I_RS

5

0.003

-20122.603

137520.862

39680.469

2

PC_I_GEMP

5

0.077

-1520.391

1855.788

40454.043

3

PC_C_GPP

0

0.075

-244.900

304.570

57337.675

PC_I_ RS

5

0.077

-2753.411

143264.151

+ GEMP

10

(0.000)

-1514.174

2010.062

PC_I_ RS

5

43236.848

158685.976

-1622.110

2072.721

-281.831

360.125

40731.652

4

0.163
5

+ GEMP

5

58902.640

(0.000).
+ GPP

0

*p<.05; ** p<.01; ***p<.001; n=10.
Economic growth: per capita income vs. political climate, top 10 states.
These findings indicate that where the level of economic development is already
high the variables used to define a state’s political climate prove to be unreliable
indicators of changes in per capita income.
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Table 4.11 Bottom 10 States, Per Capita Income vs. Political Climate
Step

Variable

Annual Lag

R-square (Adjusted)

Coefficient

SE( Coeff)

Constant

1

PC_I_RS

5

0.574**

-191960.283**

58520.740

47169.925

2

PC_I_GEMP

5

0.532*

-1379.440*

457.499

31780.477

3

PC_C_GPP

0

0.076

-121.115

149.477

37445.083

PC_I_ RS

5

0.644*

-122198.633

82539.499

+ GEMP

5

(0.542)

-722.037

615.908

PC_I_ RS

5

-92506.763

96151.560

-890.504

686.110

-79.309

115.648

42217.238

4

0.669
5

+ GEMP

5

46035.478

(0.540)
+ GPP

0

*p<.05; ** p<.01; ***p<.001; n=10.
Economic growth: per capita income vs. political climate, bottom 10 states.
Comparing the findings in Table 4.11 with those in Table 4.10 indicates the wide
swings in the predictive power of each variable. These variations are in response to the
level of economic development enjoyed by a state.
Table 4.11 exposes some significant differences in the capacity of the models to predict
growth in per capita income. Table 4.10 demonstrates how a high quality of life mutes
the power of political climate to predict changes in the level of economic growth. In
states where the level of QOL is low, these same variables play a significant role in
predicting a change in economic growth. Increasing levels of taxation in low QOL states
decreases per capita earnings in a far more dramatic way than in states where the QOL is
high. In states with a low QOL every 1% change in the level of state or local tax
decreases per capita earnings by approx $2,000 ( R-squared = 0.574. (p<.01)).
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Based on this model, the 2005 per capita income in the state of Louisiana is
predicted to be $27,013. The actual value was $24,664, an error of approximately 10%.
EG_PCI = 47,169 – (191960 *0.105) = $27,013.
Note, in 2000 the tax burden for this group of states ranged from 8.3% to 11.1%
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Table 4.12 Top 10 States, Per Capita Income vs. Business Climate
Step

Variable

Annual Lag

R-square (Adjusted)

Coefficient

SE( Coeff)

Constant

1

BC_ BHI

2

0.024

NA

NA

NA

2

BC_TAXF

2

0.000

NA

NA

NA

3

BC_DRC-C

2

0.139

117.533

103.458

27774.842

4

BC_DRC-P

2

0.208

214.768

148.248

19181.197

5

BC- DRC_V

2

0.278

136.399

77.761

27117.154

-21.216

156.232

111.200

202.397

112.870

132.785

BC-DRC_C
0.312
6

+DRC_P

2

21168.002

(0.000)
+DRC_V

*p<.05; ** p<.01; ***p<.001; n=10.
Economic growth: per capita income vs. business climate, top 10 states.
In states with a high level of QOL the measures of a state’s business climate are
unable to reliably predict change in the level of economic growth measured as per capita
income.
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Table 4.13 Bottom 10 States, Per Capita Income vs. Business Climate
Annual
Step

Variable

R-square (Adjusted)

Coefficient

SE( Coeff)

Constant

Lag
1

BC_ BHI

2

0.433*

2287.033*

925.632

18901.839

2

BC_TAXF

2

0.243

1637.756

1022.795

19540.224

3

BC_DRC-C

2

0.056

NA

NA

NA

4

BC_DRC-P

2

0.250

114.000

69.816

20940.100

5

BC- DRC_V

2

0.036

NA

NA

NA

21.863

95.651

101.773

88.369

25.325

60.495

BC-DRC_C
0.273
6

+DRC_P

2

18558.103

(0.000)
+ DRC_V

*p<.05; ** p<.01; ***p<.001; n=10.
Economic growth: per capita income vs. business climate, bottom 10 states.
Clearly a pattern is beginning to emerge. There is reason to begin questioning the
value of using business climate indices to predict economic outcomes. From the results
presented thus far it appears that measures of business climate have the capacity to
predict changes in levels of per capita earnings in states that exhibit low levels of
economic development. A quick comparison of the results presented in Table 4.13 and
those in Table 4.11 reveals how the measure of political ideology that gauges levels of
taxation (PC_I_RS) is the best predictor of growth in states when the level of
development is low (R-squared = 0.574, p<.01). From Table 4.13 one can see that from
within the cadre of business climate measures the best predictor of growth when levels of
development are low is the BHI (R-squared = 0.433. (p<.05)), but that is still subordinate
to the measure of political ideology.
169

Table 4.14 Top 10 States, Gross State Product vs. Political Climate
Step

Variable

AnnualLag

R-square (Adjusted)

Coefficient

SE( Coeff)

Constant

1

PC_I_RS

5

0.010

-23.709

84.744

9.259

2

PC_I_GEMP

10

0.529*

2.459*

0.820

2.095

3

PC_C_GPP

0

0.190

-0.241

0.176

26.272

PC_I_ RS

5

0.577*

-53.294

59.986

+ GEMP

10

(0.456)

2.579*

0.842

PC_I_ RS

5

-16.348

56.625

2.492*

0.740

-0.226

0.129

7.469

4

0.721*
5

+ GEMP

10

22.066

(0.582)
+ GPP

5

*p<.05; ** p<.01; ***p<.001; n=10.
Economic growth: gross state product vs. political climate, top 10 states.
When the level of economic development in the state is high, its political ideology,
defined as the level of employment in the public sector, is a reliable predictor of changes
in its GSP. Overall, this measure of ideology is a better predictor of change in GSP when
the quality of life is high (R-square = 0.529. (p<.05)) than it is of the states considered in
aggregate (R-square of 0.18,(p<.01), Table 4.5)).
The positive sign attached to the coefficients in both models indicates that a
higher ratio of employment in the public sector yields higher GSP. Recall that the lower
the index of employment the lower the relative percent of the work force employed in
public sector. Note the results presented here are the opposite of those observed when
growth measured as change in per capita income. There the relationship of increasing
levels of employment is reversed. The influence of this variable is highest in low
performing states (see Table 4.11 steps 2 and 4).
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The equation from the results in Table 4.14:
EG_GSP = 2.095 + 2.459 (PC_I_GEMP)
While Table 4.14 suggests that the additive effects of political ideology coalesce
to produce a model with higher R-squared values (adjusted R-square of 0.582, p<.05) the
small sample size, (N=10), is a signal cautioning against assigning too much significance
to the combined effect of these variables.
Finally, while the output is not deemed statistically significant, it is worth noting
that this is the first time that the R-squared associated with the capacity to manage
(PC_C_GPP) has been elevated into the double digits.
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Table 4.15 Bottom 10 States, Gross State Product vs. Political Climate
Step

Variable

Annual Lag

R-square (Adjusted)

Coefficient

SE( Coeff)

Constant

1

PC_I_RS

5

0.100

82.614

87.447

-1.453

2

PC_I_GEMP

10

0.205

0.920

0.640

4.133

3

PC_C_GPP

0

0.059

-0.103

0.147

15.300

PC_I_ RS

5

0.205

-3.795

125.794

+ GEMP

10

(0.000)

0.941

0.980

PC_I_ RS

5

-21.791

155.107

1.055

1.158

0.045

0.188

4.453

4

0.212
5

+ GEMP

10

2.367

(0.000)
+ GPP

0

*p<.05; ** p<.01; ***p<.001; n=10.
Economic growth: gross state product vs. political climate, bottom 10 states.
The findings presented in the prior tables demonstrate how the measure of
employment in the public sector has a far more dramatic impact on the prediction of GSP
where the level of QOL is high. As noted from Table 4.14, the measure of employment in
the public sector explains more than 50% of the variation in the growth of GSP in these
high performing states. The significance of this finding is consistent with those in the
literature. These models simply state that in states where the level of QOL is high,
increasing the ratio of employment in the public sector increases GSP. The piece missing
from this puzzle is an appreciation of the starting point for these determinations, or what
some prefer to call the initial conditions. When compared to states with low levels of
economic development, the states exhibiting high levels of economic development
already have a lower ratio of employment in the public sector. This might suggest that an
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incremental improvement in staffing yields a benefit in states where the levels of
development are already high. This matter is the discussed in detail in the summary.
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Table 4.16 Top 10 States, Gross State Product vs. Business Climate
Step

Variable

Annual Lag

R-square (Adjusted)

Coefficient

SE( Coeff)

Constant

1

BC_ BHI

2

0.048

NA

NA

NA

2

BC_TAXF

2

0.205

1.238

0.861

0.181

3

BC_DRC-C

2

0.081

NA

NA

NA

4

BC_DRC-P

2

0.046

NA

NA

NA

5

BC- DRC_V

2

0.105

-0.047

0.049

10.498

0.071

0.085

-0.029

0.111

-0.133

0.073

BC-DRC_C
0.462
6

+DRC_P

2

13.539

(0.193)
+ DRC_V

*p<.05; ** p<.01; ***p<.001; n=10.
Economic growth: gross state product vs. business climate, top 10 states.
The findings in Table 4.16 are consistent with the results in Table 4.6. There the
business climate ranking produced by the Tax Foundation predicted 12.5% of the change
in the level of GSP. In this table the Tax Foundation’s measure of business climate is the
only variable able to predict change in the gross state product when the conditions of
economic development are high. However the output did not satisfy the criteria: (p<.05).
It is not until one realizes that the states with the highest levels of development also
exhibit high levels of economic growth, measured both as per capita income and as gross
state product, and that these same states have some of the highest levels of taxation, that
such findings might be mistaken as counter intuitive.
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Table 4.17 Bottom 10 States, Gross State Product vs. Business Climate
Step

Variable

Annual Lag

R-square (Adjusted)

Coefficient

SE( Coeff)

Constant

1

BC_ BHI

2

0.025

NA

NA

NA

2

BC_TAXF

2

0.000

NA

NA

NA

3

BC_DRC-C

2

0.085

0.073

0.085

2.391

4

BC_DRC-P

2

0.015

NA

NA

NA

5

BC- DRC_V

2

0.035

NA

NA

NA

0.095

0.106

-0.061

0.098

-0.015

0.067

BC-DRC_C
0.158
6

+DRC_P

2

5.746

(0.000)
+ DRC_V

*p<.05; ** p<.01; ***p<.001; n=10.
Economic growth: gross state product vs. business climate, bottom 10 states.
In contrast to the conclusions drawn from the results presented in Table 4.13,
which established a viable role for using measures of business climate to predict changes
in the level of per capita income in the low-performing states, no such claim can be made
as to their utility for predicting changes in the GSP within those same states. A
comparison of the results between these tables highlights the difficulty in defining the
utility of these measures: are they to be used to predict changes in the level of per capita
income, or change the GSP? Are they to be used to shape policy in a state with a high
level of economic development, or one in which the level of QOL is hampering chances
of growth?
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Table 4.18 Top 10 States Economic Development vs. Political Climate
Step

Variable

Annual Lag

R-square (Adjusted)

Coefficient

SE( Coeff)

Constant

1

PC_I_RS

5

0.077

7.657

9.358

0.820

2

PC_I_GEMP

10

0.026

NA

NA

NA

3

PC_C_GPP

0

0.160

-0.027

0.022

3.867

PC_I_ RS

5

0.112

8.500

9.941

+ GEMP

10

(0.000)

-0.074

0.139

PC_I_ RS

5

7.923

11.542

-0.072

0.151

0.004

0.026

0.871

4

0.115
5

+ GEMP

10

0.643

(0.000)
+ GPP

5

*p<.05; ** p<.01; ***p<.001; n=10.
Economic development 2005 vs. political climate, top 10 states.
The analysis in Table 4.18 defines whether the measures of political climate can
exhibit a synergistic influence over the level of economic development in states where
the level of development is inherently high. Indications are that the models developed for
this investigation have failed to capture the forces responsible for enhancing the
conditions of development when the levels are already high. One explanation worthy of
exploration (and one that is touched upon in the literature) is whether high-performing
states already possess the political capacity to foster economic development. If this were
found to be the case then it would be logical to expect to find that these state have already
created ways to monitor and manage the Schumpeterian cycles of creative destruction.
Finally, if the theoretical literature is correct, these same states would also have devised
sophisticated checks and balances that mute the influence that a change in the political
climate might have over the prevailing level of development.
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Table 4.19 Bottom 10 States Economic Development vs. Political Climate
Step

Variable

Annual Lag

R-square (Adjusted)

Coefficient

SE( Coeff)

Constant

1

PC_I_RS

5

0.002

NA

NA

NA

2

PC_I_GEMP

10

0.085

NA

NA

NA

3

PC_C_GPP

0

0.002

NA

NA

NA

PC_I_ RS

5

0.140

-14.888

22.132

+ GEMP

10

(0.000)

0.183

0.172

PC_I_ RS

5

-22.225

26.726

0.229

0.199

0.018

0.032

4.430

4

0.183
5

+ GEMP

10

3.579

(0.000)
+ GPP

5

*p<.05; ** p<.01; ***p<.001; n=10.
Economic development 2005 vs. political climate, bottom 10 states.
As was seen in Table 4.8, political ideology is a poor predictor of changes in
economic development. This condition is reflected again in Table 4.19, where the ability
to predict changes in the level of economic development in states when the QOL is low is
nonexistent. The explanation, as to why these models failed to show how changes in the
political ideology of a state might influence levels of economic development when the
level of development is already low, is complex. However, the answer is revealed, at least
in part, by the finding that the majority of states exhibiting low levels of economic
development have state governments that are, by comparison, larger in size. One gets the
sense from the literature that, as the level of employment in the public sector increases,
citizens begin to view the function of government as excessive. It is quite plausible that
as this size of government continues to expand it reaches a tipping point and causes an
opening in one of Kingdon’s (1984) policy windows. If this is what is taking place then it
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is also reasonable to postulate that when citizens become aware that the ratio of
employment in the public sector is above a benchmark, say the national average, they
may judge themselves possessing governments deemed excessive, and begin to seek
remedies that temper any further expansion.
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Table 4.20 Top 10 States Economic Development vs. Business Climate
Step

Variable

Annual Lag

R-square (Adjusted)

Coefficient

SE( Coeff)

Constant

1

BC_ BHI

2

0.233

-0.206

0.107

2.770

2

BC_TAXF

2

0.036

NA

NA

NA

3

BC_DRC-C

2

0.046

NA

NA

NA

4

BC_DRC-P

2

0.517*

0.024*

0.008

3.676

5

BC- DRC_V

2

0.058

NA

NA

NA

0.615

0.001

0.008

(0.422)

-0.032*

0.011

0.006

0.007

BC-DRC_C
6

+DRC_P

2

+ DRC_V

3.752

*p<.05; ** p<.01; ***p<.001; n=10.
Economic development 2005 vs. business climate, top 10 states.
The index of performance, DRC_P, published by CFED is the only variable
expressing an ability to predict changes in the level of economic development in topperforming states. While this appears encouraging, a probe into the components that
CFED uses to construct this index reveals that it shares several of the measures this
investigation adopts to define conditions of economic development. Somewhere nested in
this index is the problem of intervening variables. The index is comprised of over 60
variables so we are unable to selectively sort and delete measures. While the utility of this
measure remains in question, for purposes of consistency, the remainder of this
investigation will continue to analyze the value of using (BC_DRC_P) to predict changes
in the level of economic development.
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Table 4.21 Bottom 10 States Economic Development vs. Business Climate
Step

Variable

Annual Lag

R-square (Adjusted)

Coefficient

SE( Coeff)

Constant

1

BC_ BHI

2

0.089

0.181

0.204

2.774

2

BC_TAXF

2

0.104

0.187

0.194

2.536

3

BC_DRC-C

2

0.140

0.016

0.014

2.497

4

BC_DRC-P

2

0.028

NA

NA

NA

5

BC- DRC_V

2

0.001

NA

NA

NA

0.016

0.018

0.001

0.017

0.001

0.011

BC-DRC_C
0.141
6

+DRC_P

2

2.385

(0.000)
+ DRC_V

*p<.05; ** p<.01; ***p<.001; n=10.
Economic development 2005 vs. business climate, bottom 10 states.
In states where the level of economic development is already low, the measures of
business climate failed to produce a variable that could reliably predict changes in the
level of economic development. The deterioration in ability of (BC_DRC_P) to predict
change in states with low levels of development helps legitimize the earlier decision to
disregard further consideration of this measure.
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Summary: The Role of Business and Political Climate in Predicting Economic
Growth and Development
This discussion summarizes the findings and places them into the context of the two
questions posed by this investigation:
1. Can an indicator of a state’s political climate, defined by measures of its political
ideology and its capacity to manage, improve our ability to predict future growth
and development?
2. Does the index of a state’s business climate correlate with changes in either
economic growth or development?
Table 4.22 provides a simplified method for interpreting these findings. Graphical
symbols are used to summarize, at a glance, how well each variable predicts changes in
each measure of the dependent variable. This table highlights how the individual and
additive measures of political climate (PC_) and business climate (BC_) vary in their
ability to predict changes in levels of economic growth in per capita income (EG_PCI),
changes in economic growth measured as gross state product (EG_GSP), and changes in
the level of economic development defined by the quality of life index (ED_QOL). The
table gauges the explanatory power of each variable to predict the value of each
dependent variable as either the five year average, or as the value assessed in the year
2005. Table 4.22 also provides a glimpse of how the predictive power of the explanatory
variables is influenced by the presence of economic development. The table highlights
the ability of these variables to predict levels of economic growth and development when
the level of economic development is high, top performing states, and when it is low,
bottom performing states.
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While the qualitative definitions of poor, fair, good or very good are arbitrary, the
range assigned to each symbol is found by dividing the range of the R-square results
presented in Tables 4.1 through 4.21 into quartiles. The R-square values used to create
this table ranged from 0.091 to 0.582. All values receiving a rating above ‘poor’
possessed an R-squared value with significance at or above (p<.05). A few of the
relationship rated ‘poor’ may not have satisfied that criterion.
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Variable

Economic Growth as
Gross State Product
EG_GSP

EG_GSP
Top 10

EG_GSP
Bottom 10

Economic Growth as
Per Capita Income
EG_PCI

EG_PCI
Top 10

EG_PCI
Bottom 10

Economic
Development as
Quality of life
ED_QOL

ED_QOL
Top 10

ED_QOL
Bottom 10

Table 4.22 Relative Performance of Political Climate and Business Climate to Predict
Changes in Economic Growth and Economic Development

PC_I_RS

z

z

z

z
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z

z

z

PC_I_GEMP

}



z
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z

z

z

PC_C_GPP

z

z

z

z

z

z

z
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PC_RS +_GEMP
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z

}

z



z

z
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PC_RS +_GEMP +_GPP
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z
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z

z

z

z

z

BC_BHI

z

z
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}

z
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z

z

BC_TAXF

z

z

z

z

z

z

z

z

z

BC_DRC_C

z

z

z

{

z

z

}

z

z

BC_DRC_P

z

z

z

{

z

z





z

BC_DRC_V

z

z

z

z

z

z

z

z

z

z

z

z



z

z



z

z

BC_DRC_C
+_DRC_P
+_DRC_V

= Very Good, R-square values ≥ 0.451

{ = Good, R sq values from 0.301- 0.450

} = Fair, R sq values from 0.151- 0.300

z = Poor, R sq values ≤ 0.150

Note: values greater than ‘poor’ have (p<.05); R-square values at this significance ranged
from 0.091 to 0.582
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The interpretations of the results presented in Table 4.22 are fairly straightforward.
As previously discussed, there are indications of spurious correlations between the
measure of (BC_DRC_P), a measure of economic performance, and the measures used to
create the composite QOL index used by this investigation. The influence of this value is
depicted in the shaded regions of the table. Results in the shaded areas will not be
discussed in the context of these findings.
In terms of answering the questions posed by this investigation:
•

Does the index of a state’s business climate correlate with improvements in either
economic growth or development?
The ability of a business climate indicator to predict levels of economic growth or

development was sporadic. Only two of the five tested in this investigation would seem
be able to answer this question in the affirmative.
The BHI, a measure of a state’s business climate, is able to measure aggregated
changes in the economic development across the states ( R-squared ≥ 0.451). It also
demonstrates the capacity to predict changes in growth when the growth is measured as
per capita income (R-squared range from 0.151- 0.300). The BHI is unable to assess
changes in GSP.
Like the BHI, the measure of business climate defined by the DRC as capacity of
the state to accommodate growth, (BC_DRC_C) is also able to predict levels of economic
development and changes in economic growth expressed as per capita income. This
index of capacity does a slightly better job than the BHI at predicting economic growth
measured as per capita income, and is a bit weaker than the BHI at predicting changes in
the levels of economic development. The ability of the Tax Foundations ranking to
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predict changes in the levels of economic growth was limited to the incidents where
growth was defined as the change in GSP in the states with a high level of economic
development or when growth was defined as per capita income and the state exhibited a
low level of economic development.
•

Can an indicator of a state’s political climate, defined by measures of its political
ideology and its capacity to manage improve our ability to predict future growth
and development?
There are some surprises here as well. The much-touted relationship that suggests

a political ideology of high taxation (PC_I_RS) inhibits levels of economic growth did
not dominate these findings. Table 4.5, step 1 shows how, on an individual basis this
indicator has the capacity to explain 11% of the variation in economic growth measured
as GSP ( R-squared= 0.112, (p<.05)). The influence of taxation is only expressed when it
is combined with the other measure of political ideology (employment in the public
sector). Table 4.5 , step 4 shows how the additive effect of these two measures predicts
changes in the level of economic growth measured as changes in the state’s GSP
(adjusted R-square = 0.274, (p<.01)). When the measure of growth is per capita income,
the combined affect is less pronounced (Table 4.2, step 4, adjusted R-square = 0.167
(p<.01)).
It is clear from these results that the levels of taxation are poor indicators of
economic growth or economic development. The only time the level of taxation came
into the picture was when the growth is measured as the level of per capita income. That
influence is restricted to the states where the level of economic development is low.
While the sample size was low (n=10) indicators are that a 1% increase in taxation
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decreases earnings in those states by approximately $2,000 (Table 4.11. R-squared =
0.574, (p<.01)).
Equally surprising, the political climate variable used to gauge a state’s capacity
to manage its affairs (PC_C_GPP) failed to demonstrate a capability to predict levels of
growth or development.
The overwhelming winner from these iterations was the political climate variable
that defined ideology as the ratio of individuals employed in the public sector of a state.
As seen in Table 4.22, this measure of a states’ political ideology was able to predict
changes in the level of GSP across all states, GSP across the top 10 states, and it
demonstrated the capacity to predict changes in the levels of growth as per capita income
across all states and within the bottom 10. As was the case with the other measures of a
state’s political climate, this measure of political ideology could not reliably predict
changes in the level of economic development.
It is worth noting that in cases where the measure of economic growth was per
capita income, the value of the coefficient attached to the political ideology
(PC_I_GEMP) was negative. However, recall that this measure is an index. The lower the
value the more favorable the conditions are to economic growth. Therefore an increase in
employment index increased its negative effect on growth. In the outputs where growth
was defined by GSP the coefficient remained positive. This suggests that increasing
levels of employment in the public sector increases the value of economic output from
the state. In states where the level of economic development was high, increasing the size
of government was a very attractive strategy (Table 4.14, step 2, R-square= 0.529,
(p<.05)). However, the states with high levels of economic development have ratios of
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employment in the public sector that is below the average for the data set. This
conundrum will be explored in the final chapter.
•

When compared to a measure of business climate how well do these simple
indicators of political climate stack up?
How do they compare in terms of defining economic growth as a change in gross

state product?
In the category of predicting levels of economic growth as gross state product,
Table 4.22 clearly indicates that measure of a state’s political ideology, defined as the
ratio of public sector employees in a state (PC_I_GEMP), outperforms any of the other
measures tested. The favorable predictions seen in the additive models can be attributed
to the contribution of this variable. The only business climate measure able to predict
levels of growth as gross state product was the ranking from the Tax Foundation. Yet that
variable was only successful at defining changes in the GSP of states where the level of
economic development was high (Table 4.16, step 2. R-squared = 0.474, (p<.05)). None
of the variables selected by this investigation are able to predict change in the level of
GSP for bottom-performing states.
How do they compare in terms of defining economic growth as a change in per
capita income?
This same measure of political ideology (PC_I_GEMP) does a credible job of
predicting changes in growth measured as per capita income (Table 4.1, step 2. R-square
= 0.231, (p<.001)). Three out of the five measures of business climate, (BC_BHI),
(BC_DRC_C), and (BC_DRC_ P), as well as the additive model from all the DRC
indices, demonstrate explanatory powers for predicting growth as per capita income that
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were at or above the level achieved with political ideology (PC_I_GEMP). Unlike the
earlier test in which the models failed to predict changes in the level of performance for
GSP in bottom performing states, here the variables are unable to predict changes in
economic growth as per capita income in the top-performing states. In terms of predicting
change in economic growth occurring in the bottom-performing states the measures of
political ideology were rated ‘very good’.
How do they compare in terms of defining economic development?
As seen in Table 4.22 all of the tests used to define the capacity of a state’s
political climate to predict changes in the level of economic development failed. The
DRC’s measure of capacity (_C) and the BHI index of business climate were the only
two measures of business climate suited to predicting changes in economic development.
By far the best indicator for predicting levels of economic development is the BHI index;
however, this same variable only rated fair in its ability to predict changes in economic
growth measured as per capita income and was poor in predicting economic growth as
changes in a state’s GSP.
What measure should we use?
A quick and easy way to assess these values is to assign each level of
performance a numeric value. This can be accomplished by assigning a “1” to a level of
performance judged fair, a “2” to performance judged good and a “3” to performance
level judged very good. Under that scoring system, the state’s political ideology defined
by its level of public sector employment (PC_I _GEMP) scores the highest, receiving a
total of 8 points. The BHI and the Tax Foundation each receive a score of 6 and thus are
in a tie for second.
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When compared to the complex nature of the index used to define a state’s
business climate, the measure of state’s political ideology, defined as the level of
employment in the public sector, has greater explanatory power than any of the other
variables tested. The attraction of this measure resides in its simplicity: it is easy to define,
it exhibits the capacity to measure changes in economic growth occurring at both the
macro level of the economy and the micro-level of the individual, it is easy to benchmark
and it is well within auspices of lawmakers to control. Further refinements of these first
pass models are warranted. The last section of this study ties these findings to the
literature and suggests areas of further investigation.
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION AND AREA OF FUTURE RESEARCH
This investigation determined whether the measures of a state’s business climate
or its political climate can predict changes in the levels of economic growth and
economic development occurring in the American states. These findings also test, in a
small and measured way, whether Schumpeter’s (1934) theory on the role that
governments play in spawning growth can be applied to the economies of the American
states.
The following section should be viewed as a companion to the summary section
that was provided at the end of the previous chapter. Rather than elaborating on the
outputs from the analytical models, this section focuses on connecting the findings from
this investigation to the theory and academic literature that integrates subjects of
economic growth, economic development and politics.
Business Climate as an Indicator of Economic Growth and Development
Fisher’s (2005) investigations into the utility offered by business climate indices
hinted at some of the shortfalls attached to these measures. Apart from their value as a
marketing tool suited to helping promote the benefits of locating a business to a specific
state, the publicized measures of a state’s business climate offer little additional value to
policy makers and politicians. The findings that these indices lack the ability to predict
change in the levels of economic growth or economic development validates Fisher’s
(2005) concern over using these indices as benchmarks to justify changes in economic or
even social policy. While the literature hints at this lack of utility, the outputs from this
investigation provide, perhaps for the first time, a quantifiable basis for rejecting these
indices as benchmarks for altering policies of growth or development.
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As presented in the previous chapter, the political ideology of a state, measured as
its level of taxation, is also a poor indicator of changes in the level of economic growth
occurring within the state. Recall that many of the business climate indices publish their
findings from an ideological bias that positions lowering taxes and decreasing the size of
governments as the prescription for increasing levels of growth. The finding that the level
of state and local tax burden fails to indicate levels of economic growth erodes the
ideological underpinning of many of these published reports. A key conclusion to be
drawn from this investigation is that a policy prescription of lowering taxes and
decreasing the size of government is not a universal cure for improving the conditions of
economic growth.
The findings from this study help expose a few of the reasons that business
climate indices fail to predict changes in the levels of economic growth or development
within a state: several of the variables used to create the index are designed to measure
changes in economic growth; others are designed to measure changes in the levels of
economic development. As pointed out by Vaughn and Bearse (1981) economic growth
and economic development are related but they should not be considered the same thing.
While the measures of business climate may have utility in other areas, their
weakness in terms of predicting changes in economic growth or development can be
traced back to how the variables are collected and how they are incorporated into these
indices. The expansion of the indices of business climate into such complex structures
speaks to the way these indices have embraced Blakely and Bradshaw’s (2002) expanded
definition of what defines growth. However, they seem to have failed to consider how to
design an index that: (a) segregates the causes of economic development or the cause of
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economic growth from the effects of either condition, and (b) differentiates between the
way economic forces and non-economic forces, or political forces, contribute to growth
and development. In a sense, the findings from this investigation can simply be thought
of as a way to get the topic of growth and development grounded. It bring us back to the
basics of understanding how to define and measure growth separate from development
and how to define and measure economic factors separate from non-economic influences.
Political Climate as an Indicator of Economic Growth and Development
Understanding how a state’s political climate influences its prospects for
economic growth or development is best examined from within the context of how
Schumpeter (1934) views incidences of growth. While most of the investigators that have
analyzed Schumpeter’s work put him into the category of a laissez-faire economist, his
suggestion that governments play a legitimate, albeit limited role in enhancing the
prospects for economic growth exposes a chink in that armor. Schumpeter (1934)
proposes that growth is optimal when governments limit their intervention in markets and
only focus on policies that preserve, protect, or restore the quality of life enjoyed by
society. The policy actions that Schumpeter considers to be a legitimate role of
government parallel the measures of QOL this investigation uses to gauge the level of
economic development in a state.
Schumpeter never tested whether the benefits emanating from a cycle of creative
destruction were impacted by the political ideology of government. A glimpse into how
these interactions occur at the state level is revealed in the findings of this investigation.
As noted earlier, the findings from this investigation suggest that variations in measures
that define a state government’s political climate as excessive (Lowery and Berry, 1983)
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measured here as a percent of personal income consumed by state and local taxes,
actually has very little impact on the state’s propensity to grow or on its ability to
improve the quality of life. Quite the opposite is true. States with high levels of taxation
enjoy the highest levels of economic growth and have the best QOL. However, when the
continuum from responsive government to excessive government is gauged from an
ideology of government size we find states with smaller governments enjoying higher
levels of economic growth and economic development (QOL).
This seems to be telling us that the definition of what constitutes measures of
responsive and excessive needs to be refined. It is difficult to justify how you would
judge a state excessive because of high taxes and responsive because of its smaller
government. The fact that many past investigations have made these determinations
based on subjective measures of responsiveness, political factors with high temporal
character (party control, interparty competition), appears to be one of the reasons the
literature continues to wrestle with how such measures might be affecting the scale of
government spending or the rate of its growth. Of course, measures of size and spending
are used throughout the literature to gauge governments along the continuum of being
either responsive or excessive (Kapeluck, 2001).
It is because most governments tend to intervene with markets in limited ways
that the forces of markets, not governments are credited with driving the cycles of
innovation: creation followed by destruction. As these cycles work to cleanse the market
of its least efficient producers, they spawn a rebirth in the economy. The end result is an
increase in the levels of economic growth and the overall quality of life. In market based
economies these cycles of stabilization and destabilization tend to be short lived. Since
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market failures are rarely synchronized across all segments of an economy the impact
that a single market failure has on society is usually quite small. In what we might call
this ‘normal mode’ , the process leading to attrition creates an economic structure that is
more agile; it moves faster, it has a greater capacity to adapt and rebound, and it can be
sustained at a higher plateau for a longer period of time. However, the claim that
capitalistic systems can reconstruct and create growth without intervention seems dubious.
While markets can leverage innovation to reorganize production functions they do
little to mitigate the social impact that occurs during a period of market destruction (Daly,
1994, Milbrath, 1989). During periods of market correction there are aspects associated
with a government’s intervention that need to be better understood. This would include
understanding the impact that various levels of intervention might have over the
prospects for restoring a QOL. Likewise, it would be critical to forecast the impact
coming from different types of intervention. Of course, the idea of timing is equally
important: is intervention defined by a trigger point or is it one of continual vigilance?
For example, if the level of intervention is too high the markets will be buoyed by an
artificial sense of calm. Inefficient producers will be shielded from the fall-out,
innovation will have been curtailed and in its wake, growth will have been slowed. If the
type of intervention is not correct, say by offering broad-based financial incentives rather
than focusing on expanding education, then the vector of economic prosperity will not
have been changed. Finally, if the timing is wrong, here the competing scenarios of too
little too late, or more help than needed both come to mind, then the evolutionary
character that Schumpeter ascribes to economic change will be interrupted. In an attempt
to identify the impact that the first element in this chain of events, the level of
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intervention, might have on growth, this investigation highlights the value that a measure
of political ideology has to predict changes in the levels of growth. It also shows how the
influence of political climate varies between states that exhibit an inherently high level of
economic development and those with low levels of economic development (defined by
the proxy QOL). These tests were developed as a way to glean a bit of information about
how the measure of political climate might be touching on Schumpeter’s cycles.
The results of this study seem to be echoing Howland’s (1993) concerns over
what happens to the prosperity of a region when the policies of growth are based on a
misapplication of neoclassical economic theory. Certainly states such as Iowa would fit
Howland’s definition of an economy where the economic output is derived from a fairly
simple, market-based system. Under those conditions she finds the market-based systems
more rigid and less able to conform to the rule of resiliency as it is stipulated in
neoclassical economic theory. This may explain why states that exhibit some of those
same economic characteristics (small economies), may, from time to time, need to
replace the normal course of growth as it would have otherwise been dictated by free
market processes, creation and destruction, with a level of intervention that is defined by
the political forces. These forces are those of the political culture that are embodied in the
work by Elazar (1984) and are operationally defined in this study as measures of political
climate: ideology and capacity to manage. This may offer a partial explanation for the
finding that as the size of state government increases it continues to have a negative
impact on economic growth measured as per capita income (larger governments impede
growth and economic opportunity within the micro economy of the individual), yet that
same increase within the public sector enhanced the level of economic growth defined at
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the level of the macro economy of a state (Table 4.1, step 2 and Table 4.4, step 2). When
the economy of the state is small and not very complex the effects of intervention would
be expected to vary
As shown in Figure 5.1, several states with high levels of economic development,
high levels of growth and smaller governments have very complex economies (NJ, CT).
Where the level of economic development is high this measure of ideology, government
employment, ceases to be a reliable predictor of growth in per capita income and
becomes a predictor of growth measured as GSP (Tables 4.10 and 4.14). Again, what is
not revealed in these numbers is shown in Figure 5.1. Figure 5.1 depicts the way that
measures of economic development (ED_QOL), economic growth in per capita income
(EG_PCI) and the two measures of political ideology, taxation (PC_I_RS) and
government employment (PC_I_GEMP) have behaved over time. The graph shows how
the behavior of each measure varies with the level of economic development in a state.
States where the initial condition is one of high levels of economic development appear
in this graph in the darker lines. Those with the lowest levels of economic growth are
shown by the lighter shaded lines. Each element of this graph represents the trend of
between 15 and 20 years of data for each variable. For ease of examination these data are
displayed with markers denoting the point of each 5-year average. The revelation here is
that states with a high quality of life enjoy some of the highest levels of economic growth.
These same states have an ideology that seems willing to spend more of their earnings to
support the role of government, yet at the same time the size of the government is smaller
when compared to its counterparts.
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Figure 5. 1 Characterization of Top 10 and Bottom 10 States Ranked in Economic Development
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While there is no indication that any of the measures used by this study to define
the political climate of a state have the capacity to predict levels of economic
development, a different story emerges concerning how well these variables can measure
levels of economic growth.
Across the states, a measure of the state’s political ideology, defined by the
relative size of employment in the public sector, was able to account for between 20%
and 25% ( p<.001) of the variation in economic growth measured as personal income.
When this same independent variable was tested to predict levels of growth in GSP it
remained significant, however, the explanatory power dropped to between 15% and 20%
(p<.01). When tested against the data set that controlled for levels of economic
development, the utility of the variable to predict changes in per capita income in states
where the level of economic development was low, was doubled (Table 4.11, step 2, Rsquared = 0.523, (p<.05)). However, this same independent variable was unable to
predict changes in the level of per capita income when the level of economic
development was high.
This distinction suggests that top tier states operate closer to the optimum point
where the cycles of growth and development are being skillfully synchronized to foster
cycles of creative destruction. Ideally these results should have been easy to tie back to
Singleton and Griswold’s (1999) suggestion that a government’s quality and not its size
is the most important factor for judging the nature of a policy environment. So while the
literature indicates that these results should have highlighted the influential role that a
state’s capacity to manage its affairs had over levels of growth or levels of development,
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the tests to determine the utility of that variable failed to demonstrate any explanatory
powers.
Political Climate, Business Climate and Ways to Change the Level of Economic
Prosperity
While this study failed to reveal a universal prescription for enhancing the
economic future of all states, it is clear that one non-partisan indicator of a state’s
political climate helped to expose the source of a state’s outward bias towards fostering
cycles of economic growth, economic development, or its willingness to languish in a
state of economic stasis. The utility of this variable, the relative size of public sector
employment, lies in its ability to demonstrate how the policies that expand government’s
interaction in free markets limit the capacity of the individuals to improve their economic
well being.
While the models produced in this study provide policy makers with a set of
metrics that are actionable, their real value is found in their utility as a starting point for
manipulating variables under their control, the relative size of government and to a much
lesser extent, the levels of taxation. The ability to understand how a push or pull on one
of these levers impacts levels of economic growth is not something lawmakers currently
possess. Certainly states such as Maine have high taxes, low levels of growth and enjoy a
quality of life on par with the rest of the nation. In states such as these the levels of
taxation may indeed be a lever that needs to be pulled.
Consistent with the work of Erikson, Wright and McIver (1993) it could be
assumed that where the society is deemed liberal it would tend to be more liberal in the
type of policy choices it makes. Under that scenario one expects to find states with higher
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levels of QOL and higher levels of growth willing to see a higher percentage of their
incomes used to expand the role of government. That behavior is seen in the examples
where several of the states with high levels of economic development accept a condition
of higher taxes. The conundrum arises when you look at Figure 5.1 and realize these
same states have smaller not larger governments. The argument that Kapeluck (2001) and
Garand (1993) make in suggesting that states with a political culture judged liberal
increase the size of government in response to the citizens willingness to accept a broader
role for government is not borne out of the findings from this investigation. In fact, a
quick look at Figure 5.1 shows that the states with the lowest levels of economic
development also have the largest governments. While this investigation deliberately
avoids making any attempt to tie its findings to any of the more subjective variables of a
conservative or liberal ideology, it is clear that the states in this category are generally
considered some of the more conservative southern states: Louisiana , Alabama, South
Carolina. The conclusion here is really a note of caution: looking at the economic policies
that improve growth through a lens that defines governments as responsive or excessive
is ill advised. Clearly, the complexity of the local political scene, the interaction of the
politics with the local economy, and the size and structure of the economy of the state
need to be taken into account. It seems growth may not be a factor amendable to being
judged by the political ideologies when they are measured from within a party affiliation,
interest groups, excessive or responsive governments and the like.
The sense from this investigation is that the political factors of importance are
those that express the capacity of the government to manage within the constraints of the
size and complexity of its economy. In large complex economies the ability to measure
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the importance of a government’s capacity to manage appears to be muted by the size of
economy itself. That is not to suggest the capacity of a state’s government to manage is
not important. What is being measured by Pew and others may not be capturing the
significance elements that are important for each government to manage. While all states
acknowledge the need to improve their capacity to manage, there is an uncertainty as to
what it is they need to be managing. This may explain why the capacity to manage did
not emerge from this investigation as a measure that supports economic growth or
development. For example this study found that in states with large complex economies,
New Jersey and Massachusetts, the critical mass needed to effectively manage the public
sector is smaller than in states where the economy is less complex. One explanation for
this is offered in neoclassical economic theory: the more complex the market the more
resilient the economy. These markets create, in a Schumpeterian way, a level of growth
that also accelerates the individual’s quality of life. Over time these complex economies
‘learn’ and eventually become synchronized with or play a leadership role in the policy
arena. Under these conditions government’s can focus on improving infrastructure and
creating the type of social change that supports innovation and economic growth.
Through this evolutionary process governments appear to have an opportunity to become
more efficient when compared to states where the economies are small and the markets
less resilient. The states with lower levels of economic diversity appear to have limited
options for creating economic strategies. These less complex economic structures also
minimize the opportunities for governments to outsource certain functions. The changes
that occur within these less complex economies are readily explained by the public’s
desire to open one of Kingdon’s (1984) policy windows. Changes in the levels of
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economic growth may not be the result of market failures or even how they are handled:
rather it may be the result of a misapplication of economic theory. Whenever the
economic conditions prevent markets from managing growth and development it appears
the only remedy is political intervention.
While the findings support Schumpeter’s basic assumptions that smaller
governments lead to more vibrant economies, they failed to highlight the role that a
measure of a government’s capacity to manage, an indication of the quality of the
institution, plays in sustaining economic growth. Like the conclusions from Dye’s (1980)
works, this study asserts that the level of taxation has little influence over the incidences
of economic growth.
One of the most significant discoveries of this study was the finding that the
politics deemed conducive to economic growth take nearly a decade to translate into a
measure of growth. As such, a state’s economic policies must be able to weather the
storms of several political seasons.
Regardless of whether the failure to adopt a longer planning horizon is due to a
change in political administrations, lack of political will, or the inability to manage the
affairs of government the outcome is always the same: as citizens seek to reelect those
candidates that have demonstrated an ability to improve the qualitative measures that
improve their quality of life the political capital of that regime is retained. The antithesis
is also true; by failing to understand the benefit of enduring short term losses for the
longer gains that accrue from periods of economic growth, the electorate routinely
bypasses those candidates best qualified to orchestrate the cycles of change that are
needed to rekindle growth. By default this leads to a dichotomy of ideologies; those
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seeking to expand the role of government and those that view government as the
facilitator of market forces.
In summary, changing a state’s economic fortunes starts when the citizens express
a willingness to abandon a monolithic approach towards electing politicians from within
a party and begin electing politicians that demonstrate a pragmatic approach to
governing: consensus building. Given the long time frames this investigation has
assigned to the benefit streams of economic policies within a state, the capacity to work
across party lines appears to offer the best opportunity for having continuity in these
policies.
Only then can we be assured that our elected officials will be effective and able to
enact the economic strategies than benefit both the constituency and their progeny.
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APPENDIX A: SUMMARY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT THEORIES
Summary of Economic Development Theories
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Theory

Basic Categories

Definition of
Development

Economic Base

Export or basic and
non-basic, local or
residentiary sectors

Increasing rate of
Response to external changes in
growth in output,
demand; economic base multiplier
income or employment effects

Staple

Exporting industries

Export-led economic
growth

Sector

Primary, secondary,
and tertiary sectors

Income elasticity of demand and labor Empirical analysis possible. Categories are too
Greater sectoral
diversity and higher
productivity in primary and secondary general
productivity per worker sectors

Promote sectoral shifts. Attract and retain producers of
income elastic products

Growth Pole

Industries

Propulsive industry
growth leads to
structural change

Growth center strategies

Regional
Concentration and
Diffusion

Higher income per
Commodities and
capita
factors (Myrdal) or
industries (Hirschman)

Neoclassical Growth Aggregate (macro) or Increasing rate of
economic growth per
two-sector regional
capita
economy

Essential Dynamic

Strengths and Weaknesses

Application

Most popular understanding of economic
development in the United States and a simple tool
for short-term prediction. Inadequate theory for
understanding long-term development

Industrial recruitment and promotion for export expansion and
diversification, expansion of existing basic industries, import
substitution by strengthening connections between basic and
non-basic industries, and infrastructure development for
export expansion

Successful production and marketing Historical perspective on economic
of the export staple in world
development. Descriptive theory difficult to apply
markets. External investment in and
the demand for the export staple

Build on export specialization. State does everything possible
to increase competitive advantage. Character of economic
base shapes political and cultural superstructure

Propulsive industries are the poles of
growth

General theory of initiation and diffusion of
development based on the domination effect

Spread and backwash effects (Myrdal) Address the dynamics of development
or trickle-down and polarization
effects (Hirschman)

Active government to mitigate backwash effects and reduce
inequalities (Myrdal). Location of public investments spurs
development (Hirschman)

Rate of saving that supports
investment and capital formation

Supply-side model

Government should promote free trade and economic
integration and tolerate social inequality and spatial dualism
Government intervention should promote free trade.
Infrastructure development, efficient local government

Interregional Trade

Prices and quantities
of commodities and
factors

Economic growth that
leads to greater
consumer welfare

Price adjustments that result in
equilibrium terms of trade; pricequantity-effects

Unique emphasis on consumer welfare and price
effects. Ignores the dynamics of development

Product Cycle

Products: new,
maturing, or
standardized

Continual creation and
diffusion of new
products

New product development;
innovation

Popular basis for understanding development among Development strategies promote product innovation and
subsequent diffusion
researchers

Entrepreneurship

Entrepreneurs or the
entrepreneurial
function

Resilience and
diversity

Innovation process; new
combinations

Mediated theory

Support industrial milieu or ecology for development

Flexible
Specialization

Production regimes,
industrial
organization

Sustained growth
through agile
production, innovation
and specialization

Changes in demand requiring
flexibility among producers

Detailed analysis of firm/industry organization;
aggregate outcomes and relationships seldom
specified

Encourage flexibility through adoption of advanced
technologies, networks among small firms, and industry
cluster strategies

Source: Malizia and Feser (1999). Understanding Local Economic Development.
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APPENDIX B: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: AVERAGE 2001 TO 2005 (EXCEPT AS NOTED *)

Variable

N of
Cases

EG_PCI
EG_GSP

50
50

23288.400
2.006

44185.200
9.524

50

1.210

4.000

2.790

2.416

0.715

50

0.066

0.133

0.067

0.103

0.012

50

1.000

4.000

3.000

2.072

0.961

50
50

69.667
2.893

92.000
7.083

22.333
4.190

81.207
5.005

5.023
0.938

50

1.000

49.600

48.600

25.500

14.467

50
50
50

50.000
50.000
52.143

97.000
97.000
97.000

47.000
47.000
44.857

76.986
76.963
77.197

12.984
13.177
11.766

ED_QOL
PC_I_RS
205

PC_I_GEMP
PC_C_GPP
BC_BHI *
BC_TAXF
BC_DRC_C**
BC_DRC_P**
BC_DRC_V**

Minimum Maximum

Range

Average

20896.800 30894.988
7.518
5.314

* The BHI average was for 3 years
** The DRC average was over 7 years
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Standard
Deviation
4431.671
1.377

Note
Dollars
Percent
Index 1.0 to
4.0
Percent
Index 1.0 to
4.0
1-100
Index 1-10
Rank 1 to
50
50-100
50-100
50-100

APPENDIX C: CORRELATION TABLE 2005 DATA
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Pearson Correlation Matrix
¦
_2005_PC_I_G_E
¦ _2005_ED_QOL
_2005_EG_GSP
_2005_EG_PCI
_2005_PC_I_RS
MP
------------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------_2005_ED_QOL
¦
1.000
0.142
-0.606
-0.153
0.133
_2005_EG_GSP
¦
0.142
1.000
-0.115
-0.339
0.179
_2005_EG_PCI
¦
-0.606
-0.115
1.000
0.056
-0.023
_2005_PC_I_RS
¦
-0.153
-0.339
0.056
1.000
-0.079
_2005_PC_I_G_EMP ¦
0.133
0.179
-0.023
-0.079
1.000
_2005_PC_W_GPP
¦
-0.071
-0.023
-0.130
0.164
-0.098
_2004_BC_DRC_P
¦
0.082
-0.163
-0.076
-0.027
-0.484
_2004_BC_DRC_C
¦
0.026
-0.185
-0.171
0.054
-0.375
_2004_BC_DRC_V
¦
-0.068
-0.119
-0.038
0.214
-0.489
_2005_BC_BHI
¦
-0.653
0.049
0.466
-0.241
-0.197
_2004_BC_TAXF_IDX ¦
0.035
0.366
0.070
-0.708
0.262
¦
¦ _2005_PC_W_GPP
_2004_BC_DRC_P
_2004_BC_DRC_C
_2004_BC_DRC_V
_2005_BC_BHI
------------------+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------_2005_ED_QOL
¦
-0.071
0.082
0.026
-0.068
-0.653
_2005_EG_GSP
¦
-0.023
-0.163
-0.185
-0.119
0.049
_2005_EG_PCI
¦
-0.130
-0.076
-0.171
-0.038
0.466
_2005_PC_I_RS
¦
0.164
-0.027
0.054
0.214
-0.241
_2005_PC_I_G_EMP ¦
-0.098
-0.484
-0.375
-0.489
-0.197
_2005_PC_W_GPP
¦
1.000
0.137
0.324
0.211
0.246
_2004_BC_DRC_P
¦
0.137
1.000
0.509
0.090
0.071
_2004_BC_DRC_C
¦
0.324
0.509
1.000
0.553
0.081
_2004_BC_DRC_V
¦
0.211
0.090
0.553
1.000
0.089
_2005_BC_BHI
¦
0.246
0.071
0.081
0.089
1.000
_2004_BC_TAXF_IDX ¦
-0.017
-0.202
-0.099
-0.183
0.261
¦ _2004_BC_TAXF_¦
IDX
------------------+---------------_2005_ED_QOL
¦
0.035
_2005_EG_GSP
¦
0.366
_2005_EG_PCI
¦
0.070
_2005_PC_I_RS
¦
-0.708
_2005_PC_I_G_EMP ¦
0.262
_2005_PC_W_GPP
¦
-0.017
_2004_BC_DRC_P
¦
-0.202
_2004_BC_DRC_C
¦
-0.099
_2004_BC_DRC_V
¦
-0.183
_2005_BC_BHI
¦
0.261
_2004_BC_TAXF_IDX ¦
1.000
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